Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

277. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 31, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
• USSR
  • Mr. Alexei Adzhubei, Editor-in-Chief, Izvestiya
  • Mr. Georgi Bolshakov, Editor-in-Chief, USSR Magazine

Mr. Adzhubei inquired whether, before the President started the actual conversation he could clarify the term “arrangement”, which he had used in a conversation yesterday.²

The President replied that he thought it might be quite impossible to find a final solution of the Berlin situation at this time and that therefore an accommodation should be found which would prevent tensions from mounting. How such a mutually acceptable accommodation could be found is another question which should perhaps be examined later. The President stressed his belief that no final conclusions could be formed as to what the situation would be some years from now. He stressed that the expectations on which both sides had acted in 1945-6-7 had obviously changed since then. However, the President said, he believed that an arrangement could be found which could stand for a certain period of time. Citing the examples of Laos and the Congo the President reiterated that situations change and that it is quite impossible to look far into the future.

Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether he had understood the President correctly that there would be a final solution after a certain period of time.

The President replied that on the basis of present positions of the two sides he could not see how a final solution could be found. The Soviet Union insists on maintaining the division of Germany and on formal recognition of East Germany. He recalled that he had stated that the United States could not accept this and that he had said why. The President then expressed the view that both sides must avoid reaching the breaking point. He noted that the positions of the two sides are at present quite incompatible. While we cannot find a perfect solution sitting here in the winter of 1962 and cannot foresee how the situation would change some years from now, we must make every effort to reach some mutually acceptable accommodation which would minimize the hazards of the present situation. This, however, may not be satisfactory to the USSR and the question is whether it is going to sign a peace treaty and then see what happens. In any event no final solution seems to be possible on the basis of the present positions of the two sides and no compromise seems to be possible. The President observed that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson, who are scheduled to meet tomorrow, might discuss the subject. However, he would be prepared to give Mr. Adzhubei some general thoughts on the problem.

The President went on to say that at the last Gromyko-Thompson meeting Ambassador Thompson had talked about an all-Berlin solution—something the USSR would not accept, while Mr. Gromyko had talked about stationing Soviet troops in West Berlin and about establishing a border—something the US cannot accept. Reviewing the recent conversations in Moscow, the President said he had gained the impression that the positions of the two sides were becoming more and more formal, and more and more incompatible. He stressed that failure to reach an accommodation could be fraught with serious consequence. Thus the question is whether both sides can reach accommodation in the light of what is acceptable to them or whether the USSR is simply going to sign a peace treaty and attempt to apply a squeeze with all of its hazards to both sides. The President asked Mr. Adzhubei for his view as to whether it would be preferable for the Soviet Union to sign a peace treaty without accord on matters where agreement is possible and see what happens then, or, alternatively, to seek agreement on the basis of give and take. The President noted that on this the two sides seemed to have opposite positions.

Mr. Adzhubei replied that first he would like to state that it would be best if an all-German solution could be found. The search for an all-German solution should not be abandoned. He expressed the view that the President should continue contacts with Mr. Khrushchev on the subject. Mr. Adzhubei said that he felt that before the issue of international autobahn was raised there had been some possibility in this respect. He recalled Mr. Gromyko’s remarks about the possibility of an accommodation on the question of aircraft safety, and he also referred to the idea of placing the UN Headquarters in U.S. Berlin. He continued by saying that, in his personal view, the U.S., having sensed the USSR’s “loyalty” and desire for agreement, decided to put pressure on the USSR. The USSR is doing the same. But, as the saying goes, the worst peace is better than a good war. Perhaps a third solution is possible. Mr. Macmillan had spoken some time ago about suspending things in mid air. That suggestion met with some objections. Some people felt that resistance to change was tantamount to weakness. However, the President had suggested at least some accommodation. Mr. Adzhubei then said that both the President and Mr. Khrushchev carry a tremendous burden on their shoulders and that he would therefore prefer to listen to what the President had to say rather than to talk himself.

