Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

156. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Chancellor Adenauer⁰

Washington, November 15, 1962.

As I said yesterday, I am gravely disturbed by reports about the level of German defense expenditures, and I want to state my concern frankly. It appears that the German defense budgets for 1962 and 1963, as they now stand, will not finance the scheduled build-up of German forces to NATO-agreed force goals, and will not meet the scheduled payments for military goods and services received from the United States under the Strauss-Gilpatric agreement.¹

A high state of readiness of NATO forces—and most particularly those of Germany and the United States—is essential if we are to be able to defend Berlin. This requires all of us to maintain the necessary level of defense expenditures. We cannot talk with firmness unless we act with firmness.

We, for our part, despite a serious balance of payments problem, are maintaining major military forces in Europe which, in Germany alone, entail an annual United States balance-of-payments expenditure of about $700 million. We feel we have the right to expect Germany, in turn, to do its full share.

The arrangements under which Germany is procuring military goods and services from the United States have mutual advantages; they enable the Federal Republic to procure these items at the lowest costs, and they help to offset the balance-of-payments costs of United States defense expenditures in Germany. If the Federal Republic did not meet its part of the military procurement arrangement this year, important payments which the United States expects during the rest of this year would be postponed. This would not only add to our balance-of-payments deficit; it would have destructive psychological effects.

I trust the German Government will meet both its NATO commitments and its procurement arrangements with us. We understand this will require an immediate supplemental appropriation of two billion D-Marks to the 1962 German defense budget, and a comparable supplemental figure to the 1963 budget. We believe total German resources are ample to meet these needs, if the necessary measures are taken. We are sure the German people will respond generously if the real nature of the need is made clear to them by an act of political leadership.²

JFK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
1. Not further identified.
2. On December 12 Chancellor Adenauer wrote to the President that in response to this memorandum he had assigned an additional division to NATO and resolved to increase the West German defense budget by 1.1 billion DM. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)