196. Strategy Paper Prepared in the Department of State0
Washington, May 17,
1963.
NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Ottawa, May 22–24, 1963
1. Salient Features of the Current Situation
As Ministers gather for the meeting at Ottawa, five factors dominate the Atlantic scene: [Page 576]
- a.
- Gaullist opposition to an expanded EEC and an effective NATO has had a depressing influence on the Alliance. The crisis provoked by the French in January has been succeeded by a search for ways to cope with French intransigence, without sacrificing all possibilities for progress in Alliance and Common Market matters.
- b.
- As the Cuban crisis has receded into the background, East-West relations, except as regards Laos, have moved into a calmer period; the Soviet bloc, like the West, seems to be undergoing a period of reassessment or consolidation.
- c.
- Western Europe has entered on a period of governmental instability and change; Italy is in the midst of an interregnum while opposition parties in Germany and the United Kingdom appear to be approaching power. Accordingly, the governments concerned are becoming more reluctant to take hard decisions.
- d.
- The Nassau Declaration has stimulated new developments in NATO’s nuclear arrangements, the end results of which cannot yet be discerned.
- e.
- The continuing disparity between accepted NATO force requirements and the force contributions of certain member nations remains a potential source of serious inter-Allied discord.
In these circumstances there would seem to be more need than ever for firm leadership to inculcate a sense of purpose among statesmen unsure of the trend of events in national and international affairs. As is customary at NATO meetings, the United States will be expected to strike the keynotes for NATO action and to establish guideposts by which Allied statesmen may steer their courses.
2. General Objectives
At Ottawa the general US objectives should be:
- a.
- To maintain Alliance solidarity and morale in the face of the French onslaught against a cohesive and effective NATO structure and against an integrated Western Europe. More specifically, to avoid a direct confrontation with the French which would have the effect of aligning them against other NATO members in a divisive conflict; instead, to devise means to carry forward Alliance activities despite French reluctance to participate.
- b.
- To continue to broaden the dimensions of the consultative process in NATO by full and frank exchange of views on political and military problems which should be of interest to all the Allies.
- c.
- To extend the progress now beginning to be made in sharing nuclear responsibility within the Alliance, through decisions on arrangements for the Inter-Allied Nuclear Forces and through private, expository conversations on the Multilateral Force.
- d.
- To set the stage for a sustained US effort in NATO to persuade the Europeans of the need for improved conventional forces capable of prolonged operations in forward areas, thus making practicable a strategy of measured response to Soviet aggression.
3. Political Issues
- a.
- Consultation. Pursuing its recent efforts, the United States should carry the process of frank exchange of views on political problems, both general and specific, even beyond the point hitherto reached. It would be appropriate for the Secretary frankly to explore the nature of the ties binding the Alliance together; the meaning and consequences of independence and interdependence; the effect of preponderant US military power and our wide-ranging interests and responsibilities; the relationship of NATO to East-West confrontations in areas distant from Europe; and similar matters of fundamental concern to NATO. While admitting the difficulties of dealing with crisis situations to the satisfaction of all concerned, the United States can legitimately seek Allied cooperation in building a more generally acceptable structure of consultative practice.
- b.
- East-West Problems. Relatively little need be said in the meetings with regard to specific East-West problems. It will be helpful to explain the situation as regards Laos and Vietnam and to present a brief progress report on the positions in Cuba and Haiti and their implications for Latin America as a whole. On other areas such as Berlin, however, there will be little to add to what Ministers already know. Our views will be sought on prospects for a test ban agreement, on a declaration on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to states not now possessing them, and on measures to reduce the risks of war including direct communication between US and USSR Heads of Government. A sober enumeration of the difficulties standing in the way of any further East-West accords on these subjects at this time will help to dissipate any false optimism on these matters. At the same time, it should serve to counteract French insinuations that the United States is planning to dispose of European interests in direct bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union. On a more general plane, the point should be made that recent developments in the USSR—notably, ideological differences internally and vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists, leadership problems and economic difficulties—suggest that Soviet foreign policy may be moving into a period of greater intransigence.
- c.
- Integration and Partnership. The French would be antagonized and nothing substantial would be gained, if the United States were too pointedly to reassert its support for European integration. We should, however, continue to emphasize in NATO that our goal is Atlantic partnership. In bilateral conversations, US spokesmen should stress both the [Page 578] continuity of American policy on these two main themes of American policy and the firmness and reliability of the American commitment to Europe. A principal objective in these matters should be to set at rest any doubts about our intention to fulfill our commitments to the common defense, in the nuclear area and in others.
4. Military Problems
- a.
- IANF and MLF. We should evaluate fairly the moderate progress incorporated in the organizational arrangements concerning the Inter-Allied Nuclear Force, resisting any French effort further to denature the concept while restraining the British or others from provoking an open fight with the French. Careful press briefing will be required to maintain a balanced public view of the post-Nassau decisions on this subject, which after all represent the only specific accomplishment we now expect the Ministers to approve at Ottawa. It will also be appropriate for the United States briefly to report on the status of the Multilateral Force discussions; others will no doubt do so as well. While Ministerial action on the MLF will be premature and should be discouraged, US spokesmen should convey an atmosphere of confidence and momentum in their comments. Bilateral discussions on the status of MLF negotiations with the UK, German and Italian Foreign Ministers should be useful. Moreover, we should note the increase in information we are making available to NATO nations on nuclear matters and specifically the imminent submission of a proposed new Agreement for Cooperation regarding Atomic Information under section 144(b) of our Atomic Energy Act of 1954,1 as amended, which will permit us to extend this procedure still further.
- b.
- NATO Defense Policy. The US should continue to expound to the Allies the need for a strategy of flexible response to Soviet aggression which will avoid the necessity to resort prematurely to nuclear warfare for the protection of NATO territory. It should urge the Allies to augment their conventional forces and adopt the necessary budget levels and planning practices for this purpose. The objective of US discussion on this subject should be to inaugurate study and action in NATO along these lines after the Ottawa meeting, so that measurable progress may be made this year toward acceptance of more equitable sharing of the NATO defense burden by the Allies.
- c.
- American Military Retrenchment. Allied Ministers will come to Ottawa with suspicions nurtured by press reports to the effect that the United States intends to reduce its conventional forces in Europe, either because of dissatisfaction with Allied performance or because of balance of payments difficulties. Any American comment giving currency [Page 579] to these suspicions would have disruptive effects running far beyond the meeting and in fact, in Western Europe generally. It is essential to avoid any reference to American planning on these matters pending completion of the President’s trip to Europe and high-level policy decisions in the US Government as to whether or to what extent the American force structure in Europe should be altered.