Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

276. Letter From the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Berlin, January 30, 1962.

Dear Dean: Having now been in Berlin for a little over four months, I believe a review at this time to be timely.

At the time of my arrival West Berlin morale was still low, although definitely recovering from the extreme low point. Confidence in Allied determination, rightly or wrongly, was badly shattered by the wall. However, the restoration of confidence was started by the Johnson visit and by the arrival of reinforcements. Today, morale has definitely improved. The flight of capital has not only stopped, but indeed has reversed, and the outward movement of persons from the city has become only a trickle. Still, there can be no question but that the tension in West Berlin remains high and very little would be required for it to erupt into a mass exodus of both capital and persons.

It seemed essential to me when I arrived to take a few measures to demonstrate American intent to be firm on the ground in Berlin. It would not have occurred to me that I would have been sent here for any other purpose. Examining these few measures now, it is incomprehensible that anyone should regard them as bold or, indeed as some of our Allies do, as dangerous. Herewith are these “bold” measures and their status today:

a. Helicopter flights were undertaken into Steinstucken and a military police patrol was stationed in this American exclave. Both continue, and so far have not developed into the dreaded escalation which had been predicted by some. They have made possible the evacuation of over thirty refugees. Our recommendation to replace the helicopter flights with movements on the ground was not approved.

b. Our recommendation to keep Friedrich Strasse open by force if necessary was approved enough to permit us to maintain the right of entry of our officially licensed vehicles until confronted by Soviet forces. I believe this action to have done more than any other action on our part to convince not only the population of West Berlin, but also the East German and Soviet governments of our determination to be firm in West Berlin. However, any further action to this end has been disapproved.

c. We inaugurated armed assistance patrols to stop harassments on the autobahn. These patrols did effectively stop harassments by East German police and bring about the resumption of control on the autobahn by Soviet military forces. When our patrols were stopped by Soviet military intervention, we countered with the increased movement of armed convoys on the autobahn. Due to pressure from our Allies, these movements have now been substantially decreased.

d. Tanks kept on the alert near Friedrich Strasse were withdrawn to Tempelhof which was immediately followed by Soviet withdrawal of tanks from East Berlin, although it seemed clear that the presence of the Soviet tanks in East Berlin was embarrassing both to them and to the East German government. This withdrawal was not ordered by higher headquarters, but was undertaken in response to the desire of our government that every effort be made to avoid incidents during the period of probing.

e. When our Political Adviser, and later General Watson accompanied by civilian aides, were stopped at Friedrich Strasse, we countered with a ban on their opposite numbers. Our Allies objected to the identification procedures designed to enforce this ban. To meet their objections, in the face of an insulting letter, we now seek the restoration of the procedures formerly in existence. We have agreed to give up our position with respect to the Political Advisers and have not as yet decided our position with respect to continuing the identification procedures. In my opinion, while not relatively important, this approach does indicate a weakness in our determination which we may be sure will be exploited.

Any examination of these measures other than the rather hysterical belief that an incident in Berlin can cause war will indicate that the measures and the remnants thereof which remain have very little of either bold or dangerous characteristics.

On the night the tank barricades were erected it was clear that the East German forces were nervous. I asked General Watson to get permission to move tanks up if it seemed desirable to have a show of force, but this permission was refused unless and until General Watson was prepared to give a specific reason for their use. In my opinion, a movement of tanks that night would have caused consternation in East Germany and in any event could have done us no harm.

Some weeks ago I pointed out that in case of attack there would be no time to then establish an Allied Command. Steps to minimize the time delay have recently been taken. However, no Allied Command not functioning prior to an attack can ever be formed in the time available if an attack does develop. To date, my recommendations for a specific and separate plan for American action have failed to receive any comment.

Also for some weeks conduct to be followed in case of an uprising has been under discussion. If such an uprising should occur and we based our conduct on tentative draft instructions, it could result in my opinion in situations which would be almost intolerable for our position here in the free world. We can depend neither on telephonic communications nor on detailed instructions in the event of a real emergency.

