Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

237. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/9

Paris, December 12, 1961, 2:15 p.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

• Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin
• Dr. Klein
• Dr. Lemmer
• Dr. Bahr
• The Secretary
• Mr. Kohler
• Mr. Hillenbrand

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The Secretary began by extending his condolences on the death yesterday of Senator Lipschitz. He then said he knew that sometimes the line to Berlin seemed a long one from Washington, and that he would be glad to try to answer any questions the Governing Mayor might have.

Brandt said that the most important political and psychological question for the Berliners was the relationship of the City to the Federal Republic. He did not know what the Western position was since he had not yet seen Foreign Minister Schroeder. However, there were reports of proposals for changes in the status of West Berlin which had caused fears. Any transformation of the City into an isolated area with only weak links to the Federal Republic would destroy confidence in the future. The Secretary said that, as a matter of international law, West Berlin was under tripartite occupation. This had led to the suspension of inconsistent articles of the Basic Law in 1949. Thus Berlin was not a Land of the Federal Republic under international law. It was essential to maintain occupation rights as a basis for access rights. The Federal Republic and Berlin could not provide such a basis between them for access rights. Thus the status of the City was intimately linked to access. We recognized that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic were of utmost importance and we did not want to diminish them. The word “contract” had crept into discussions. We did not have in mind that the Federal Republic and Berlin should sit down to negotiate a contract. We would maintain as against the Soviets that West Berlin must have the right to work out its own arrangements with the rest of the world, including the Federal Republic. Many of these arrangements already existed. From an international law point of view these ties rest on consent. We are not suggesting that the constitution of the Federal Republic be changed as long as our position is not affected but vis-á-vis the Soviets we feel that the Occupation status of the City must continue as basis of access rights. Moreover, the Secretary continued, from the point of view of the US people, there was another factor. We had an absolute commitment to the security of West Berlin which was a casus belli all the way to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. This was a complete commitment. It was easier to justify this as something we had undertaken on our own responsibility rather than as part of a NATO force. We would, therefore, sustain and protect the relationships between Berlin and the Federal Republic, but not on the basis of the Federal Republic’s constitutional position.

Brandt pointed out that, even if one could not accept the legal concept of the Federal Republic, many legal and formal links between the two had been established with the consent of the three Occupation Powers, sometimes even at their request. West Berlin should not be regarded as an area with no obligations towards the West German State. The Secretary noted that there might be a difference in what we would say to the Soviets and to the Germans. If the Soviets take the position that East Berlin is not to be discussed, we could respond by saying they have no interest in West Berlin. We want to protect our position with respect to the Soviets. We recognize that intimate links have grown up between Berlin and the Federal Republic and that they are vital to the City. However, we could not expect to translate these into de jure links in any formal agreement with the Soviets.

Brandt said it might strengthen Western tactics if, on certain points, the Western Powers told the Soviets that they also had to take account of the commitments and agreements which they had with their Allies in West Germany and Berlin. The Secretary said he thought it would, in fact, work out this way. Brandt commented that the idea of a new contractual agreement could cause difficulties if the Soviets regarded themselves as silent partners. The Secretary said that, while the relations between the two were not constitutional relations, the Federal Republic and Berlin had links based on the mutual consent of the two. We had to be careful in dealing with the Soviets not to give them a chance to attack our access rights because of such an alleged constitutional relationship. In confidence, the Secretary continued, he wanted to tell Brandt that we wished to reserve the right to put to the Soviets, under certain circumstances, the possibility of making West Berlin the Eleventh Land of the Federal Republic by removing our suspension of the pertinent articles of the Basic Law.

Brandt asked whether the US would demand certain changes in the present situation in Berlin, e.g., removal of the wall. The Secretary said we would put forward an all-Berlin proposal which would cover restoration of free movement in Berlin, but we could not have very much hope that it would be accepted. Brandt agreed with this estimate but thought that it might be possible to get some additional movement between the parts of the City.

