Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

238. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/10

Paris, December 12, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • State Secretary Carstens
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Minister Krapf
  • Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)
• British
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Sir E. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. W. B. J. Ledwidge
• French
  • Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Laloy
  • M. Mayer (Interpreter)
• US
  • The Secretary of State
  • Assistant Secretary Kohler
  • Ambassador Bohlen
  • Mr. Percival

SUBJECT

• Berlin and Germany

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the third quadripartite Foreign Ministers’ meeting on Berlin and Germany with his apologies for being late to the afternoon meeting. He stated that the French Government did not believe it would be good to accept a statement of some kind or another of willingness to negotiate with the Soviets. Especially in view of recent Soviet statements, i.e. Khrushchev statements before the WFTU and Ambassador Menshikov’s speech in Washington on December 11, 1961, the French Government felt that a readiness to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of Western weakness. He repeated that the French Government was not opposed to Ambassadorial soundings being made in Moscow by one or several Ambassadors. The French, however, did not believe it would be good to state this willingness publicly or have it endorsed by the NATO Council. Such a statement of one kind or another would merely indicate a weakness in the Western position, he repeated.

Lord Home said he would like to pose a question. He believed that Couve had said he did not object to soundings by one or several Ambassadors in Moscow. He wondered whether this statement meant that the French Ambassador in Moscow would be ready to take part in such soundings.

Couve replied that he had not said that the French Ambassador would take part in such soundings. The French Ambassador in Moscow was always in touch with the Soviet Government but he would not now participate in the soundings which were under discussion. By the phrase “one or several Ambassadors”, he had meant that soundings could be undertaken by the American Ambassador or by the American Ambassador and the British Ambassador. It was his impression that the British would like to be associated with the American Ambassador’s efforts as had been the case in New York with the Rusk-Gromyko talks.

Lord Home commented that Couve’s position posed great difficulties for the four powers. He observed that the French indicated a willingness to see exploratory talks take place but it was difficult to understand why the French Ambassador should not take his share in these talks since the three powers were partners in the same alliance system and had similar responsibilities concerning Berlin.

Couve replied there was a very simple reason. The Soviet position was very clear to the French and had been made more so by the recent Soviet statements to which he had earlier referred. Therefore, the French saw no reason for the exploratory talks to take place.

At this point the Secretary asked for a fifteen-minute recess.

After the recess, Lord Home stated that he was very worried indeed. The French were taking the position that exploratory talks might weaken the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets but it was a fact that within 24 hours the four Foreign Ministers would have to appear before the NATO Council without any position whatsoever with respect to negotiations. The NATO countries, however, insist upon negotiations and the differences which exist would become publicly known. If there were to be Western contacts with the Soviets, they should be based on an agreed Western position. Otherwise the West would be in a terribly weak position. The Soviets would take advantage of this situation to sow confusion in the NATO alliance which was undoubtedly one of their principal objectives. He asked whether the introduction of the adjective “exploratory” before the phrase “diplomatic talks” in the formula under discussion would help the French.²

The Secretary observed that the four Western powers seemed to be in a very grave position. The US had tried to explain why it believed it was necessary to make an approach to the Soviets to ascertain whether there was a possibility of negotiations due to the potentially grave threat to the peace which the Berlin situation posed. The US had no illusions or false hopes concerning the course of such negotiations which would not be easy. The US was not prepared to make concessions to the Soviets which might be regarded as unacceptable by the US and its allies. At the same time, the US saw the possibility that the crisis might become so acute as to lead to a nuclear war. In such a situation, it was imperative to have the complete support of and unity of views within the NATO alliance. He was obliged to wonder whether there is in fact an alliance. When there are overwhelming necessities in dealing with a given and specific situation and this feeling is completely shared by the alliance, the US feels that each member country should overcome its marginal doubts about a particular move so that the alliance can take unified action. He said he was appalled at the possibility of what might happen if the Foreign Ministers left this and the NATO ministerial meetings in obvious disarray. The Secretary asked how the French Government foresaw the most probable course of events if the four Foreign Ministers adopted the view that: there should be no negotiations with the Soviet Union, no exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, and no contacts with the Soviet Union on an agreed Western basis.

