Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

193. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 3, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President on the Multilateral Force, Friday, May 3, 1963 in the Cabinet Room

PRESENT

• Secretary Ball, Ambassadors Merchant and Finletter, Messrs. Tyler, Rostow, Chayes, Smith, Admiral Lee, State; Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Gilpatric, General Taylor, Admiral Ricketts, Messrs. Nitze and McNaughton, Defense; Commissioners Palfrey and Ramey, AEC; Mr. Bundy

Secretary Ball opened the discussion, listing those MLF problems which needed early decisions. These included Congressional consultation; approaches to the British; key elements to be incorporated in the final MLF charter; and Greek, Turkish, and other participation in the Force.

Secretary Ball said the State Department did not think Congressional consultation could be deferred much longer. Congress was becoming restive about the MLF and the situation would not be eased by the Bundestag discussions on the MLF which were due to get underway next week in Bonn.

Secretary McNamara disagreed. He said he was unaware of Congressional restiveness and questioned the wisdom of engaging the Congress, at least until an attempt had been made to bring the British on board.

After a further exchange, the President said discussions on the Hill were certain to leak and this would put the British in an embarrassing position. He therefore thought it best to delay the discussions on the Hill until after an approach had been made to the British Government. Moreover, the Administration then would be in a position to go to Congress with British and German commitments in hand.

Mr. Bundy asked whether discussions with the Joint Committee could not take place anyway. These would focus on the technical shape of the Force rather than the diplomatic progress of the exercise and provide a technical foundation that would be helpful later. The President agreed these would be useful but asked that they also be held in abeyance until after the British talks.

Addressing Commissioners Ramey and Palfrey, the President went on to say that when talks with the Joint Committee got underway—and he felt that talks with Senator Pastore and the Staff would be extremely useful—it would be important to stress the fact of British and German participation to counter the arguments that the MLF was a “nutty” venture; and remind the Committee that the Administration, with considerable effort and apparent success, had met two of the Committee’s principal concerns—mode and control.

Commissioner Palfrey pointed out there was still the matter of custody but the AEC felt this was manageable. Commissioner Palfrey also brought to the President’s attention the Commissioners’ statement on the warhead and design data security problem. The President said this statement, as well as that of the JCS, which Secretary McNamara gave the President, was helpful. (The JCS document had a paragraph for everyone, but in effect said the MLF was feasible, useful, and desirable.)¹

On the diplomatic side the President felt getting U.K. participation in the MLF was the most urgent item of business. This was particularly important to avoid giving the MLF the appearance of a U.S./German arrangement. Moreover, the British might be reminded that the MLF was an integral part of the Nassau commitment.

After some discussion it was agreed that discussions with the British would get underway next week in London, with Secretary Ball, Admiral Ricketts, and John McNaughton joining Ambassador Bruce for these talks. To keep the noise level down, Secretary Ball would travel to London alone, (ostensibly to discuss trade problems) while Admiral Ricketts and John McNaughton would travel a separate route, via Paris.

In this connection, Secretary McNamara raised the question of the British financial contribution. He felt this should be no less than 10% of the total. Given other commitments, he thought 10% might impose a very heavy financial burden on the British. He therefore felt we would have to help the British and suggested this might be accomplished by revising other arrangements we had with them. He proposed looking into these possibilities immediately after the meeting.

The President agreed with this general approach, but said he wanted to clear in advance the instructions for the British talks, including the proposed financial arrangements.

The President then turned the discussion to the Italians. After some discussion of the political uncertainties in Rome, the President suggested a message go forward to Fanfani, urging early Italian commitment to the MLF. He was prepared to leave the form of the message to Ambassador Reinhardt’s discretion to avoid putting Fanfani in an embarrassing position.

In reply to the President’s question as to what might be done for Spaak, Walt Rostow undertook to speak with Spaak next week—since he will be in Brussels then on other business. He also agreed that he would keep these discussions on a very general plane.

The President then returned to the subject of Bundestag discussions on the MLF. He wondered whether Adenauer could not be asked to have them postponed until we talked with the British and were ready to start our own consultations with the Congress. Mr. Bundy thought this was feasible, especially since Adenauer left this possibility open in his letter. The President asked that Adenauer be told we were delaying our consultations with the Congress, pending talks with the British and hoped the Germans would do the same.

Ambassador Merchant mentioned that the Greeks and Turks were anxious to participate in the MLF. Their principal problem was money, but he felt some formula could be found to meet this problem. If they joined, control arrangements probably would have to be modified.

Mr. Bundy then raised the question of the negotiating timetable. He thought we should move ahead as quickly as possible, but did not think it would be useful to be tied to a fixed and arbitrary schedule. We did not want to feel we were defaulting if we did not have an agreed treaty by September.

After an exchange on the Rockefeller/Nixon nuclear ploy, the President said it was necessary to make our political case clear and convincing. Mr. Merchant said such a paper was in preparation in State, and Mr. Bundy asked that it be fully coordinated with the White House, Defense, and AEC.

In conclusion, the President reiterated that the first order of business was trying to get the British on board. Congressional consultations would follow.

D.K.²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Secret.
1. Presumably a reference to JCSM–350–63, May 2, to the Secretary of Defense, which began with a statement that there was no military need for a seaborne MLF, but that, given adequate participation and support by the Allies, it was feasible and would be an effective and useful supplement to NATO nuclear strength. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files)
2. Initialed by David Klein.