In response to the Secretary’s inquiry as to whether the Mayor had any doubt as to the US commitment on Berlin, Brandt said he had none but that there were many people in the Federal Republic who had such doubts. He had made this point in a recent memorandum to the Chancellor and to party leaders in Bonn. The Chancellor himself had not been convinced before his visit to Washington. He had returned convinced and perhaps even a little frightened at the extent of the American commitment. Brandt said he also had the impression that the US was now somewhat more convinced that responsible German leaders were prepared to play their part in this serious commitment. The Secretary agreed that some of our doubts had been removed. He also thought that the point had been clarified in Khrushchev’s mind, despite his speech on Saturday which did not change much. Khrushchev was perhaps not in the position of strength he had thought he was some eight or nine months ago. Brandt wondered whether he might not come to the same conclusion about his small chances of success in negotiations, as he apparently had prior to his breaking up the Summit meeting in 1960. The Secretary noted that, if the present situation merely dragged on and the Soviets turned over more and more of their responsibilities to the East Germans, this would be followed by a series of erosions. If so, he thought, we should try to pin the Soviets down specifically soon rather than just sit.

In response to Brandt’s query as to the talks with Gromyko in New York, the Secretary said that the results had been essentially procedural: (a) the Soviets were aware that we would not recognize the GDR; (b) they were aware we would not negotiate with the GDR on access to West Berlin and that the Soviets would have to take care of any arrangements with us with the GDR; (c) removal of the deadline.

Brandt commented that, in an interview less than two weeks ago, CBS Correspondent Daniel Schorr had asked Ulbricht regarding the peace treaty. The latter had said he was convinced the GDR would get it in 1962 but did not specify when, and in general did not give a very clear impression. On the substantive side, the Secretary continued, Gromyko made no concessions but a certain clarification had been achieved such as his knowing we would not accept the Soviets in West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary’s question, Brandt indicated that there had not been much recent discussion in Berlin about a UN role in the City. The Mayor said he had never believed in moving the UN headquarters there, and considered this unrealistic. However, UN agencies would be welcome in Berlin, although he was not “too enthusiastic” about the idea of replacing German agencies with UN agencies. The Secretary commented that we likewise did not believe in moving the UN headquarters to Berlin. This was both a matter of US national interest and prestige. However, movement of certain UN agencies there was another matter. Before his death, Dag Hammarskjold had expressed the view that the ECE might be moved there from Geneva.

Reviewing the current economic situation in Berlin, Brandt said it was better than people thought it would be under the circumstances. Production was increasing despite the heavy manpower losses incurred through the cutting in two of the City. There had been some out-flow of capital to West Germany, but the trend had begun to stabilize early in October and things were now as good as they could be. There was still some movement of people out but people were also starting to come in again. He did not want Berlin to turn into a ghetto and favored free movement of people in and out. Progress was being made on the project to establish West Berlin as a world educational and cultural center, and the efforts of the Federal Republic in this area were being concentrated in West Berlin. The City Government had set up a planning group, with representatives from business, government, trade unions and the universities to assist in this work. He had been fortunate in obtaining the services of Professor Schilling to replace the recently deceased Senator Hertz as Senator for Economics.

The Secretary asked what the other vulnerabilities of West Berlin would be if there were no military action against the City and present access could be maintained. Brandt said these were really negligible. The only weak spot was sewage disposal which is still handled by a common all-Berlin system. If this were disrupted, conditions in West Berlin would be very bad. The City would be forced to dump its sewage into the lake and canal system. This would, however, also badly affect the surrounding GDR areas. Hence there was a strong common interest in maintenance of the present sewage disposal system. As far as water, gas, electricity, and city transport were concerned, West Berlin was self-sufficient. As a matter of fact, Brandt continued, he was convinced that the Berliners could carry on during a certain period of blockade if there were trouble with access.

Brandt explained the various efforts being made to achieve at least a certain measure of movement over the sector boundaries in humane cases. The SED had so far refused permission for family visits over Christmas, but there were indications that General Watson’s approach to the Soviet Commandant on this subject had been reported back to Moscow. Brandt favored discussion of this general subject in its broader terms at the Four-Power level to be followed by recommendations to the Germans to take care of the details.

In conclusion, the Secretary returned to the point that Khrushchev also has his worries—not only about the conditions in the Bloc but also in connection with the basic power situation between the Soviet Union and the US. He had been surprised and angered but impressed by the President’s speech of July. He did not expect such a vigorous US reaction to his threats.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the U.S. Chancery.