Couve responded that the Secretary had mentioned two matters: the alliance and its attitudes and what should be the appropriate course of action now taken by the four Western powers. As to the first, he did not doubt that most of his NATO colleagues yearn for negotiations. It was quite evident that a majority of the NATO countries desired negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin. I think, he said, that France and the United States are very much in agreement on the substance of their position. He did not think that the US had decided to or envisaged making any concessions, even on the status of Berlin, which would endanger Berlin. The French-US difference was on tactics. I would not, however, he said, say the same thing for all the NATO countries, for many of them at the bottom of their hearts do not share our view of what must be maintained in Berlin. One of the differences is in assessing the importance of NATO country attitudes. Concerning the second matter, he said the problem was what should be the Western course of action. The answer to this mainly depended on the Western estimate of Soviet intentions. He doubted that the Soviets would take a major risk over Berlin. He said the Soviets wished to obtain their objectives by frightening the West. They have already removed their time limit on signing a separate peace treaty. While he did not know the future, he doubted that there was a great risk to be run and that the Soviets would lead the West to war. He asserted that if the West takes no action, the Soviets will be embarrassed and not know what step to take next.

When the Secretary commented that if this was the case, both sides would be in an equal position, Couve replied that this might be the case. Nevertheless, it was the Soviets, not the West, who wished to make changes with respect to Berlin.

Lord Home observed that he did not believe that the NATO nations want negotiations for negotiations’ sake. NATO did not favor the “sacrifice” of Berlin. If the NATO nations, however, are to make the sacrifices and great efforts needed to face the Soviet challenge over Berlin and possibly be asked for more sacrifices, then they must be satisfied that every avenue be explored with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not agree at least to exploratory talks being undertaken with the Soviet Union so that there would be some position to present to the NATO Council.

Couve replied that all thinking about the situation returned to the same basic thought. What was important to the Foreign Ministers, in his view, was not what the NATO Council might think but what the Soviet Union thinks and intends. He opined that if the West showed a willingness for or a desire for negotiations at a time when the Soviets are acting as they recently have, the Soviets will believe the West is both frightened and weak and is therefore, requesting negotiations. Even an outsider, he said, would then judge that NATO had demonstrated its weakness in the face of Soviet threats.

Lord Home countered that it was clear what the Soviets would think about NATO if the four Western powers could not even talk about exploratory talks with the Soviets. In such a situation the NATO countries would publicly demand negotiations. He could not understand why, if the French did not object to exploratory talks, they did object to exploratory talks on the basis of agreed positions. He noted that the formula considered in the morning merely called for contacts with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not take the position that recent Soviet statements indicated that Khrushchev showed no current interest in serious negotiations but that if Gromyko wished serious negotiations, the Western Ambassadors in Moscow would always be available to receive any initiative Gromyko might wish to make. Thereby, the onus for further initiatives could be put on the Soviets.

The Secretary stated he could not accept this concept, for important and vital interests were involved. He was not certain that all the governments participating in the consultation with respect to Berlin and Germany were aware that war might result from the current situation. There was a basic casus belli involved in the situation. The American people, he said, would only go to war with good consciences. They would wish to believe that they were fighting for a just and honorable purpose. He would prefer not to take up Lord Home’s concept since the West could not leave to the Soviets alone the decision as to whether or not anything more should be said concerning the problem of Berlin and Germany.

