Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, August 5, 1963, 8 p.m.

475. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Ambassador. Secretary McNamara accompanied by Hillenbrand saw Chancellor this morning for one hour 40 minutes.¹ Although Chancellor wandered considerably over current political scene and back through history, main points which emerged were:

1. Still has very great difficulties with effect of Test Ban Treaty on status of Ger, but emphasis, at least in his own mind appears to have shifted from Articles II and III of treaty to Article IV with its reference to exercise of “national sovereignty.”

2. While admitting apparent present success for U.S. policy in signing of partial test ban, he feels it will prove to be essentially a Soviet success in long run and that ceremonial signing today in Moscow constitutes a political victory for Khrushchev which will greatly enhance his prestige. On German adherence, although he was not entirely clear, he apparently anticipates doing nothing definitive until after Bundestag reconvenes October 9.

4. He believes American policy suffers from credulousness about Soviet intentions as well as from being erratic. In this connection, he was critical both of State Department and his own Foreign Office.

5. With reference to Sino-Soviet dispute, he believes present U.S. tactic of attempting to exploit it is mistake and that best policy for West would be simply let Russians and Chinese fight it out among themselves.

6. According to Chancellor, who cited this as example of Soviet duplicity, Khrushchev had a few weeks ago indicated to Germans that he would be willing to pay visit to Bonn and to negotiate seriously with Federal Republic. (Chancellor requested that this information be considered as highly confidential.)

Chancellor began his opening remarks, which lasted 57 minutes, by saying that he wanted to be considered as belonging to those Allies who always state the truth and speak frankly. These were the best Allies. In his recent press conference, President Kennedy had shown that he was not correctly informed, the Chancellor stated.² The President had indicated that the language of the Test Ban Treaty had been on the table for a full year and that now all of a sudden people seemed to be excited about it. The Chancellor noted that in the Geneva text there was only one depository. Now, however, there were three depositories, because one hoped in this way to avoid the GDR recognition problem. What worried the German Government was Article IV of the treaty, which stipulated that it was of unlimited duration but that each party, in exercising its “national sovereignty”, would have the right to withdraw from the treaty under certain circumstances. This reference to “national sovereignty” would, upon GDR adherence to the treaty, clearly constitute an express recognition of the “national sovereignty” of the GDR. It would create an unfortunate precedent which could not be repudiated in any subsequent treaties which might now come from the Moscow talks. Under longstanding agreements, the U.S. recognized the Federal Republic as the only government entitled to speak for the German people as a whole, but now the GDR would be recognized as a sovereign area.

He could only say, the Chancellor continued, that the U.S. had sold this great concession too cheaply, much too cheaply. With the signing of the treaty in Moscow the U.S. “very probably” had a certain success. Some 30 countries had already indicated their readiness to adhere. But such an initial success was not necessarily a final success.

At this point Chancellor went off on a lengthy excursion combining references to Bismarck’s fear of the Russians on the Elbe, the parlous state of political situation in Italy and in France (if De Gaulle were to be assassinated or to die) and his great distrust of the political sense of the late Pope John XXIII who did not appreciate the nature of the Communist danger. His conclusion was that, if confidence were lost in the wisdom and foresight of U.S. policy, Western Europe would be lost.

He was convinced, the Chancellor said, that these various considerations had not been brought to the President’s attention before the signing of the Moscow treaty today. He did not believe that Mr. Harriman or Lord Hailsham³ (he described the latter as always living far removed from the Holy Spirit) understood the significance of what was happening. The Chancellor expressed his concern that the State Department was not what it had been under John Foster Dulles, that policy now seemed to be more erratic and not as well considered. Since contacts were still close between the German and American Governments, he had a personal feeling that this was the case. He did not wish to mix in purely U.S. interests, but he felt this was a matter of common interest. For example, he did not know why the U.S. seemed to attach so much importance to appearing to the Chinese as a good friend of Khrushchev. He thought this was a mistake; Khrushchev could come to an agreement with the Chinese tomorrow. Basically the Soviets and Chinese were offshoots of the same tree.

