Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

122. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Berlin, September 25, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conference at Berlin City Hall

PARTICIPANTS

• Berlin
  • Governing Mayor Brandt
  • Mayor Amrehn
  • Senator for Economics, Dr. Schiller
  • Senator for Federal Affairs, Mr. Schutz
• United States
  • Mr. Bundy
  • Ambassador Dowling
  • General Watson
  • Mr. Hulick

Mayor Brandt started the conversation by expressing his appreciation for Mr. Bundy’s visit. Mr. Bundy responded by stating that Berlin was today the most important place in the world; and that he was glad to have this opportunity to see the Mayor just before his trip to the United States. He indicated that the President very much hoped that the Mayor would be able to come to Washington for a talk with the President. (In a brief meeting with the press following the conference, Mr. Bundy confirmed that, in addition to seeing the Secretary, the Mayor would also be seeing the President.) Mayor Brandt then outlined the itinerary of his U.S. visit as follows: Saturday, Sunday, and Monday (September 29 through October 1) he would be in New York, conferring with the Ford Foundation on Sunday on the latter’s contribution to the viability program, and on Monday with General Clay; Tuesday and Wednesday he would spend at Harvard for his lectures. He indicated he would come to Washington on Thursday morning and would be available to see the President until Friday afternoon, when he was scheduled to depart on his return flight to Berlin.

Mr. Bundy expressed the admiration of the President, his Administration, and the people of the United States, for the determination and intelligence with which the Berliners and their Government leaders were managing their affairs under such trying circumstances.

Ambassador Dowling then asked the Mayor what possible actions he anticipated from the Ulbricht regime over the next few months. Mayor Brandt stated that indications had recently been received from the East German regime that some arrangements in the trade field could bring some amelioration of a humanitarian nature with respect to the problem of movement of persons within Berlin. On the trade side, the East was not pressing now for the original credit, but seeking an agreement to increase the swing within the present IZT agreement. Mayor Brandt indicated that in his recent discussion with the Chancellor, they had reached agreement to explore this matter in a positive manner to see if the East German regime was serious, and, in exchange for an increase in the IZT swing, would agree to procedures to bring separated families together and to permit visits to take place. For this purpose they are prepared to give Mr. Leopold an additional authorization as a negotiator to work out an agreement facilitating movement of people.

Mayor Brandt then outlined three other subjects which he had discussed with the Chancellor. The first dealt with the question of a plebiscite in West Berlin. Admitting that when this was first suggested a year ago the Berlin authorities had not been enthusiastic from the timing point of view, he indicated that they now believed a carefully tailored referendum-type plebiscite could be very helpful. Brandt indicated that they have a plebiscite law ready; and that all they need is agreement on exactly the right questions to be asked. He indicated that their present thinking was that the questions put to a vote should bring out the unquestioning desire of the Berliners to (1) confirm once and for all Berlin’s existing ties and relations to the Federal Republic, and (2) the continued presence of the three Allied Powers in Berlin. Elaborating on the first point, the Mayor stated it was necessary to do something which would underline the fact that the links of Berlin to the Federal Republic exist not because of some article in a constitution, with respect to which the Allies have had to maintain reservations, but as something which reflects a living and vital element of self determination on the part of the West Berliners. He also indicated his conviction and that of his colleagues, based on their frequent talks with representatives of the important non-aligned nations, that the wartime agreements, now seventeen years old, were no longer satisfactory or convincing as a basis to obtain their support for the maintenance of Berlin’s ties to the Federal Republic and continued presence of the three Allied Powers; and that a new and convincing basis had to be found. He indicated his belief that a popular referendum dealing with these two questions could produce this new basis, which would be more convincing from an international point of view in UN discussions and elsewhere.

