Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:43 p.m.

1768. Eyes only for Ambassador. This telegram deals with three aspects of your next meeting with Gromyko:

(a) General purpose of next round (paras 1-3);

(b) Contingency instructions in event discussion goes very badly (paras 4-7);

(c) Comments on your telegram 1988 (para 8).²

1. We have given thought to your suggestion that we should now state to Soviets that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate “peace treaty” in order to avoid highly dangerous situation. Although under any realistic assumption our purpose in trying to make an arrangement with Soviets is to provide for situation after signature of their “peace treaty”, we are inclined to believe that, for next meeting at least, we should still keep discussion within broader framework and not yet indicate we have come to conclusion that all hope of arrangement other than for in extremis situation has been abandoned. This is intent of basic instructions which you will be receiving in separate telegram.³

2. We see purpose of next round, therefore, as essentially to impress on Soviets that rigid maintenance of their present position will prevent agreement but that some flexibility on their part may provide basis for progress. Moreover, meeting will provide occasion for us to get certain documents on record which will be helpful in building public case in event of continuing deadlock and Soviet decision to publish their declaration together with Free City Statute and Protocol of Guarantees.⁴

3. As you are aware, there has been considerable speculation that Soviets really want to bury Berlin issue and that their seemingly unhurried approach to Gromyko’s exchanges with you reflects desire to talk subject to death. We know you do not share this view and evidence is certainly lacking to substantiate it. If anything Gromyko says or which comes to your attention from other sources tends to confirm such an intention, report it immediately.

4. We would, therefore, want to avoid at present stage, if at all possible, any implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty. Should, however, your discussion with Gromyko on basis of instructions go very badly and should he clearly indicate that Soviets desire to break off talks so that they may proceed to signing of peace treaty, you may, if you consider it essential, observe that perhaps differences are so great between two positions that only practical course seems to be to focus on situation which will arise when Soviets sign separate “peace treaty”. Highly dangerous confrontation would inevitably result if effects of that “treaty”, without prior understanding, were to be what Soviets allege.

5. You might then raise question of status of West Berlin after signature of “peace treaty” between Soviets and GDR. Soviets claim that effect will be to terminate occupation and that arrangements for access to city must be made directly with GDR. As Soviet Foreign Minister well knows, Western Powers do not accept premise from which this description of events derives, namely, that Soviets by an agreement with East German regime can dispose of Western rights in Berlin which was never part of GDR. Soviets have implied, however, that as a matter of procedure, a prior agreement between four occupying powers might be envisaged which would be subject of subsequent agreement between Soviets and GDR. Soviets have indicated what they think should be content of such prior agreement. This initial Soviet position on content is clearly unacceptable to West. Since we cannot agree on status of West Berlin, or on guaranteed form of access such as International Access Authority would provide, and since Allies cannot negotiate with GDR, it would seem important to avoid dangerous situation that we attempt to find agreement on how access to Berlin will be administered after peace treaty. If we can agree that this would be useful subject for discussion, we would be prepared to proceed on this basis.

6. You might then reiterate point contained in para 8 of basic instructions that, if Soviets have other problems with respect to Berlin they can raise these. You might also note that they have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights which do not require such confirmation but for acceptance, as one of facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with the problems involved. If you consider it useful, you may also wish once again to briefly review how we see present situation in West Berlin lest there be any misunderstanding on part of Soviets as to status of Western sectors (para 12 of Deptel 1615).⁵

7. You might then conclude by again making point about avoidance of collision course in Berlin contained in para 8 of instructions and expressing hope that Soviets will reflect upon situation which their position is creating along lines para 10 of instructions.

8. Following are comments on specific points raised in your 1988:

(a) Since your discussions with Gromyko do not purport to be on behalf of French and since we are showing them your instructions only for information at same time they are sent to you, see no reason why summary of International Access Authority proposal and all-Berlin proposal should not be put forward, as provided in instructions, as proposals for purposes of discussion in same way as you originally raised question of International Access Authority. Although distinction between exploratory talks and negotiations at times seems metaphysical, Soviets presumably aware that neither side is making binding commitments to other at present stage. As you are aware, all-Berlin proposal in form suggested for presentation to Soviets is agreed Four-Power document and is Annex in Washington Working Group Report as approved by Foreign Ministers in September 1961.⁶

(b) Text of proposed statement to be made by you and left in writing with Gromyko is being sent in separate telegram.⁷

(c) As you will note, language in paras 2 and 3 of draft instructions (which also being sent you in separate message) has been modified to play down emphasis on “extreme” positions. However, logic of argument being put to Soviets is precisely that we are being more reasonable than they by not advancing positions which we believe to be correct but which other side maintains is totally unacceptable; this shows sincerity of our desire to reach agreement. You will note that arguments against free city have been expanded along lines suggested by you.

(d) We wonder whether our point on compatibility of International Access Authority and of overflights with “respect for GDR sovereignty” is not relevant. As we understand their position, Soviets have maintained that need for such “respect” might be met by prior Four-Power agreement which Soviets would then undertake to have GDR accept. However, they appear also to have made additional argument to you that very concept of International Access Authority, with its excision of area of sovereignty from GDR control, is incompatible with that sovereignty. Similar argument has been made in attacking unregulated air access to West Berlin. Purpose of argumentation in para 5 of present instruction and on overflights in previous instruction was to make point that, even judged by existing practices elsewhere, such Authority or overflights are not per se incompatible with sovereignty. This fact, combined with Soviet agreement with GDR on basis of prior Four-Power understanding, should, therefore, presumably take care of all aspects of “respect for sovereignty of GDR”. While we believe foregoing argument is persuasive, and would be effective in oral statement if this subsequently published, we would not want insist on its inclusion if you believe this would really be counterproductive. Please advise us urgently if this is your conviction.

(e) Language along lines suggested by you regarding discussion of “other problems” has been inserted.

(f) If Gromyko should attempt to pin you down on composition Board of Governors Access Authority, you are authorized respond along lines suggested para 5 your 1988.

9. We are commenting separately on your 2026.⁸

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand on January 26; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Kaysen, Guthrie, and Bohlen; and approved by Kohler.
2. Telegram 1988, January 19, transmitted Thompson’s reaction to the draft instructions that had been sent to him on January 18. (Ibid.)
3. Document 274.
4. See footnote 2, Document 264.
5. Document 259.
6. A copy of this report is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951.
7. Not found.
8. Telegram 2026 from Moscow, January 24, stated that Soviet policy had been marking time for some months and that Gromyko might be inclined to string out the talks on Berlin. Thompson then offered several reasons for this attitude. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/1-2462) In a reply on January 29, the Department of State agreed that the Soviets seemed to be drawing out the talks, but felt that it was still too early to come to any conclusions. (Ibid., 762.0221/1-2962)