Lord Home replied that he was not particularly taken with his own idea which he had merely advanced in the hope that it might be something with which the French could agree.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that he had two particular comments to make. He wanted to emphasize that the German delegation had just learned about the Menshikov speech in Washington during the course of the morning. He had not had an opportunity to read a complete text of what Menshikov had said. From the press accounts, however, he could only conclude that Menshikov had repeated most of the ideas contained in the Soviet November 1958 note with certain minor differences with respect to military matters. Menshikov had also rejected the idea of an international access guarantee. Most of the statements which the Soviets make, in his opinion, seem to repeat the demands of 1958. At the same time, the Soviets are faced with a similarly clear purpose and firm Western position which has rejected most of the Soviet argumentation. There is a great gulf between the positions of the two sides. But nothing obliges the West to believe that it does not have some chance to bring about a shift in the Soviet position which was the purpose of the formula suggested during the morning session. What the West wishes to explore is the possibility of reducing Soviet demands. In his opinion, the West should proceed with further exploratory talks without illusions towards goals on which the West is united. The West was agreed on objectives. The current principal difference was on tactics. If the West is to engage in exploratory conversations with the Soviets, it should be done on the basis of a unified agreed NATO supported position, for only in this manner would the Western effort be impressive to the Soviets. If the Western position was not solid and unified, the Soviets would exploit Western differences. In his opinion, unity of purpose and unity of objectives would be supported and clearly demonstrated if there were procedural unity. The procedure suggested in the formula involved no commitments. Equally decisive was the fact that diplomatic efforts had to be accompanied by the NATO military build-up. He agreed with Secretary Rusk that public acceptance and support were required not only for the military build-up but also for the Western position in general, and that Western public opinion would not be satisfied unless it was certain that the Western governments had fully explored the Soviet position. He did not believe that the procedure suggested was harmful even though the French argued that it was due to the two recent Soviet statements. What was more harmful was that if the West seemed in a state of confusion the Soviets would try to cause more trouble. He opined that the Soviets interpreted unified Western action as a sign of Western strength and thought that it represented an effort on the West’s part to nail them down in an effort to come to a solution of the Berlin problem. Therefore he believed that the Foreign Ministers should agree to further exploratory talks with the Soviets to see if a real basis for negotiations might exist.

Couve responded by asking whether anyone thought that, exposed to the current trial of strength, the best reply to the Soviets was an expression of willingness to negotiate. He thought that Western display of anxiety to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness and as a sign of Western sensitivity to Soviet intimidation. The best response, in his opinion, to Soviet tactics was to say that if the Soviets behaved badly, there would be no negotiations.

Foreign Minister Schroeder reiterated that in his opinion the recent Soviet statements were largely repetitive of previous positions. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets keep publicly answering public statements by Western leaders and thus restrict the area of negotiating flexibility. In his view, it was necessary to let the Soviets know that we could not accept their contentions but that we were willing on the diplomatic level, not in the public arena, to see if there was not some real basis for a negotiated settlement. In some circumstances he might agree with Couve’s views but there were two important factors to be borne in mind. In the first place, the Soviet Union was in a position to create changes with respect to Berlin to the West’s disadvantage. Either we responded to Soviet salami tactics with protests only or the West had to react more strongly to Soviet moves which might require serious military actions. Serious military steps, however, could not be taken until public opinion was convinced that there was a necessity for such action and was convinced that it was necessary for the West to stand and fight if need be. One cannot, he said, always wait for what appears to be a more propitious time for conversation. The enemy was materially and psychologically in a position to exert strong pressure on the West. He felt it was essential to explore the Soviet position further before the Western area of maneuverability and flexibility was again narrowed.

The Secretary observed that if the Soviets in two different recent speeches on two different days had prevented the West from moving forward together in unity, then these speeches would be two of the most fantastically productive speeches ever made. In a certain sense what the four countries thought was of a major importance was of major significance because of their responsibilities. But it was also important that the NATO alliance display unity. Other countries of the alliance also had their vital interests. An appearance of complete NATO disagreement would make Khrushchev more bold. If he were convinced there was no NATO unity and agreement on how to deal with the Berlin crisis, he might gain the impression that the Western alliance was gravely weakened. This might seriously increase the dangers of miscalculation on his part. In all frankness and good will, he felt obliged to say that he had thought the four Western powers were agreed on the substance of their position. He had to confess, however, that if the most minimum move to develop the substance of the Soviet position was rejected, the U.S. would have to review the whole situation to see if it and its allies were in fact agreed on substance. It would appear that review would be necessary to ascertain whether all four powers had the same objectives. Maybe, he said, Khrushchev is trying to prevent negotiations and will go ahead and sign his separate peace treaty and thus initiate a grave crisis. On the other hand, he may let his threatening campaign peter out. In any case, large risks are involved which must be clarified. The Secretary stated that it would be helpful to him for the four Foreign Ministers to speak alone in private for he was obliged to report to the President and he wanted to clearly understand the French position. After this conversation, he thought it would be possible for the Ministers to determine what might be said in the NATO Council and what should be said to the Press.

Lord Home supported the Secretary’s request. He stated that the possibilities of an understanding should be thoroughly exhausted for otherwise “disaster stares us in the face”.

A private meeting followed in which the Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again at 9:45 pm, December 12, 1961.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Percival and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay.
2. See Document 236.
3. No record of this meeting has been found.