Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, December 6, 1962, 15:21 p.m.

1340. Paris also pass USRO. Ref: Bonn’s 1440.¹ Subject: Berlin: Advance Notification for Autobahn Convoys.

1. I have reviewed recommendations submitted by you, Berlin, and General Norstad concerning our reaction to statement by Sergin on November 14 that US would thereafter have to submit advance notification for convoys of more than five vehicles. In doing this, I have taken into account views expressed by French and British.

2. US objectives regarding convoy procedures remain those set forth in Deptel 76 to Bonn, dated July 10:² (a) to reach Allied agreement on convoy procedures related to inspection, dismounting, and advance notification and (b) to gain Soviet acceptance of or acquiescence in these Allied procedures.

3. From an analysis of messages from Berlin, Bonn, and Paris and our talks with British and French here, it would appear that we are at present confronted with following alternatives:

a. French would prefer not to send any note to Soviets and favor finessing issue by not sending six or seven vehicle convoys.

b. British favor note to Soviets, with oral comment that Allies hereafter will give notification on eight or more vehicles. British here indicate they might be prepared to see US, after suitable wait, send six or seven vehicle convoy, to test Soviet intentions. We agree with Bonn and Berlin that British probably hope Soviets will engage US in dialogue over convoy procedures.

c. You and General Norstad have recommended use of note contained Paris 2252.³ Although you do not say so specifically, I understand you would propose to follow this at suitable point with convoy of more than five vehicles.

d. Soviets have proposed that hereafter convoys of more than five vehicles (not counting escort vehicle) give advance notification. (We recall in this regard that this is number of vehicles proposed by US and French Berlin Missions to British in June. See BQD CC–18.)⁴

4. If written note were sent to Soviets, I believe it would be important to follow it up with convoy of six or seven vehicles, in order to back up our words with action. If such a convoy were sent, I agree that we should be prepared to invoke Rules of Conduct for Allied autobahn convoys (SHLO 600/128).⁵ If we start down this road, I agree with General Norstad that we should have as much support as possible from British and French.

5. Advantage of this course of action is that it would demonstrate to Soviets that we are unwilling accept unilateral Soviet demands regarding convoy procedures.

6. Disadvantage would be that, if Rules of Conduct implemented, we would have precipitated crisis over issue on which it might be hard to maintain Allied unity.

7. On balance we prefer not to precipitate issue by sending more than five vehicle convoy without advance notification at this time but neither do we wish to foreclose resort to this alternative at a later point in time. We recognize, of course, that prolonged delay in sending six or seven vehicle convoy without notification will tend to rigidify our position, but we are prepared to accept this risk. Total picture of Soviet position post-Cuba is still in process of emerging and we should like to retain as much flexibility as possible to stiffen our position on access if need be without at this time forcing issue of notification to a head.

8. You should, therefore, inform British and French that, although we shall reserve the right to do so at a later date, we do not plan at this time to send any further six or seven vehicle convoys. In your discretion, you should also (after informing the British and French) take advantage of next five vehicle convoy to make statement orally at Babelsberg checkpoint along lines message proposed by General Norstad. This should preferably be made by American officer to Soviet officer.

9. We are not transmitting this information to British or French in Ambassadorial Group, and would prefer to keep consultation on this subject in Bonn. Believe it advisable also that you include Germans or at least keep them informed.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/11–2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Ausland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Bundy (in substance), Nitze, Thompson, Davis, and Weiss (all in draft); and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
1. In telegram 1440, November 29, Dowling supported the views expressed at a meeting with General Norstad on November 27 for unrestricted access to Berlin, but noted that Allied procedures differed on notifying the Soviets about convoys to Berlin. He stressed the need to resolve the question of notification without further extensive delay. (Ibid.)
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 762.54/7–662)
3. Dated November 28. (Ibid., 762.54/11–2862) The 4-paragraph note reiterated Allied rights to unrestricted access to Berlin.
4. A copy of this paper is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
5. A copy of this paper, dated August 28, was attached to an August 30 memorandum from Norstad to six commands in Europe. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Germany)