Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

100. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, August 23, 1962, 4 p.m.

241. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. USAREUR for POLAD. Part one of three-part message.¹

Summary

The Soviet action in liquidating the office of the Commandant in East Berlin is long step in direction in which they have been moving for some time.² Timing may have been influenced by increased pressure being brought to bear by Allies for Commandants to meet and by strong reaction in West against GDR activities along wall for which Allies were holding Soviets responsible. However, move of this sort had very likely been planned for some time for relatively early execution. To Soviets it must have seemed highly desirable to eliminate once and for all their special responsibilities for East Berlin as distinct from Soviet Zone. By their act they have formally lopped off East Berlin from greater Berlin and have left Western sectors in effect as 3-power managed city in midst of East Germany with specific Soviet presence and quadripartite as well as unilateral functions remaining in it (quadripartite—BASC, Spandau; unilateral—war memorial).

Operationally, we shall be confronted very likely by Soviet efforts reduce role of Allied Commandants to level of Soviet troop commander. Immediate practical effects on our operations however will not necessarily be great. (This is not to say there will not be such effects—witness threat of Autobahn trouble on August 24.) While this is so, psychological and long-term importance of this formal Soviet step should not be underestimated. With passage of time, perhaps even matter of months, image of Berlin in eyes of world and even of Berliners themselves will likely be considerably affected. In absence effective counteraction on our part, connection of Allied presence in West Berlin to its origins in 4-power post war occupation control will become vaguer and vaguer until it may be lost entirely at which time Allies will appear simply to be managers of entity known as West Berlin and located in midst of GDR. Within West Berlin there is danger that if Commandants lose substance of their role which gives them right and power to control the city, Berliners will be less and less willing to accept such control. There has been evidence of this already in recent past.

Meanwhile Soviets can be expected to attempt to graft Allied Berlin presence onto NATO, having cut it away from 4-power principle. When they consider this graft psychologically complete, by which time Allied access to East Berlin would presumably have ceased, they will if their past tactics are any indication take the further concrete steps which logically follow from it. Among latter would be further pressure to secure international acceptance of West Berlin as free city, recognized 4-power presence in West Berlin, etc.

While this is bleak enough picture, it is of course nothing really new. We had not foreseen maneuver in this particular form on part of Soviets but had been aware that their efforts being directed along lines described above. Soviet move accelerates certain trends and brings more clearly into focus problems which face us here. Effective steps can be devised to meet continuous Soviet challenge. As this challenge becomes more basic in its nature, however, and latest development is quite basic in its attack on our position, our responses must be weighed with particular care.

Hulick

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–2362. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:31 p.m. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
1. In part two (telegram 244, August 23) the Mission examined the likely short-term effect of the closing of the Soviet Commandant’s office. (Ibid.) Part three is Document 105.
2. For text of the August 22 Soviet statement abolishing the post of Soviet Commandant in Berlin, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 714–715. In response, on August 24, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France stated that the abolition would “have no effect whatsoever on either Allied rights or Soviet responsibilities in Berlin.” For text of the tripartite statement, see ibid., pp. 715–716.