As far as FedRep adherence to the Test Ban Treaty was concerned, the Chancellor continued, this must be approved by the Bundestag which was now in summer recess. Its vacation ends on October 9. To call the Bundestag into special session now would be inopportune. It would merely cause excitement, and he could not be sure what its attitude would be on the treaty. He knew that CDU floor leader Von Brentano had the same views as he (the Chancellor). However, this was not the view of Foreign Minister Schroeder, who in his general judgment was somewhat softer.

The Chancellor noted that Schroeder, in a letter of August 1,⁴ had proposed that, to ease the German accession problem, Secretary of State Rusk should make a statement in Moscow. Under Secretary Ball had indicated to the German Charge in Washington⁵ that this would not be possible but that such a statement might be made on August 12 before the U.S. Senate. Here the Chancellor speculated about whether or not the U.S. Senate would ratify the Test Ban Treaty, and concluded that he didn’t know. In any event, the German Federal Republic would not want to do anything that would make the position more difficult. However the German press (here the Chancellor noted a number of papers by name including the Springer papers) was strongly against German adherence to the Test Ban Treaty. The Federal Government was being very reserved on the subject, but could not keep the press quiet.

Apart from the British, no European countries had been consulted in advance, the Chancellor pointed out. Some would say that to end explosions in the atmosphere or in outer space was a blessing, but such explosions would continue underground which was closer physically to people on earth than explosions behind the moon.

The Chancellor said he feared for the fact that the talks in Moscow would continue for a week. The Chancellor recounted that on August 13, 1961, when the wall was built in Berlin, Brandt went immediately to the U.S. Commandant and asked that something be done to stop it. He had to wait 60 hours for an answer, and then the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow had said to the German Ambassador “thank God for the wall, it will help to solve the refugee problem.” The Chancellor said he had refrained from saying any of these things publicly to date because of the obvious bad effect it would have. When he was in Washington late in 1961, he had repeated the remarks attributed to the American Ambassador in Moscow to Ambassador Grewe. The latter said he was not surprised since he had heard the same views in the State Department. He did not believe that the U.S. properly understood the danger of Communism. He then, somewhat irrelevantly, cited a conversation which he had had last year with Eleanor Dulles, sister of the late Secretary of State, who, in response to a query of his as to whether the State Department had any greater influence over policy than before, had replied “no more than last year.”

Here again the Chancellor went off on a historical excursion covering the Mongol invasions of Europe and the 300 years of Turkish occupation of Hungary and Greece, as a prelude to making the point that, if the hordes from the East had overrun Europe before, they could do it again. The U.S. simply did not understand the nature of the danger in Europe. Our major preoccupation was Latin America, but the danger of Communism existed in the entire world. He was concerned about the fate of the free world, which included the U.S., in an era of interrelated interests.

After expressing the great personal prestige which the Chancellor enjoyed in the U.S. because of his role in creating the Federal Republic, Secretary McNamara referred to the President’s statement during his recent visit here that the German border was our border and German freedom was our freedom. We were willing to risk our cities to protect German cities. This was the essence of our foreign policy and it was shared by all of the ranking officials of the U.S. Government, including those in the State Department. Moreover, the President, more than any other leader in recent years, has recognized that we must conduct our foreign policy on the basis of growing military strength. We had increased our military budget annually by $9 billion, and with all our budgetary deficit and balance-of-payments problems, had expanded our defense expenditures more than $30 billion since the present administration had come into office. This had greatly increased our military strength. It had made it possible for us to respond as we had in Cuba, and meant that we were in a better position to defend Europe. As a result of this, Secretary McNamara continued, we believe the Soviets were forced to act as they had both with respect to their relations with the West and Red China. We were putting them under ever greater pressure, both economically and politically. Our growing military strength was thus inevitably strengthening the foreign policy of the U.S. and the West.

The Chancellor commented that we were doing all we could to achieve this result, but he feared we were too credulous about Soviet intentions. Secretary McNamara referred to the alleged remark by Khrushchev during his U.S. visit that his grandchildren would bury us. His views remain now what they were then. We had no illusions about this; only the military power of West could prevent Soviet achievement of its objectives. He did not believe there was any difference in German or U.S. ultimate objectives. We thought we could bring pressure to bear on the Soviets which would deepen the rift with the Red Chinese and force their policy in a direction more favorable to our objectives. It was in the Western interest to use this means of leverage.

