202. Memorandum of Meeting0
The President met with Secretary Rusk in the Cabinet Room to discuss the Secretary’s trip to Moscow. Also present were: Messrs. Ball, [Page 545] Harriman, Foster, Thompson, Bundy, Kaysen, Davis, Read. The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes.
The Secretary went through the points listed in Mr. Thompson’s memorandum of August 1 on the agenda for the Secretary’s visit to Moscow.1 The following points received particular emphasis in the discussions:
[Here follows discussion of bombs in orbit, Laos, a possible Khrushchev visit to the United Nations, trade, bilateral U.S.-Soviet issues, and Cuba.]
- 7.
- The discussion then moved on to non-aggression arrangements (2). The President made a number of points. First, while there appeared to be little in such arrangements for us, we should keep an affirmative position and try to maintain the mood which Harriman’s visit created. On the other hand, it was clear that we had to get finished with the test ban treaty before we could do anything further on this subject. It was important to find out what the Soviets saw in this proposition, and whether such arrangements could give us additional security in Berlin.
- 8.
- He asked for Mr. Thompson’s comments, and Mr. Thompson pointed out the disadvantages of any non-aggression arrangement in its impact on the Allies and in particular the Germans. The President noted that Mr. Harriman had a different view and asked him to state it. Mr. Harriman pointed out the consequences of a detente in permitting a further loosening of ties between the satellites and the Soviet Union. This would apply to East Germany as well, and make more possible an improvement in the East German situation along the lines that Brandt had asked for. He spoke of Khrushchev’s concern over a possible repetition of the 1953 uprising in East Germany, and urged that we had the same concern. Secretary Rusk commented on the Italian reaction to the proposals for a non-aggression pact in terms of this as a further step in legitimatizing the Italian Communist Party.
- 9.
- The President observed that while Berlin was not now in trouble and in his judgment, did not seem likely to be in the near future, the connection between an improvement in the Berlin situation and a non-aggression pact was one that was useful for us to maintain in terms of our relations with the Germans. The President said that while it was important to deal with the West German problem, he thought that Kohler’s views were too negative, and we should have a more positive attitude. Mr. Thompson pointed out again the difficulties which a non-aggression pact would create in the Alliance and its effect in discouraging hope in East Germany, and suggested that if we ran up against a dead end in our negotiations with the Allies, we might try unilateral NATO declarations. [Page 546] On the other hand, he agreed that if we could make a gain in Berlin, it would be useful, and warned that it is likely that the Soviets will soon incorporate East Berlin into East Germany if they do not get a non-aggression pact. The Secretary doubted whether a mere declaration by NATO would answer Khrushchev’s needs.
- 10.
- Discussion then turned to the problems of getting the Federal Republic to sign the test ban treaty. The President said he thought it is very important to get them to sign, both from a domestic point of view and from the point of view of the Soviets. There were some discussions of the way that the questions raised by the Germans in the last few days could be answered. The Secretary said that these questions reflected as much on Von Brentano’s political attitude toward Schroeder as they did the concerns of the German Government in general. The Secretary pointed out that while Von Brentano was Foreign Minister, Germany had adhered to several conventions to which East Germany had also adhered. Further, Secretary of State Dulles had taken note of East Germany’s adherence to the Prisoner-of-War Convention and stated that on this matter, the U.S. was in treaty relations with East Germany.
It was agreed that the Secretary should not say anything on East German adherence at the time the treaty was signed, in view of what the President had already said at his press conference. We could make it plain to the Soviets that we would treat East Germany as they proposed to treat Taiwan. It was left unclear as to whether this point should be communicated to the Federal Republic now, or wait til later.