Mayor Brandt indicated that the second subject on which he and the Chancellor had reached agreement was that of making the Wall and the inhuman Communist actions connected therewith a matter of great international confrontation. The Mayor indicated that they have received what they consider to be reliable information to the effect that Khrushchev has instructed Ulbricht to be more careful and to avoid creating incidents along the wall. He said he and the Chancellor were agreed that pressure should be maintained on the Ulbricht regime to this end, stating that as a first step the Federal Republic would soon be publishing a White Book. He expressed the hope that the Allied Governments would support this campaign with actions of their own.

Mayor Brandt stated that the third item of discussion, on which he and the Chancellor held different views, concerned the question of whether GDR harassment of German civilian access might be expected in the coming months. He reported the Chancellor as being more optimistic than he, that because of the Ulbricht regime’s economic situation, harassing of German access was unlikely. Brandt said that he was not convinced of this; and that in his view it was an urgent matter to determine with the Allies at exactly what point GDR harassment of German civilian access would be considered unacceptable and what specific measures would be applied to counteract such actions. He stated the Germans will take on their full share of the burden; that they regard this as an extremely important question; but that they were genuinely concerned that the discussions so far in the Four-Power Steering Group in Washington have led to the idea of invoking a policy of self denial and blockade too soon. He said a blockade raises many problems, especially a breakdown of Berlin industry and a severe adverse popular psychological reaction which would be much more serious than in 1948, since Berlin had now reached a much higher standard of living. He indicated his strong desire to have the Allies, in conjunction with Berlin and Federal Republic officials, reach an agreement on a clear definition of what the common goal would be in the event of self-denial and a blockade, coupled with forthright and convincing counter-measures by the Western powers to achieve this goal. He stated it was not a convincing position to say that preservation of everything as it exists (the status quo) is sufficient and acceptable. He said we must return to demanding something new and concrete to really guarantee free German access. Referring to the Jessup-Malik solution of 1949,¹ he said this was not specific or concrete enough, having dealt more with broad principles.

Mayor Amrehn at this point asked whether new negotiations between the President and Khrushchev were pending. Mr. Bundy responded by saying there was nothing new about such a meeting to his knowledge and the matter rested as indicated by the President in his recent press conference statement² to the effect that if Khrushchev comes to the United States for the General Assembly, the President would be willing to see him, just as he would any other head of state or prime minister. If such a meeting should materialize, Mr. Bundy stated that what Mayor Brandt had been saying would be more rather than less important, especially with respect to the trade negotiations and the idea of a referendum. With respect to the referendum, as outlined by the Mayor, Mr. Bundy indicated it would be important to have the support of the free expression of the Berliners’ position on the points mentioned in any future talks or negotiations with the Soviet leaders.

Mayor Amrehn stated that after the U.S. elections in November, Berlin would probably face a new critical situation. Mr. Bundy responded by saying that the whole question of Berlin depends upon the will of the Berliners. He commented that the counter-measures taken to meet the Soviet harassment in the air corridors in February and March seemed to have been just about right. He said it will not always be easy to develop effective counter-measures; and that we must be ready to take on the responsibility of effective counter-measures rapidly. Coming back to the question of German access rights, Mayor Amrhen asked whether or not a new codification of these rights would be ready soon. He expressed his belief that the details must be nailed down. Referring to the occasional arrests which occur on the autobahn, Mayor Amrehn stated that one of the newest harassing restrictions introduced by the GDR on the autobahn from Berlin to Hamburg was to stipulate that the trip must be completed within a period of four to four and one half hours, and a restriction of halting enroute to the four designated stopping places. Mayor Amrehn insisted that a definite point must be fixed beyond which all agreed the viability of Berlin will be adversely affected. He added that Berlin authorities had some difficulty with the word viability as being too general as a concept to cover adequately the Berliners’ vital interest in access and their ties to the Federal Republic.

