Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

195. Message From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Prime Minister Macmillan’s Private Secretary (de Zulueta)⁰

Washington, May 10, 1963.

The President has asked me to report that in sending the following message on the MLF, he does not mean in any way to put this topic ahead of the test ban matter on which he has just read the Prime Minister’s last message. He will be replying to that at the first of the week, and while his own reading of the Khrushchev letter is somewhat less optimistic than the Prime Minister’s, he has given instructions that there be as few gloomy rumors as possible until the next move has been agreed between the Prime Minister and himself. Message follows:

Dear Friend:

I have talked with David Gore about recent developments in our plans for a multilateral nuclear force, and at his suggestion I am writing directly to you to ask your support at a point that I may be decisive in the progress of the large-scale undertaking we began at Nassau.¹

In spite of all the criticism and lack of understanding with which the Nassau agreement was met at first, it has weathered the winter very well. The Polaris agreement between our two countries is clear and good, and I would not want to have the job of opposing it in either country. The inter-allied nuclear force is well on its way; if we can judge by the latest discussions in NATO, its real values are going to carry the day; the French have been reduced to haggling over names, mainly because their own best people know that the idea is a good one for them as well as for NATO. So two of our three projects are pretty well settled.

There remains the multilateral force. As I said to David, the Germans have now come aboard in terms that are very satisfactory indeed, although there is still some bargaining to be done about costs and shares. I enclose a copy of the Chancellor’s last letter² to show just where matters now stand. Between the Germans and ourselves much more than half of the total effort is assured, and some of the smaller poorer cousins like the Greeks and the Turks are waiting only for a complimentary ticket.

But what this club now needs most is the joint support of the Nassau partners. I believe that with such support, the MLF will be sure of success. And what is much more important is that with the U.K. as a charter member the enterprise will serve the larger ideas of a big Europe, an Atlantic partnership, and a reconciliation of independence with interdependence. And these, as we both know, are very large prizes indeed.

I recognize fully that in your country as in ours there are honest sceptics about the MLF—though I’d be glad to turn some of our zealous admirals loose on Admiral Mountbatten. I recognize also that many Englishmen think the Germans should be kept quiet in other ways. But your reports from Bonn will probably run with ours in expressing the depth of the German desire for nuclear reassurance through a shared enterprise. What is encouraging about this German desire is that its basis is not an ambition for independence, but a deep need to feel sure that the nuclear powers will be there when needed—with the result that as far as we can tell the Germans actually prefer to keep our finger on the trigger, at least for the present.

Finally, I recognize that your commitment to British Polaris submarines puts a limit on the funds available for a British share in the MLF—and I understand also that while you gave a fair wind to the project, from Nassau onward, there is no contract that binds you to any specified share of it.

But I have watched with interest and respect the serious and growing support which you and your colleagues have given to the MLF idea through the winter—in your own statement of January 30, in Shuckburgh’s statement in Paris on February 27, and in the March meetings in London between your Government and Merchant’s mission.³ This support has been of great importance already, and I think it is well understood in Germany, as it is here.

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle’s insistent and self-imposed isolation has been matched by his even more determined commitment to an independent force. In a queer way he, who appears to dislike Nassau, has made all three of its parts more important: your Polaris force because it is not easy to see how Britain could be without an independent force while France insists on having one; the inter-allied force, because it holds the gate open for some real French participation in NATO; and the MLF, because it is the best available way of making it clear that the French force in its present form is not the only—or the best—way of giving the Continent a real share in the most modern form of deterrence.

Through the winter and spring our own thinking and planning for the MLF have been greatly refined. We are now clear about the value—and the preferability, for these purposes—of surface ships; we are clear about the things we do and do not need to ask of our own Congress; we are clear that control should be unanimous among the major participants; we are clear that the whole idea—complex and demanding as it is, and hard to understand at first—offers a new hope for unity in NATO and a path to safe partnership with the Germans.

And while the Russians write about it in their usual unhelpful way, Thompson and our other interpreters report that their noises are significantly mild, for them—and that they do seem to understand the enormous difference between a thoroughly mixed force that simply cannot be fired without the consent of its nuclear members and a force that might go off on the unauthorized whim of some “revanchist.” And indeed the truth of the matter is that the MLF will be at least as safe from this standpoint as the nuclear weapons now deployed to German forces, under our custody, on the Central Front.

So I return to my main purpose, which is to ask if you and your colleagues can now make a definite commitment to participate in the multilateral force. We do not need to decide exact shares at this time, but as I understand it what has been discussed among our colleagues is a possible contribution on the order of 10%. I myself strongly believe that whatever the immediate hazards or costs may be, the long-range interest of your country, as of ours, lies deeply in the assured success of the MLF, along with the well-started inter-allied force. We must show all Europe which are the nations that really care for the common interdependent interest.

What does not go forward eventually slips back—so I believe we ought to do all we can to keep the momentum we now have on all aspects of Nassau. What I would hope is that your Government might see its way in the next few weeks to a clear decision in principle. Such a decision would pave the way for prompt negotiations looking toward a basic understanding among prospective participants.

A British decision to join will be immediately helpful in Italy, where it is more important than ever that there be encouragement to a reaffirmation of support for clear commitment to NATO and an active role in its affairs. What is more important still, your decision would confirm the Germans in the responsible choice they prefer to make, and it would put an end to what is otherwise the very real possibility of a Franco/German cooperation in nuclear weapons systems in the narrow Gaullist spirit.

I understand that on the naval side our experts are already in touch with each other, and I am making arrangements to insure that David Bruce is kept fully up to date on our thinking. I do want you to know once again that while I see the costs as well as the opportunities, for us both, I am convinced that the moment for a determined advance together is here.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Eyes Only.
1. See footnote 1, Document 194.
2. See Document 192.
3. For text of Macmillan’s statement to the House of Commons, see House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 670, cols. 955 ff. A summary of Shuckburgh’s statement to the North Atlantic Council was transmitted in Polto 1068 from Paris, February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US/Merchant) Regarding Merchant’s talks in London, see Document 183.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.