Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

159. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, December 3, 1962, 23 p.m.

1415. Embtel 1410.¹ Following is detailed report conversation with Semenov December 3 at which Sukhodrev served as interpreter.

At outset substantive portion conversation, I expressed interest in fact that both Mikoyan, in conversation with President,² and Semenov had indicated Cuban experience was not without implications for German problem. Semenov replied exchange of letters between President and Khrushchev³ had mentioned problems other than Cuba, specifically nuclear testing in first instance and disarmament. According his recollection issue of G/B touched upon. Semenov said peaceful resolution of Cuban problem did not automatically mean other problems could similarly be solved. I noted that question of G/B not really dwelt on in exchange of letters, but only one element entering into discussions of past year seemed to be singled out, namely NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship. Semenov replied this did not lessen urgency of resolution problem West Berlin since forces involved which could get out of control. Pet project of Strauss has always been bring US and USSR into direct confrontation in West Berlin. Strauss has gone but his theme remains with Weinstein serving as principal instrument of pursuit this policy. I said I had many discussions with Strauss and never heard anything along lines mentioned by Semenov.

I pointed out US interest is workable solution of Berlin problem. Thus far, however, USSR proposed four formulae which emphasized word “temporary” and which constituted variation on theme to oust US from West Berlin. Semenov said that this view incorrect and that Soviets not attempting get someone out of Berlin and assured me this is view of Soviet Government. If he reported to Soviet leaders that aim was to oust US, they would say it isn’t so. It is not question of pushing US out but normalizing situation in West Berlin. I itemized four formulae presented by Soviets and said these contained no element of compromise. They all involved the withdrawal of Western forces either now or in future. Such an event would completely remove protection now accorded West Berlin and this was certainly one of most dangerous developments that could occur in Central Europe.

Recalling previous conversations, Semenov said political-social system in East Berlin same as in GDR. On other hand, West Berlin has social system differing completely with that within GDR. Thus there are now three separate entities in Germany, consisting of West Germany, GDR and West Berlin. An attempt must be made to assure peaceful coexistence these three entities. One can only speak of protection when an attack against something is contemplated, which is not the case. USSR believes West Berlin should be free and independent as long as sovereign rights GDR protected. Neither USSR nor GDR has slightest need for West Berlin and both are prepared provide guarantees to West Berlin. US believes guarantees should be in form of troop contingents. Although USSR does not think so, it is willing to meet US half way. US side itself has said troops should not remain in West Berlin ad infinitum; therefore US also recognizes principle of temporariness of troops. In essence question is one of peaceful coexistence in which both sides will observe international obligations. USSR wishes to see greater degree of trust and to insure that events do not lead to explosion. Latest events attest to fact that this is reasonable position.

I agreed trust desirable if explosion to be avoided. Speaking frankly, however, Cuban situation has improved matters in this regard. Our aim must be seek guarantees which are obvious and self-enforcing. In broader context, problem is less how several parts divided Germany will live together than how US and USSR will live side by side. USSR can have peaceful existence in this area and has it at moment because both sides are observing mutual obligations. Attempt by USSR however to oust Western presence from West Berlin contrary to mutual obligations and peaceful coexistence. If two sides can’t coexist peacefully in Berlin, question arises what this term means.

Semenov said general question of peaceful coexistence between USSR and US involves broad issues which would involve wide exchange of views. His personal attitude toward me made such an exchange possible and he would do utmost to have frank discussions, proceeding from normal positions of both governments.

Semenov said developments in G/B are of concern to USSR since they have evolved in abnormal manner. In instances where troops are in direct confrontation with each other, situation could become dangerous should, for example, officer on either side undertake irrational act or should third parties continue their provocations. USSR intends to ensure freedom of West Berlin and to permit it to have ties with all countries. Development should proceed in such way as to preclude collision because this could have dangerous implications, especially since West Berlin located in heart of Europe. Soviet Union preoccupied by militaristic and revanchist tendencies in both West Germany and West Berlin. USSR worried and preoccupied not because it is afraid but because these forces are seeking to set US and USSR against each other. In past ten years these tendencies have strengthened and problem must be viewed not only with respect to past but with respect future probabilities. USSR doesn’t want situation to develop into thermonuclear war. Therefore remnants World War II must be removed and situation in West Berlin normalized on basis of peace treaty. Semenov agreed that both sides have been abiding by international obligations but these obligations entered into as result Second World War and included German settlement. Situation however now changed and new obligations must be undertaken. USSR proposing that both sides undertake new obligations on basis of existing situation. The occupation in West Berlin cannot last forever. Soviet Union ready to assume new obligations and US side has indicated new settlement possible and expedient. In any case, he and I might make useful contribution by weighing what has been said by two sides and bringing positions into accord.

