Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

105. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, August 25, 1962, 4 p.m.

268. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Ref Berlin’s 241 and 244 to Dept, 215 and 217 to Bonn.¹

Part three of three-part message. Among longer-run problems covered in part one, following four deserve further elaboration:

1. Soviet presence in West Berlin.

Soviets have eliminated any unique aspects their presence in East Berlin, which now simply part of their presence in Soviet Zone generally. Only Soviet activities for which they will assume responsibility relating to special status of Berlin are now in West Berlin. This situation has two significant aspects: Soviet presence West Berlin is something Sovs will foster as contribution to thesis of 4-power West Berlin; and it is also basis for Soviet claim for access rights to West Berlin. In latter respect Soviets can be expected argue that all four are now in same situation. War Memorial may become most important of symbols Soviet presence since it unilateral and thus can be presented as their “sector” in West Berlin giving them right of presence. Soviet presence in West Berlin would no longer be based, therefore, on previous right of circulation all four powers in 4-power city including East Berlin, but on principle of right of access to installations.

Under these conditions we can expect long-term problem of our relations with Soviets to develop along two lines: first, issues re right of Soviet access to West Berlin; and secondarily, issues re right of free circulation within West Berlin, involving Sov relations in West Berlin with Allied Commandants. In latter connection, Sovs could conceivably attempt designate a representative in West Berlin, perhaps installing him in offices in quadripartite ACA Building as representative of Sov High Commissioner.

2. “Meaning” of Soviet presence in West Berlin.

In Mission’s tel 100 to Dept, 87 to Bonn,² point was made that Sovs might eventually seek to transform their CINC relations with Western CINCs into Warsaw Pact-NATO pact relations. This connection, it significant that in both USSR and GDR communiques³ commenting on abolition post of Sov Commandant, emphasis was placed on NATO pact character of Western Allied garrisons in West Berlin.

In seeking to establish Warsaw Pact-NATO pact equivalence, Sovs probably would wish to give some role in West Berlin to Czech and Polish military missions “accredited” to ACA. In light of their own past conduct re military missions, Sovs could not insist on right of Czech and Pole military missions to reside in Western sectors. They might, however, insist on their right of access to ACA Building to conduct business and to raise questions regarding West Berlin. Thus issue of access to, and circulation within, West Berlin of Czech and Pole military missions may also become problem in our relations with Sovs in future.

3. West Berlin attitude toward Allied Kommandatura.

There have been over the years frustrations on part West Berliners with cumbersome tripartite machinery. In addition, events particularly in past year have brought some increase in uncertainty of West Berliners regarding our determination in long run to maintain security of city. If there is added to this a downgrading of Commandants as result development higher level contacts with Yakubovsky, restiveness of West Berliners with Allied control likely to increase. This tendency should not be over-emphasized since West Berliners are aware their ultimate security lies with three Western governments. However, it can be expected that pressure by West Berlin government on Allied Kommandatura through attempts to assert independence and take unilateral actions will increase. We have seen numerous symptoms of this in past few months (S-bahn posters, arming of customs police, etc.). Though incidents on borders will continue for immediate future to be most inflammatory issue, it is likely that, over long run, problems posed by East German claims to “sovereignty” over S-bahn will take on crucial significance.

4. Signing of German peace treaty.

To extent that Sovs are successful in achieving any of goals described in foregoing sections, they would have brought about additional conditions which they have insisted be part of peace treaty. Re other clauses of peace treaty, Sovs might be expected in near future to begin harassment designed to change mechanism of Allied land access to West Berlin, perhaps initially along lines of association and eventual substitution East German Vopos for Soviet personnel on access routes. This connection, Mission wishes re-affirm views expressed in our tels 98 and 99 to Dept, sent Bonn 85 and 86,⁴ emphasizing that, as Sovs achieve goals, peace treaty when finally signed will be simply formalization of conditions existing at that time (as we have just experienced with dissolution of Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin).

Hulick

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–2562. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
1. Telegrams 241 and 244 from Berlin are parts one and two of the three-part message. See Document 100 and footnote 1 thereto.
2. Telegrams 98, 99, and 100, July 26, speculated on Soviet and East German “erosive” actions that might be taken against West Berlin in light of their recent statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2662)
3. For text of the August 22 East German statement, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 961–962.
4. See footnote 2 above.