Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations⁰

Washington, September 25, 1962, 7:57 p.m.

Topol 399. Deliver Finletter 8 am Sept. 26. You may convey to NAC following Department assessment.

TASS statement September 11¹ postponing further pressure for negotiations until after US November elections indicates Soviets apparently deferring separate peace treaty signature for several months. Likely they contemplate some further discussions on Berlin problem before actually signing treaty, which in turn would postpone treaty action sometime beyond November. Department does not believe this postponement excludes interim Soviet unilateral action on local Berlin scene designed to achieve further de facto changes prior to eventual peace treaty but probably does preclude major steps likely to entail serious risks. Limited infringement on Allied access to Berlin, attempts to involve GDR in control of Allied access, harassment of local helicopter flights in Berlin Control Zone, or maneuvers designed to affect West Berlin morale as vital ingredient of economic viability of city still possibilities at moment.

Intelligence sources indicate existence of various bloc security preparations scheduled for completion between September and November. Preparations appear such as could be utilized either to implement individual measures designed to heighten tensions considerably, or to cope with tensions resulting from moves up to and including peace treaty. However, although preparations are being made and planning deadline may exist (reportedly November) current Soviet and bloc military posture does not indicate anticipation of any imminent steps which might be expected to provoke violent Western countermeasures.

In any event Soviet willingness revert to bus transport for WM guards September 14 suggests Moscow opposed to exacerbation of Berlin situation at moment. However Soviets may also believe they have established principle of CINC channel for Berlin matters with this episode and thereby maneuvered West into tacit acceptance of abolition Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin. Kommandatura abolition thus far represents only demonstrative alteration of certain institutional aspects Berlin status but Soviets may now be encouraged attempt additional de facto changes implicit in measure (e.g. Allied dealings with GDR in East Berlin).

Recent indications point to Soviet consideration of UNGA as suitable vehicle for exerting pressure on West to be more forthcoming in negotiations. Furthermore Assembly could provide Soviets with forum for presenting their case and for ascertaining reaction of or influencing UN members. Possibility also exists Soviets may be contemplating UN initiative after some unilateral Berlin move in order deter Western countermeasures. However Soviets still appear undecided about raising Berlin issue in UN probably because they doubt UN can be confined to mere discussion without bringing about direct UN interference in Berlin and German question. September 5 Soviet note² blaming Berlin tensions exclusively on Western Powers and West Germans, without venturing serious proposals for alleviating tensions, suggests preparation of case for public record. Such approach would be logical preliminary if UN involvement under consideration. But it is likely Moscow will in fact wait as long as possible before final decision on taking issue to UN. In any event if Khrushchev were to come to New York to present Berlin or other issue to GA, Department believes his major interest would be summit meeting with President Kennedy on Berlin rather than UN debate.

Summarizing, Department believes Soviets at present in a phase of Berlin policy in which they are exerting pressure and maneuvering to bring about what they would regard as remunerative negotiations while simultaneously strengthening position in Berlin to put them in more advantageous situation for later action preempting some changes inherent in peace treaty.

FYI. Dept. has noted Polto 253.³ Material on Western response to peace treaty, which authorized for distribution NAC year ago and on which NAC has not commented, presently undergoing minor revisions. As soon as this process completed material will again be submitted to NAC for discussion and comments.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2562. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Mautner (BTF); cleared by Anderson, RPM, and INR; and approved by Cash. Repeated to Berlin and pouched to Moscow, London, and Bonn.
1. For text of the TASS statement, see Pravda or Izvestiia, September 12, 1962.
2. For text of the Soviet note, see Pravda, September 6, 1962, or Izvestiia, September 7, 1962. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 720.
3. Polto 253, September 5, reported that the Belgian Permanent Representative had stressed the “absolute necessity” for the North Atlantic Council to consult as soon as possible on Berlin contingency plans and the philosophy behind them. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9–562)