On question of peace treaty, I agreed both sides obligated seek peace settlement with Germany. From our point of view, peace treaty with two parts of Germany or separate peace treaty would not represent settlement but legalization of partition of Germany to which US cannot be party. US profoundly believes partition Germany not in Soviet interests since division only sows seeds of revanchism. In my view, peace treaty appeared more a slogan than practical approach to peaceful resolution of problem. I then stated presence Western forces not negotiable. We are in West Berlin by same force circumstances USSR in East Berlin and East Germany. US deeply committed to protection of two and one fourth million West Berliners. We consider troop presence essential guarantee of our commitment. It likely that direct confrontation our troops represents better situation than if Germans confronted one another since latter might not be as responsible as US and USSR. US desires to reach understanding as to how two sides can live together in Central Europe. We could either live as we are or, since Soviets wish to change situation, reach broader modus vivendi which would take into account interests of both sides and lead to more peaceful atmosphere. If Soviets sincere regarding mutual concessions and attempt to solve problem on broader basis, this would interest us. In past sixteen months, Soviet side has not reciprocated US attempts to meet interests which USSR consider vital.

After Semenov said he did not understand broader measures to which I had referred, I listed items contained in Principles Paper given Soviets at Geneva, noting that these were advanced on assumption Soviets would recognize our vital interests in West Berlin. Semenov noted he had taken part in recent exchanges of view and added exchanges had not been in vain. A rapprochement had been registered on some questions by two sides and statements of President and Secretary indicated attempt being made to reach mutually acceptable solutions. He commented that my statements seemed step backward, although he appreciated it was sometimes necessary to go back in order to make a big jump ahead.

I said key point made by President and Secretary was that US in West Berlin and that we would not get out. Soviets would have to use force to evict us. If Soviets accept fact of our presence in West Berlin as we accept fact of theirs in East Germany and East Berlin, then would be possible for two sides live together in Central Europe.

When I asked Semenov whether my recollections correct, he answered that I knew as well as he.

Semenov then read statement referred to in Embtel 1410 and promised send us copy unofficially. Embassy translation will be transmitted when received.⁴

I said I appreciated clarification of Khrushchev remarks to Ambassador Roberts since they evidently different than Roberts understood them. Speaking personally, however, I said I didn’t see how this represented concession since it was still aimed at removing our troops from West Berlin. Semenov replied goal is quite different and what is sought is peaceful settlement and normalization of situation in West Berlin. Statement requires careful examination and study in all its aspects and represents concession to US. I then repeated view that US cannot accept peace treaties with two Germanies since this would legalize partition and added that signature of peace treaty by USSR and others with GDR did not represent peaceful settlement German problem. On contrary, it could lead to dangerous provocation of peace. Semenov then said that US in 1947 considered it possible sign peace treaty with separate parts of Germany and that Dulles and Murphy were exponents of this view. Stalin, however, maintained different viewpoint which Soviets now consider to have been mistake. Life has borne out that US was correct. US however has retreated as USSR approached once-held US position. Secondly, Semenov said USSR wished register existing situation. While US not prepared sign peace treaty under existing circumstances, US has not opposed signature of treaty by USSR and GDR. USSR believed it good thing to have such questions as frontiers, access and respect for sovereignty GDR agreed upon prior to signature of separate treaty. Soviet Union considered it in its interest to agree on certain arrangements prior to signature separate treaty with GDR.

I said signing of such treaty would be meaningless in itself. However, we consider it dangerous if USSR would thereby try to change US position or Western position in West Berlin and with respect to access. If we could have accord which would protect our vital interests that would be acceptable to us.

What concerns us is implied threat that signature of separate peace treaty would bring with it certain consequences which would affect our vital interests. US not seeking to change situation to disadvantage USSR. Dramatic illustration of this attitude demonstrated by our conduct in events of August 13 last year, which we hope will not be misinterpreted. This experience indicated US would not move against USSR where it has physical control. If USSR seeking change, US willing to listen to and study proposals which take our vital interests into account. We are looking for such proposals but haven’t found them. All those advanced attempt to bring a change to our disadvantage.

Semenov said he did not want to repeat Soviet positions and merely wanted to point out that all that has been said by Soviet leaders retains its force. He hoped contacts would be continued in order to bring sides closer together although he was mindful of humility of his position and does not count on possibilities being too great. I noted that I would be going to Paris next week where I would see Secretary. I would send clarification of what Khrushchev has told Roberts to the Dept for study and would discuss with Secretary in Paris.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–362. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. In telegram 1410, December 3, Kohler summarized his conversation with Semenov, stating that it provided no real clarification, no discernible hint of change in the Soviet position on Berlin, and no forward progress. Kohler concluded, however, that Semenov seemed inclined to continue the dialog. (Ibid.)
2. See the source note, Document 158.
3. Texts of the letters exchanged between the President and Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis are printed in volume VI and volume XI.
4. The statement provided for replacing the Western forces in Berlin by U.N. police formations, which might include U.S., British, and French contingents, but which would all be withdrawn in 4 years. (Telegram 1423 from Moscow, December 4; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–462)