239. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and President de Gaulle1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President of the United States
- President de Gaulle
- Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
- Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR
The object of the call, which was placed by the President on the recommendation of Secretary Rusk (who was in Paris at the time), was to try to get de Gaulle to agree to the following text which had been agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers (US, UK, French and German) in Paris, but which de Gaulle had refused to accept:
“The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government.”
The President told de Gaulle how important it was that Allied unity be maintained, and that we all together move forward in order to try to find a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Government. The President said he hoped that de Gaulle would find it possible to agree to the foregoing text.
de Gaulle said he had two objections: (1) The text referred to “diplomatic contacts”, but did not specify by whom, and (2) it mentioned “on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers”, whereas there were no such agreed positions in so far as France was concerned.
The President stressed his concern at the fact that our positions should be different at a time when we may be finding ourselves close to war. He said he felt that every effort should be made to bridge the gap between us, in order to impress Khrushchev with our unity, and to find an acceptable basis for negotiation. In this way, we would have the [Page 680] whole alliance with us and we would be all together. We would see whether a basis for negotiation existed, and if it did not, we would have lost nothing and we would have demonstrated our unity. We could then see what should be done.
de Gaulle said he could not agree to any language which stated or implied that France considered that it was wise to undertake, or to move toward, negotiations with the Russians. He said over and over again in different terms, that Khrushchev does not want war, that therefore he will not start a war, that the thing for the West to do is to stay put and let Khrushchev come forward with his proposals for negotiation. de Gaulle said that he was not opposed to contacts being undertaken if certain countries wanted to do so, but this was up to them, and France did not wish to be drawn into negotiations because of such contacts.
de Gaulle then suggested that the text in question should contain some such words as: “The NATO Council would approve a proposal that certain countries should continue contacts by diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union.”
The President objected that the use of the words “certain countries” would emphasize differences of opinion within the NATO Council, and that the word “continue” would imply that such contacts would be bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was not desirable.
de Gaulle then proposed that the word “undertaken” should be used instead of “continue”, and that the language be left vague with regard to what countries should undertake the contacts.
de Gaulle then proceeded to object to the second half of the foregoing text on the grounds that it went too far in implying that France might be prepared to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union. He reiterated his strong conviction that it was unwise to make any move toward negotiation at this time, and that France would not be a party to any language which implied that it might, even under certain conditions, be prepared to do so. He said again that it was up to Khrushchev to come forward with his proposals.
de Gaulle made several suggestions, from which it proved possible to arrive at the following agreed text:
“The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken in the direction which the West is following in order to preserve world peace. The Council hopes that these contacts may serve to ascertain if a basis might be found for negotiations.”
The President tried hard to get de Gaulle to accept “on the basis of carefully prepared positions” before the words “in the direction”, but de Gaulle was adamant. First of all, he said that diplomatic contacts [Page 681] were usually preceded by careful preparation and that the proposed language was, therefore, redundant; then he said that in any case this language was obnoxious because it implied that there existed agreed positions between France and her Allies, which is not the case.
The President asked whether de Gaulle thought that it might be possible for France ever to reach agreed positions with her Allies on the subject of negotiations with regard to Berlin, to which de Gaulle replied that there could not be agreement on the point at issue, which was that whereas we felt we should move toward negotiations with the Russians, he, de Gaulle, was of the opposite opinion.
In conclusion, the President thanked de Gaulle for his consideration of these matters, and said he was glad to have had this chance of talking to him. He said he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should now discuss the problem further, and that he would like to call de Gaulle again tomorrow or the next day, should he consider it desirable. de Gaulle said he would be glad to talk to the President again at any time.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, France/Security. No classification marking. Drafted by Tyler who interpreted for the President. President Kennedy was in Washington; President de Gaulle was in Paris. According to Bundy’s record of this conversation, it took place about 1:15 p.m., following a Rusk-Kennedy conversation in which Rusk explained that only the President could change de Gaulle’s position on the statement. (Memorandum for the record; ibid.) For de Gaulle’s reaction to the telephone call, see Alphand, L’Etonnement d’etre, p. 366.↩
- The Foreign Ministers discussed the agreed text at 9:45 p.m. and how it might be presented to the North Atlantic Council. (US/MC/13; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000) It was subsequently discussed by the Council on December 15. (Polto Circular 76, December 16; ibid., Central Files, 375/12-1661) For the final text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 505-508.↩