Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

194. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Multilateral Force

PARTICIPANTS

• Assistant Secretary Tyler
• Ambassador Merchant, S/MF
• Mr. Spiers, EUR/RPM
• Mr. Denis A. Greenhill
• Minister, U.K. Embassy

Mr. Greenhill reported that when Ambassador Ormsby Gore saw President Kennedy¹ subsequent to the Ambassador’s meeting Friday with Under Secretary Ball,² he had advised the President of the U.K. views on the MLF as they had been transmitted to the State Department. The President told the Ambassador that, given the situation resulting from the Italian election, U.K. participation in the MLF was more desirable than ever and he hoped the UK would be prepared to make a statement of its position. The Ambassador had noted that, while the US wished to proceed apace in order to achieve a treaty by September, the UK had to go slow. The President had agreed to provide the U.K. Embassy “this week” with a paper setting forth what the UK could contribute to the MLF and what “price tags” could be assigned to various items and facilities which the UK could make available. The President wanted to send this paper to the Prime Minister to reflect on in the hopes of gaining an early U.K. decision. The President had spoken to the Ambassador of the UK taking a 10–15% share of the MLF. The President reportedly had not realized that the Prime Minister believed that the UK’s Nassau commitment was to contribute Polaris submarines to the NATO Nuclear Force and not necessarily to participate in the mixed-manned element of this Force. The Prime Minister understands the U.S. desire for U.K. participation but believes that this would require a new U.K. decision. The Macmillan government is already under attack on this general question. This is why a U.S. paper such as the President promised would be invaluable in helping the UK make up its mind.

Ambassador Merchant reviewed the highlights of his talks with Lord Home and Prime Minister Macmillan in London which covered the possibilities of U.K. contributions “in kind” to minimize cash requirements. He recalled that the communiqué³ issued at the end of his talks recorded the hope of HMG to find the means to participate in the MLF.

At Mr. Greenhill’s request Ambassador Merchant reviewed present U.S. thinking on the schedule of activities on MLF negotiations and Congressional consultations between now and September, including the concept of working out agreed instructions for representatives of governments who would participate in a drafting group. Mr. Greenhill expressed alarm at the time schedule contemplated. He asked whether we considered that agreed terms of reference would be recorded in a common document and signed by governments. Ambassador Merchant noted that there were a variety of ways in which the objective could be accomplished. In substance, what we sought was agreement by governments to assign representatives to the negotiation and to give them common instructions on certain basic issues. This would not constitute a commitment to sign the agreement resulting from the negotiations. We hope that this stage of agreement in principle could be reached by the time the President goes to Europe (about June 20).

Mr. Greenhill said that this schedule would give the UK “big trouble.” He could not judge how amenable the Prime Minister might be to these suggestions since this is clearly a very sensitive political issue: Macmillan is under attack both from the opposition and from elements of his own party. Ambassador Merchant noted that while the treaty would be open-ended, the US preferred that the UK be in as a founding member. He estimated that we would be able to give the UK a paper confirming the time schedule he had outlined, the nature and content of the terms of reference, an indication of what we would hope the UK would find possible to contribute as its share, and that payments could be made, in part at least, “in kind.”

Mr. Tyler said that he had passed on to the White House and to the Acting Secretary the suggestion that Ambassador Ormsby Gore go to London to work this problem out. Mr. Greenhill noted that Ormsby Gore had not been thinking of going so immediately as next week, and that the Ambassador would be away from May 10–14. He said the Ambassador expressed the hope that he might look over the papers which we would send to the Prime Minister before they are despatched, since he might advise on the best way of presenting the issues involved.

In response to an observation by Mr. Tyler, Mr. Greenhill noted that there would be a useful impact on the British Labor Party if “Willy Brandt and Company” came out in favor of the MLF. He said that the UK was quite prepared to continue with talks on the technical level between the US and UK Navies while the basic political consideration was going on.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Def 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers.
1. Gore met with the President from 4:02 to 4:30 p.m. on May 3 (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book), but no other record of this meeting has been found.
2. Memoranda of Ball’s conversation with Gore on the MLF and IANF are in the Department of State, Central Files, Def 4 and Def 12 NATO.
3. Not found.