Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

103. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President’s Special Counsel (Sorensen)⁰

Washington, August 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The Berlin crisis has warmed up a lot in recent weeks and looks as if it is getting worse. The Soviet Government has not stated any new deadline, but has indicated on every channel its continued belief that the only way of making progress is for the Western occupation forces, in one way or another, to get out of West Berlin. We have of course said that this is impossible. This has been said in conversations between Rusk and Gromyko, around the Laos meeting, between Rusk and Dobrynin here, and on the pen-pal circuit (which Dobrynin reads but does not talk about). The latest pen-pal exchange is attached for your information.¹

We have no hard intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions about a peace treaty, but yesterday’s abolition of the Soviet Commandant’s office looks like the first in a series of steps aimed at changing their official position on Berlin still further. The most notable phenomenon to me in recent weeks has been the constant increase in Soviet noises and the lack of any correspondingly angry public statement on our side. This owes much to the President’s own temper, and much also to the fact that the Soviets have been crying wolf since 1958.

In my own judgment, the most useful thing you can do with Dobrynin if he brings up Berlin—and perhaps even if he does not—is to say as clearly and emphatically as you can that it would be a most dangerous business to confuse our calmness and good manners with any weakening of determination whatsoever. Any move against our vital interests in Berlin will be met by appropriate, prompt, and energetic responses, and no one can doubt the dangers which such activity would imply for all concerned. Moreover, if the Soviet Government insists upon forcing the issue in terms of propaganda and public opinion, we shall have no alternative but to make clear just who it is that is disturbing the peace in Berlin.

You should of course say none of this in tones of threat, but rather in the interest of clarity of communication. The importance of your saying it is precisely that you are not Foy Kohler or Chip Bohlen and can speak with the authority of political engagement in this Administration.²

McG. B.³

At a second meeting on September 6 Dobrynin told Sorensen that he had been instructed to relay a personal message from Khrushchev that nothing would be undertaken before the congressional elections to complicate the international situation or aggravate tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This included a German peace settlement and West Berlin. (Memorandum for the files, September 6; ibid.) For Sorensen’s recollection of these meetings, see Kennedy, pp. 667–668.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret.
1. Not attached, but presumably Documents 73 and 78.
2. In a memorandum for the files on his lunch with Dobrynin at 1:15 on August 23, Sorensen reported that the conversation was general, “representing more of a ‘get acquainted’ session than a significant exchange of views.” With regard to the fall elections, Sorensen stated “that the President could not possibly lay himself open to Republican charges of appeasement in his response to any buildup in Berlin pressures between now and November 6.” (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, General, 1962)
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.