There have been too many who have interpreted the relative quiet of the past several months as an indication of a Soviet desire to negotiate. This I doubt, as the Soviet pattern of pressure has always been a period of application of extreme pressure to the point of risk, followed by a period of quiet. Since as soon as they relieve the pressure we accept it and discontinue any aggressive actions which we may have initiated, they prepare, as they are certainly doing now, their next move. It seems clear to me that our lack of firmness on the ground has made the East German and Soviet governments confident that they can take many additional steps to destroy the morale and economy of West Berlin without risk. I realize that for many years our representatives in West Berlin have been charged with having developed “localitis”. I can only say that it is as clear to me in 1962 as it was in 1948 that we can save Berlin without war only if we refuse to yield further at any point.

However, since we have no specific policy to guide our activities here, I find we must fight each particular case through almost every echelon of government. Obviously, the majority of the actions we could take here do not require such prompt action as to prevent telephonic recommendation, even though the time lag for instructions to return here can often make it impossible to associate counter-action with action. Moreover, some of these actions which we should take are too insignificant to warrant telephonic recommendation although their accumulative effect can be most damaging.

In any event, the instructions under which General Watson must operate are much too rigid for any advice I may give to him to have any value. Hence, I would like to be relieved from this specific responsibility. It has not been clearly understood here that I have neither responsibility nor authority, and this must be made completely clear. Of course, if an emergency develops I will do my best to communicate by telephone. However, I can not accept any responsibility for failure to act in Berlin if there is no time for such communication. Moreover, I have done all that I can do to change our policy in Berlin. I do not believe I am helpful to you or to anyone else in continuing to press my views on individual cases, knowing that they are not consistent with our policy in Berlin even though it is a policy I can not accept.

However, I would be negligent in my duty if I did not specifically recommend once again and for the last time that pursuant to the general policies of the United States and under the general instructions which he has received, our Commandant be authorized and held responsible for taking those measures in an emergency which he deems necessary to support and maintain our position in West Berlin. I believe that the next moves against West Berlin will start soon, possibly with the new East German customs law as it is applied, and that we must meet each move head-on when it occurs. I want to make it very clear that I am not asking for any further authority for myself. Nevertheless, as the senior American representative in Berlin I can not see our position lost by default without clearly reporting to our government that this could happen under our present instructions.

I am fully aware that this makes my presence in Berlin symbolic only. I am also aware of the obligation to the people of West Berlin which I assumed by coming here voluntarily, and of the firm commitment which I made to the President. However, I would rather be here for the remainder of my stay merely as a symbol than to participate in an advisory capacity in a course of action which I do not believe can be successful, or to accept the outward aspects of a responsibility which has no meaning since those I would advise have no authority to act.

I did not discuss these matters at any length with you when I was in Washington as our meetings were beclouded by the publication of a secret cable which obviously made it a bad time to discuss what may be basic differences.² While we may not differ at all in basic principles, it is very difficult for me to reconcile our strategy and tactics with these principles.

Please be assured that my commitment still stands, and the timing of my departure rests in the President’s hands. Nevertheless, I could not stay here even in this role without making it very clear that I believe our actions here to be so timid and cautious as to vitiate our policy.

I am deliberately expressing my views in a period of relative calm because I expect the strangulation process to start anew soon. If it does not develop, then it will soon become apparent that I am not needed here. If it does develop, I do not believe it can be stopped either with timidity here or with case by case decision in Washington. Since my viewpoint as to our course of action here differs from our apparent intent, I must so advise you before a situation develops which could be embarrassing to both of us. This might well influence the decision as to how long I should remain. While I am here, I shall try to play my symbolic role as best I can and to avoid actions which would be embarrassing to you and to our policy. However, I am out of character.

Sincerely yours,

Lucius
General, Retired
U.S. Army

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Clay Cables. Personal and Confidential.
2. On December 21 Clay had sent Rusk a telegram (1223 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-2161) complaining about the tight restrictions under which military officials operated in Berlin. The Washington Star obtained a copy of the letter and published an accurate summary of it on January 4 despite efforts by the Department of State to stop it. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 4; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192) On January 6 and 7 Clay was in Washington for consultations, and his telegram was the main subject of conversation. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 6; ibid.; and memorandum from Taylor to Lemnitzer, January 9; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 6A, Berlin)