Here the Chancellor said he wanted to tell Secretary McNamara something on a strictly confidential basis. A few weeks ago Mr. Khrushchev had informed him that he was ready to come to Bonn and negotiate with the Federal Republic. This proved he would negotiate with anyone. He feared that, through the Moscow agreement,⁶ we were causing differences among the Allies and not helping to strengthen their confidence in the U.S. This was regrettable. Some of the satellites which had recently been showing signs of moving away from Moscow would not be impressed by apparent American favoring of Khrushchev. The ceremonies in Moscow today were bound to strengthen the Soviets. Why could we not have insisted that Mr. Gromyko come to Washington for the signing, the Chancellor asked. Instead Moscow was made the center of foreign policy. This was bound to have a lasting and beneficial effect on the Soviets and cost them nothing. They could claim that the beginning of a new era took place in Moscow. He considered the U.S. judgment in this matter as lacking in true appreciation of the situation as that of Pope John XXIII when he received Khrushchev.

Secretary McNamara said the Chancellor would surely recognize that the tensions in the Communist movement worldwide were greater than at any time in past five or ten years. The struggle for control between Red China and the Soviet Union was being heightened by the test ban negotiations and signing of the treaty in Moscow. The Chancellor argued that, on the contrary, he felt the U.S. was helping Khrushchev and that this would lessen tensions between the Red Chinese and the Soviet Union. He asked again why the signing ceremony had not taken place in Washington. Secretary McNamara observed that we were forcing the Communists all over the world to take sides between the Red Chinese and the Soviet Union and that, in practice we now had two Communist Parties in many countries instead of one. The Chancellor said Mr. McNamara would surely agree that the Western powers had no interest in giving material support to Khrushchev. The Red Chinese danger was for the future, the Soviet danger was in the present. Yet the U.S. was now strengthening Khrushchev’s position. Anything like the Moscow treaty would have been impossible six years ago.

Secretary McNamara cited the record over the past 24 months of the increasing nuclear warhead strength of our strategic alert forces, the increase contemplated in this category for the next 24 months, and the increase in the past 24 months of warhead strength in Europe. Without waiting for a translation, the Chancellor again asked why we helped enhance the status of Khrushchev and strengthen the self-confidence of those who were beginning to doubt in his entourage.

After a further exchange as to whether our policy was strengthening the Communists or tending to divide them by forcing them to choose, Secretary McNamara said that, at any rate, the Chancellor would recognize the need for agreement on a continued increase of Western military strength. He was sure the Federal Republic would continue to move in this direction and encourage other Allies to do likewise. The Chancellor said his purpose today was to infect the Defense Secretary with mistrust of the Soviets. Secretary McNamara commented that we must never mistrust the purpose and policy of our Allies.

The Chancellor at this point invited Secretary McNamara briefly to give his impressions of his recent trip to Germany, so that there would be something which could be told to the press. He did not want to reveal that the test ban and related matters had been the principal subject of conversation. After further discussion, Federal press chief Von Hase was called in and the general line agreed that Secretary McNamara had informed the Chancellor of the impressions which he had gained during his visit to the Federal Republic and of the results of his talks with Defense Minister von Hassel. The U.S. Secretary of Defense had expressed his satisfaction with the results of these talks and the agreements reached, which were designed to strengthen the U.S. and German forces. He and the Defense Minister had agreed on the continuing need to maintain and to increase the defensive strength of the Western Alliance.

Department please repeat to Moscow as appropriate.

McGhee

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–4. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:15 p.m. and relayed to the White House. Repeated to Berlin.
1. McNamara was in Europe visiting U.S. military installations.
2. For a transcript of the President’s August 1 news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 612–619.
3. Lord President of the Council and Minister of Science for the United Kingdom.
4. A copy of this letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
5. A memorandum of this conversation on August 3 is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
6. The nuclear test ban agreement.