Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/12

Paris, December 12, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

• French
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Laloy
  • M. Alphand
  • M. Mayer (Interpreter)
• British
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Killick
• Germans
  • Dr. Schroeder
  • Dr. Carstens
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Mr. Krapf
  • Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Cash

SUBJECT

• Negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin

M. Couve de Murville opened the meeting by asking if the group should now resume its discussion on Berlin.²

Lord Home said he would agree, but after lunch he had a few additional things he wished to say about the Congo.

Couve then asked what the group wished to discuss about Berlin.

The Secretary said he felt it was of the greatest importance that we come out of this meeting and the NATO meeting with obvious unity in the West. Otherwise there would be dangerous discouragements. He felt the differences disclosed in the discussions had not been as wide as it had seemed at first glance or as the press seemed to feel. We, ourselves, have not seen a basis for negotiations in the Soviet statements on Berlin. We are under no illusion that the Western position is negotiable with the Soviets. Khrushchev’s proposals are not negotiable from our point of view. We do think it of the greatest importance to continue to discuss the matter with the Soviets, especially two or three specific problems. We have a very important domestic issue in the US, where we have called into service about 300,000 reservists some of whom are not happy. We have increased our military budget by 6 billion dollars and will add more in January. We have disturbed our situation at home to increase our strength, and it is, therefore, of the greatest importance to us to be able to say, as we get ready for war, that we are doing everything possible to avoid it. The American public does not expect concessions that would damage the Western position. The pressure of public opinion in negotiations would be for firmness.

The Berlin issue should be precipitated sooner rather than later in order to get a fresh commitment from the Soviet Union. We believe that they are in the process of improving their military weaponry, which will make it more difficult to deal with them in a year or eighteen months. We should recall the ICBM development. The Soviets very early said that they had a fully operational ICBM, and they seemed to think that this was all that was required. They moved with great confidence and aggressiveness. The ICBM illusion has now been dispelled in both their minds and ours by intelligence activities. Today they don’t push political developments on the ICBM basis. However, they are presently saying that they have solved the anti-missile missile problem. We don’t believe that these are in production, or that they will be for some time, but just a few anti-missile missiles could set them off on a renewed period of over-confidence and aggressiveness. Their recent tests indicate that there has been some significant technical advance in the nuclear field. Therefore, we don’t want to drag out the discussion of Berlin, because in 12 or 18 months it may be more difficult to handle.

Our problem is not to assume that a basis for negotiations is already in existence but to see if a basis can be found. This can be accomplished only by responsible contact and by the participation of all four. The US would be uncomfortable doing this alone or with one or two others, in fact in any way except with the participation of all four. The question is how to be in responsible contact on an agreed basis to discover whether a basis for discussion of Berlin exists. There are many ways this could be done. This is the range of problems we might discuss to see if we can find a basis for agreement.

Lord Home said he was quite certain that our aim must be to come out of NATO united. The basis for negotiations is not apparent and may not be found, but it is just possible that it could be found after much discussion. Therefore, we must find out. The alternative is a possible nuclear war. We cannot break off contact. Maybe the Russians won’t make war, but they might. Therefore, we really must find out, and we ought to do it all together. The results will affect all of us alike. This can be done in various ways. First of all, the Foreign Ministers might begin a discussion on a broad basis and proceed to a narrow basis or begin with a narrow basis and proceed to a broad basis. Or secondly, we might continue the discussions in Moscow. It might be most profitable for the Ambassadors to talk with Gromyko to discover whether there is, in fact, a basis for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting on Berlin. Meeting through the Ambassadors would be normal diplomatic practice. It is hoped that something like this will be acceptable to all of us. If there is not agreement in NATO, very serious differences will be revealed to the public and do great damage.

