Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, November 28, 1962, 19:34 p.m.

1172. Re Moscow’s 1339.¹ Following are your instructions for luncheon meeting with Semenov:

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for time being.

2. Although certain aspects of Cuban situation remain unresolved, we want to take advantage of opportunity provided by Semenov’s opening to initiate probe present direction of Soviet thinking on Berlin. (While you should make clear at outset that you are undertaking talks with him on personal basis without any governmental commitment although both you and he will presumably be reporting to your principals, we realistically assume that you will be regarded as speaking on basis of at least general instructions.)

3. A solid settlement in Berlin on terms that keep the city free and viable is a target of high priority for us, and we do not wish to miss any opportunity that may now exist for a Berlin settlement. You should maintain the position that since the Soviet Government started the Berlin crisis, the initative for new proposals should rest with Moscow, but you should leave no doubt that we are much interested in a workable settlement. You should point out that we see no good in facing difficult negotiations with Germans and French except in terms of a real prospect of settlement.

4. As we see it, there are two broad possibilities for such a settlement. One is a de facto continuation of the status quo, in which any peace treaty would leave the real situation unchanged, and each side would interpret the position in its own way. This is probably easier to negotiate but less satisfactory for the long pull than a broader settlement. The terms of a wider agreement must include for us plainly acknowledged right of Western troop presence and improved access rights like those proposed under our international access authority. A number of adjustments of interest to the Soviets could be made in return for improved access and wholly accepted presence. Without communicating all of the above to Semenov, you should make it plain to him that any Berlin settlement which shifts from the status quo must include advantages for us as well as for them, and that the advantages of greatest interest to us are improved access and a wholly acknowledged right of Western presence. It would be appropriate to indicate that we would be interested in knowing how Soviets would construct a wider agreement including these two features.

5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this hint, you should also endeavor to draw him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which had been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Senenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interest in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of those vital interests.

6. A further point which it might be useful to probe would be role now assigned to peace treaty by Soviets. We have noted recent deemphasis of peace treaty in both Soviet and GDR statements. Semenov will undoubtedly continue to pay lip service to peace treaty, but we would be interested in your impressions from talking with him that this is definitely on back burner.

7. We are much interested in Khrushchev’s recent conversation with Ambassador Roberts² and his suggestion that troops might remain temporarily under a certain unspecified UN role. In the degree that this could be a face-saver for Soviets while Allied troop presence and guarantee remain, this proposal is of real interest to us. A major purpose of your talks with Semenov should therefore be to ascertain whether this suggestion represents a real shift in the Soviet position or is merely a device for limiting both the duration and the effectiveness of Western presence. You should make it clear that we cannot express any judgment on what they have in mind until they have spelled it out. You might, for example, seek to determine what the Soviets have in mind among such possibilities (without offering them a catalog for shopping) as following: (a) simple registration of any agreement on Berlin with UN, (b) agreement to report to UN on such matters as the size, composition, and activities of forces in Berlin, (c) some form of UN representation and authority in West Berlin, (d) some new status involving West Berlin request for Allied troops under some UN umbrella, (e) a move of elements of UN itself to West Berlin, (f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence—as for example access or perforation of wall. You should probe as to the role and authority of West Berlin Senat, Western garrisons, and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our own guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a US position on such possibilities.

8. You are familiar with standard arguments made repeatedly by Secretary in his numerous conversations with Soviets over past 16 months. To extent you deem desirable, you should repeat these arguments as appropriate. We would want to avoid giving impression that our position has weakened in any way on what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable man whose strength and restraint have both been demonstrated.

9. We believe foregoing should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as to whether to pursue it by discreet questioning.

FYI. We would hope that you could have lunch with Semenov without this getting to press corps. While we accept inevitability of your having to brief French, British, and German colleagues, at least in general, on your discussion, we would also hope that information could be limited to them. In talking with them, you should be careful to avoid giving impression that you are in any way negotiating rather than engaging purely in probing operation on informal basis at Soviet initiative. President is dubious about possibility of carrying out really useful exchanges with Soviets if we follow usual procedure of full briefings for three and then for NATO. In past, this has led either to leaks and public discussion of Allied differences before reactions of Soviets have been ascertained, or to debate within Alliance on theoretical points which have not played role in talks with Soviets. While President is, therefore, prepared to have you initiate probe with Semenov, at appropriate point he may wish to use other channels.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11–2362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and revised in the White House, cleared in draft by Rusk and in substance by the President and Bundy, and approved by Davis.
1. Telegram 1339, November 23, reported that during Kohler’s first courtesy call on Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, Semenov had suggested he and the Ambassador meet informally to discuss Germany. The telegram noted that Kohler would try to arrange a meeting for November 29 or 30 and asked for instructions. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 3, Document 154.