Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

1. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, March 9, 1962.

In your discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva,¹ you should bear in mind our need to draw him out on the main directions of present Soviet policy regarding the West and, specifically, the United States. It would be of considerable importance to us to get a clearer picture of the underlying attitudes which will have a direct bearing on such matters as a nuclear test ban, disarmament, Berlin and Southeast Asia. You will have to judge on the spot how best to explore these matters but, for our own approach, my conversation in Vienna, my interview with Adzhubei² and other communications with Soviet leadership give ample guidance.

With particular regard to Berlin, you should attempt to develop in your discussions with Gromyko the draft proposal of a modus vivendi which has my approval.³ I should like to add the following for your guidance:

1. We anticipate that, at an appropriate stage, such a proposal would be given in written form to Gromyko. This is the only way we can be sure that in its full form it will get top-level study in Moscow.

2. In presenting the proposal, you would indicate to Gromyko that this represents the sort of practical way of moving ahead with due regard to the interests and obligations of both parties that I have had in mind in my various communications with Chairman Khrushchev.

3. While the draft proposal corresponds, in our view, to the essential interests of all concerned, and while in our view it would stand before the world as a document fair to the prestige and power of all, we should of course be glad to hear Soviet suggestions for improvement. We believe that our document points the way to a method of handling the Berlin question which recognizes the realities on all sides.

4. In presenting the draft proposal to Gromyko, we should initially omit the section on Germany. Since Gromyko will almost certainly raise questions which are directly relevant to such a section, you would indicate to him that we must talk with our Allies, including Bonn, before agreeing on any language for such a paragraph with the Soviet Government. Since it is in the common interest of both Moscow and Washington that we reach some basis of stability and mutual security on such questions, Gromyko will appreciate the need for us to be able to act on the basis of agreement with the strong and independent governments with whom we are intimately associated.

5. You should indicate also that if the Soviet Government is interested in discussion of this kind of proposal, and if serious progress can be made with respect to agreement on such a proposal, I would regard the matter as one which might be the basis of a fruitful meeting of Heads of Government.

While our expectation is that you may not get much questioning from Gromyko on this document at this stage, there may easily be an immediate question about the duration of such an understanding. I believe that our answer on this point should be indefinite, but if the point is pressed, we might suggest that the Committee of Deputies might be asked to report after a given interval of time. This would give a date for new negotiations without threatening the life of the modus vivendi itself.

6. If the Soviet Union should press on the matter of occupation status, I assume that we will answer in the usual fashion—that the real presence of our troops and our real access to the city cannot be negotiated away. But it is appropriate to remark that the modus vivendi is so constructed as not to require any open abandonment by the Soviet Union of its own views on this matter.

7. The draft proposal does not go very far, mainly because we must not put on paper things which might shock our Allies if presented without prior consultation. However, you should indicate orally to Gromyko that if the Soviet Government is prepared to discuss an interim arrangement, we would expect to be able to consider a number of additional elements. One of course is a paragraph relating to Germany, and you should indicate informally the possibilities now contained in the bracketed German paragraph of the draft proposal. In addition, we could make it clear that during the life of the modus vivendi both sides could readily lower the temperature of their “inflammatory propaganda” on Berlin and East Germany. Further, we could indicate the possibility of widening the future negotiations on non-aggression so as to examine together proposals which the two sides have made in the past. And finally, you should repeat the private assurance you have given Gromyko in the past that if progress can be made in this direction, we believe that boundary problems can be effectively settled.

8. If discussion should turn toward respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, you should indicate, as I did to Adzhubei, that time may be more effective here than any other instrument, and you should also find occasion to develop the point that if the Soviet Union should ever wish to multiply the responsiveness of the West on this point, we believe it could obtain substantial concessions by the simple expedient of replacing Ulbricht by a more “Polish” leader; this is a statement of objective fact, and not a bargaining proposal.

9. I believe that the privacy of the draft proposal is of very great importance, and yet I recognize the necessity for avoiding a split in the Western alliance by apparent “back door” negotiations. Accordingly, we have agreed that you will give appropriate oral indications of our notion of an indefinite modus vivendi to Home and Schroeder—but it seems to be quite undesirable that the document itself should be mentioned or circulated at this time. We must consider by cable or telephone, prior to your handing over a document to Gromyko, whether we should do so without specific consultation with our Allies. It is my thought that, if real progress has been made consistent with the vital interests of the West, Allied consultation would not be difficult; on the other hand, if Gromyko’s reactions are entirely negative, we must consider whether there would be any point in transmitting to him a document which would be both futile in Moscow and irritating to our Allies.

John Kennedy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
1. Rusk was in Geneva March 10–27 for a meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament March 14–June 14.
2. Regarding President Kennedy’s interview with Adzhubei on January 31, see vol. XIV, Document 277.
3. The draft under reference, dated March 6, consisted of four paragraphs (Purpose, Proposal, Advantages, and Soviet Reactions) and a draft proposal with paragraphs on: 1) Berlin, 2) Germany, 3) Nuclear Diffusion, and 4) Non-Aggression. (Attachment to memorandum from Legere to Taylor, March 9; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 38 Negotiations) In commenting on this draft, Legere wrote that it was “a very dangerous paper,” since it assumed that pending a Berlin settlement, the Soviet Union was interested in eliminating tensions. (Ibid.)