Couve said he agreed that we might have difficult discussions in the North Atlantic Council where everyone was anxious to reach a settlement, get rid of the problem, and believe that everything was all right so that they would not have to worry or spend money. However, our difficulties with the Soviet Union are more important than those with our allies. Concerning the substance of the Secretary’s remarks, the French had never taken a stand against the principle of negotiations. However, it is really not very useful or good for our position to enter negotiations in a situation where no basis for negotiations exists. We need only think of the recent Russian speeches to produce misgivings. However, there is no difficulty in accepting that explorations can be made to ascertain whether a basis for negotiations exists or not. If a basis appears, the French are quite ready to reconsider concerning formal negotiations. In the past explorations there were some discussions on the procedural aspects of the Berlin problem. Even the question concerning our relationship with the “GDR” remains unclear and might be further explored. There was some exploration of this and there was some mention of other problems, but it is fair to say that the substance of any Berlin status was not fully explored. It seems especially after the most recent Soviet speeches that it would be worth while exploring again with the Soviets the question of the status of Berlin, the garrisons, the question of with whom any agreement on access should be concluded, as well as the question which is so important for the Germans of the relations between the Federal Republic and the West Berliners. If that should be useful and could be done by diplomatic contact, he would not see any objections from the French side.

One thing probably would remain open to controversy, that is how any exploration should be made, by whom, and on whose behalf. That is the difficulty. The French do not wish to take a final position now. If explorations are made officially on behalf of all it is difficult to see how this is different from negotiations because all would be committed. He understood the Secretary’s feeling that it was good for one to take the responsibility and not the others. This is quite clear. The French share this view. For the past three years and especially the last six months we have been discussing these matters every day. His idea would be that if there were any kind of approach in the discussion of further explorations on Berlin, it should not be the beginning of negotiations. He would prefer that it be done by one ambassador for reasons of convenience. One of the ambassadors in Moscow might make the exploration. He would not commit anyone not even his own Government. He might see what field should be covered and what questions there were to be raised, and where we needed to have a statement of the Russian position in order to see what we should do. We could then decide on negotiations, or wait, or proceed with explorations, or whatever. The French don’t think we can have a systematic view under present circumstances. It is quite evident that the situation has changed since August, and it may be completely different in a month from now.

The Secretary said he thought we were moving in a constructive direction. In looking back to the talks with Gromyko, one of the things that had inhibited further development of an exploration for a possible basis of negotiation was that that kind of discussion tended to become a kind of negotiation. The Secretary had not felt much consensus. He had felt that the flanks and rear were exposed and that he could not explore very far. He didn’t think there could be much difference in the degree of responsibility of involvement in exploratory talks and in actual negotiations. He didn’t think that the US Ambassador could take a tentative position with the Soviet Union. He could not believe the Soviets would believe the Ambassador was not committing at least the US Government. The basis for negotiations is a long way down the road and can be reached only after further discussions, and there could not be a significant degree in differing responsibilities in exploration and negotiation. For explorations to move on, they would have to be quite precise. We have been categorical on some points, but there are aspects which cannot be developed except on a quadripartite basis.

Couve said he could see it was hard to draw the line.

Lord Home said that the choices were between a Foreign Ministers’ meeting when they would be in a position to make commitments, or exploration by the Ambassadors obviously following a coordinated line which would be put to the Soviets without commitment. He would have thought the latter, though difficult, would not be impossible. We could give an indication of how we were thinking without being committed. There could perhaps be a series of Foreign Ministers’ conferences with adjournments from time to time. We could work through the three Ambassadors with German support. This would be a laborious process, but it would be possible.

Couve said he did not think it would be inconceivable on the basis of the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches³ to go to Gromyko and say that we have noted them and ask whether this was in fact the Soviet position. We could ask for explanations. We could ask the Soviets if they think any negotiations with the West are possible on that basis. The Soviets would once again state their positions. We could then discuss this among ourselves and agree that it was not possible to negotiate on that basis. We could then say this to the Russians and see the result.

Lord Home said he thought it was possible to move the Soviets in an argument. Of course they could say that our occupation rights could not persist. We would say that they must. This subject might then be left aside with each side maintaining its own position.

Couve said that we had discussed this for two months at Geneva and then passed exclusively to Berlin discussing an interim arrangement. We then had the question of what would be the situation at the end of the interim arrangement. We had said we would start afresh without our rights having been prejudiced. Gromyko had never accepted this. He had never said yes or no. He had wanted to be free to say that all our rights had been abolished and that we would have to start anew with no rights. That was one reason why we had come to no agreement. If we had come to an agreement, we would have been in a bad position now not knowing what our position was in Berlin.