The President said that he recognized that the Soviet Union was concerned about remilitarization and the revival of nationalism in West Germany as well as about the possibility of West Germany’s acquiring nuclear weapons. He said that all this would not be in the interest of peace. However, on all this some accommodation might be found. Referring to his earlier statements about U.S. policy with regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons the President emphasized that any increase in tensions in Berlin would seem to increase the very dangers in Germany which the Soviet Union says it fears.

With reference to the Gromyko-Thompson talks the President said that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should speak in specific terms rather than simply reiterate the well-known general positions of the two sides. For instance, the U.S. would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists that the U.S. recognize the GDR as a national entity and then negotiate with it or whether some other arrangement is possible. Likewise, we would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists on having its troops stationed in West Berlin and if so, why. These are the things Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Gromyko should be talking about. Otherwise, the positions of the two sides become more and more formal, the two sides exchange diplomatic messages restating their positions, and nothing happens. The President expressed his concern that so far the talks have not produced anything and observed that the French are saying that the talks are useless.

The President went on to say that the Soviet Union is in a good position as far as applying a squeeze is concerned. However, he pointed out, neither he nor Mr. Adzhubei could tell what may occur on Friedrichstrasse or on the access routes tonight. Incidents may occur there without either side being able to control them. The President then stated that perhaps Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should attempt to make progress on details. In the event that there should be no progress he would see the new Soviet Ambassador after his arrival and also write to Chairman Khrushchev. The President stated that he viewed the situation as unsatisfactory to both sides, although the Chairman may feel that the situation is better to the Soviet Union in view of the geography. In any event, each side knows what is unacceptable to the other, and it is important to seek accommodation on what is acceptable to them.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he would talk with Moscow on the telephone tonight and express the belief that Mr. Gromyko would talk about the points mentioned by the President. Noting that he did not wish to complain about Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Adzhubei said that Ambassador Thompson had not started the talks along the lines suggested by the President. Ambassador Thompson had bluntly said that the conversation should be about access. This is not the correct way to proceed. On the other hand, the President seems to have in mind concrete issues.

Noting that Ambassador Thompson had already received his instructions, the President said that he would also be sent a report on this conversation, so that he would know what had been said here. The President stressed, however, that there is no point in talking about such questions as free access when we do not know what the Soviet Union means when it says that access to Berlin would be free in accordance with accepted international standards for such communication. The President said that there was need for clarification as to the exact meaning of this statement by the USSR.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he wished to attempt to think along the lines suggested by the President. Noting that he was merely thinking out loud, he said that, for example, recognition of East Germany by some Western states would be a big step forward. It would make it possible to resolve other questions in a more conciliatory manner. For instance, the question of access would be easier to resolve if GDR were recognized by some Western states.

The President stressed that this would require a change in our position from reunification to formal division of Germany. The U.S. could not make such a change.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he did not have in mind the U.S. Nor did he have in mind that all Western states should recognize the GDR. It would be helpful if at least some Western countries extended recognition to the GDR.

At this point the President requested Mr. Akalovsky to prepare a summary of the main points covered, a copy of which he wished to be given to Mr. Adzhubei.³

After Mr. Akalovsky had left the room, Mr. Adzhubei inquired as to what the President’s attitude would be toward East Germans controlling access under the supervision of an International Commission. The President did not respond to the question but indicated that this question would have to be studied in the light of details.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on February 7. The meeting was held in the White House.
2. According to the President’s Log, he had lunch with Adzhubei and Bolshakov at 1 p.m. on January 30. The discussion of “arrangement” took place at this time. Salinger gives a brief account of the lunch in With Kennedy, pp. 213-214, but has it taking place on the same day as this conversation. A memorandum of the luncheon conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Document 150. A 2-page briefing memorandum on Berlin, prepared for the President by Bundy on January 31, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin.
3. A copy of the summary was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1780 at 10:07 p.m. on January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-3162)