Governing Mayor Brandt then referred to the difficulties of last month with respect to the death of PETER FECHTER and the Soviet War Memorial Guards. He expressed the hope that it was understood in the White House that there was nothing serious to back up the news reports regarding a breakdown in morale and confidence in the United States. He said the people were worried, to be sure, but that the majority were in their factories and in their homes, as normal. The demonstrations were conducted largely by young people, the majority of whom hold to the same beliefs and positions as the Mayor does, but on this occasion expressed them differently than he would have. He said the main trouble stemmed from a minority of bad elements among the youth. He felt he had to handle the demonstrations in the way he had, with some delay in introducing severe police measures, so as not to antagonize the majority of the young people and turn them against him and the Allies by giving them the impression that he and the city authorities were placing them in the same category as the small minority of bad actors.

Mr. Bundy stated no one in the White House had the feeling that matters had gotten out of hand; that there was agreement that the measures taken seemed to be adequate to cope with the situation. He stressed that there was complete understanding for the political problem of management involved in the situation and that there was full recognition for the courage Mayor Brandt’s government had shown in the end. He indicated the President had full understanding for the reaction of the young people and recognized that it was necessary and proper for them to show their feelings under the severe provocations. He concluded by stating that one must be ready in the future for new incidents and be prepared to act more rapidly.

With respect to making more concrete proposals for guaranteeing unhindered German civilian access, Mr. Bundy agreed this was important. At the same time, he said, we must all recognize that the Soviets are not interested in agreeing to anything like this. He took this occasion to stress the necessity for our being frank with one another. He said Berlin authorities should speak up when they think actions are required; and that we must be sure that we have the closest means of communication between Berlin and Washington. He stated that the two most important focal points were Berlin and Washington; that while one naturally had to take into account the views and positions of others (the Federal Republic, Paris and London), they were, in the final analysis, secondary compared to having the clearest understanding between the leaders in Berlin and Washington, who were the most directly involved (should a serious showdown, with all its implications, occur, was implied but not stated).

With respect to the plebiscite (referendum), Mr. Bundy indicated this might have some value, particularly if toward the end of the General Assembly the Berlin question was thrown into the debate. If such a referendum were held, he suggested it might be of value to have observers, such as the Indians, present, and that a free expression of the West German population on the questions suggested might be of some negotiation value in subsequent talks by either the Secretary with Gromyko or the President with Khrushchev.

Ambassador Dowling asked the Mayor whether he thought further actions by the Ulbricht regime or the Soviets would be more likely to come before or after conclusion of a separate peace treaty. Mayor Brandt expressed his belief it was more likely they would come piece by piece before conclusion of a peace treaty. Mr. Bundy then inquired how this might affect the timing of a plebiscite. Mayor Brandt said he thought it made the holding of a plebiscite more urgent and that one might think of holding it in November, after the American congressional elections.

Mayor Brandt then turned to the question of internal problems. He said these were not too serious; that the manpower situation had achieved recently an encouraging balance; and that there were slightly more people coming in than going out of Berlin, the influx being predominantly of the younger generation. Senator Schiller stated that the rate of investment in Berlin was slightly lower than that in the Federal Republic; that there was no inflationary problem; that Berlin productivity had improved; but that there was presently a cautious waiting attitude obtaining with regard to new investments in Berlin.

Mayor Brandt concluded by stating that the decision making machinery was very important and that one could not avoid feeling that it takes too long to reach decisions in order to cope with serious developments. Mr. Bundy took this occasion to refer to the S-Bahn situation as posing a serious problem. Within this context, he supported the Mayor’s action in stressing publicly the importance of the three power status and rights in West Berlin.

The conference was concluded by Mayor Brandt passing to Mr. Bundy the greetings of President Luebke and the latter’s desire to meet with Mr. Bundy for an hour or so at Wahn airport enroute to Cadenabbia, if this proved feasible for Mr. Bundy.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hulick on September 28. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with Bundy. Bundy visited Berlin September 25–26 as part of a trip to Europe. Additional documentation on the trip is ibid., Trips and Conferences Series, McGeorge Bundy Trip to Europe.
1. For text of Jessup-Malik agreement, May 5, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 751.
2. For a transcript of the President’s news conference on August 22, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 631–639.