Lord Home said we would certainly know what our position was even though the Soviets denied it. He reiterated that he felt it was possible to argue the Soviets out of certain things.

Couve said it did not appear very encouraging to him and he wondered why it was necessary to make a statement now.

Schroeder said that it was difficult to know if the Soviets were proposing diplomatic negotiations, or if the Soviets felt contact should be through ambassadors, foreign ministers, or the summit. We don’t know what lines the Soviets are thinking on, and it may be worth while to exchange views. There have been the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches, the interviews with Spaak and Lange, and the letter to Fanfani,⁴ all of which were only variations on the opening note the Soviets sent us in November 1958. If, as a matter of fact, a common line is found, for example that the three Ambassadors in Moscow would contact the Soviets, it would be useful to do this in close contact with the Germans, who would send experts to reinforce their Embassy in Moscow.

The Secretary said he felt it was very important to establish demonstrated unity among the Four and NATO in order to prevent the Soviets from getting a sense of disunity and to prevent fishing expeditions with Spaak, Fanfani, Lange, or one of the Four Powers. They will attempt to exploit disunity. Disunity on our part would be a serious political weakness.

Lord Home then said he would like to propose the following formula:

“The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken, on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers, in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government.”

If we find a basis we would then have a Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that this was very close to the actual position. There could be negotiations if an adequate basis were found. This would not be found by public speeches but through discussions.

Couve said the NATO position was not the essential thing. The essential thing was our position vis-á-vis the Soviets. He knew there might be some NATO difficulties, but this should not influence us too much. The real issue is between us and the Soviets, not among the NATO allies.

The Secretary said he thought if there were agreement among the Four, there would not be any difficulty with the allies. If the Four disagreed there would be difficulty. It would be difficult to proceed if the rest of the allies seemed dissatisfied. It would weaken us in relation to the Soviet Union. The allies would come along if the Four were in agreement.

Lord Home said there would be real trouble in the Alliance if the Four could not agree. There was a feeling within the Alliance and even within the UK, that the military effort could not be sustained if at the same time we were not trying to find whether or not there was a basis for negotiation. He would have thought this should have been carried through jointly. He would have thought his formula was not far off.

The Secretary said that if there were no further talks in the weeks ahead, there was a real possibility that the Soviets would go ahead with their separate peace treaty. They might call a conference not limited to the Soviet bloc alone and might get the participation of a number of the Belgrade Powers. But if some activities were in the process it would be much more difficult for the Soviets to act.

Lord Home suggested the substitution of the phrase “on the basis of prior consultation” in his formula.

The Secretary said he would prefer the original wording. “Consultation” was too shadowy for the present situation.

The Secretary then read Mr. Kohler’s suggestion for the NATO communiqué.⁵

Couve said his problem was always that this would be negotiation.

Lord Home said exploration would be all right, but exploration gets near to substance.

Couve said that if the formula were put in this way, it would be more on the side of negotiation than exploration.

Lord Home suggested that the meeting might adjourn for a few moments to consider his formula.

The Secretary said that in any event as much as was covered by the formula would occur and in a most disorderly fashion unless agreement were reached. The Soviets were going to play, and unless the matter were handled responsibly we would all suffer. He had been impressed recently with the large number of people who say they know how to get along with the Soviets. He had to admit he didn’t.

The meeting then adjourned to consider the British formula informally.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay.
2. For the beginning of the discussion, see Document 234.
3. For text of Khrushchev’s address to the Fifth World Congress of the WFTU, December 9, see Pravda or Izvestiia, December 10, 1961; for extracts and a summary of Menshikov’s speech at the National Press Club, December 11, see The New York Times, December 12, 1961.
4. Spaak visited Moscow in September and Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange visited the week before the Western Foreign Ministers met in Paris. Khrushchev had written to Italian Prime Minister Fanfani on August 22, who in turn had sent a letter to Kennedy describing Khrushchev’s approach. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIII.
5. Not further identified.