Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

183. Memorandum From the Head of the MLF Negotiating Delegation (Merchant) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, March 20, 1963.

This memorandum is intended to provide a summary of my visit, together with Gerard Smith and Admiral Lee and other members of the Team to Paris-Rome-Brussels-Bonn-London-Paris between February 22 and March 17. It will be supplemented by more detailed reports and recommendations.

I return encouraged over the prospects for an MLF, of a character which is sufficiently responsive to certain of our European allies’ desires and at the same time acceptable to the United States. A substantial element of the leadership of important members of the Alliance wants an MLF—and any doubts on this score in the United States should be set at rest. If the United States does not move with this European pro-MLF drive, Gaullist forces will be encouraged and Atlantic Community hopes set back.

In response to pressing invitations, we have scheduled visits beginning early in April to The Hague, Athens and Ankara. I think it is important to accept their invitations. We may well encounter serious interest on the part of one or more. None of these countries, however, in my judgment is crucial to the establishment of an MLF and none is in a position, with the possible exception of The Netherlands, to make any significant contribution of resources. Therefore, the next round of capital visits should not be the cause for any delay in the United States Government reaching a definitive position re MLF.

On this second trip it will probably be desirable to return to one or more capitals covered in the first circuit, as well as stopping in Paris to reassure NAC that it is being kept abreast of significant developments. In this connection, Stikker now appears to be an outspoken advocate for the MLF, although he has serious reservations concerning several aspects of our concept. If he can be kept in this constructive frame of mind, to which his Washington visit contributed so much, he will be a valuable ally.

As you know from reporting telegrams, I made clear that we were on an exploratory mission to ascertain whether the basis for the negotiation of an agreement existed. In every capital I emphasized that, as a result of our deepened and intensified studies in recent months, we had reached certain conclusions which we desired to share with our allies and exchange views.

Certain aspects of our concept gained ready acceptance by all. Among these were that an MLF would be managed and controlled by its owners, assigned to NATO and fitted appropriately into the NATO military command structure. Another was that an MLF should be created by Charter or Treaty, in a form suitable for ratification by governments, in accord with constitutional requirements, and that it should be open for later adherence by all NATO members prepared similarly to accept its obligations and responsibilities and contribute a fair proportionate contribution to the enterprise. No single member should contribute more than 40 per cent to the total cost of creating and operating the fleet. An administrative organization, with an Executive, would need to be established to handle budgetary, administrative and similar matters.

The concept of mixed-manning was generally accepted and there was general agreement on its practicability, particularly in surface ships. There was also general acceptance that the MLF should not be created at the expense of conventional forces.

Crucial Elements in Our Concept

Three elements in our concept which are crucial and still not fully acceptable abroad:

1. The Force should be a surface force;

2. Whereas many administrative decisions might be taken by a vote less than unanimous, the vital decision to grant political authority to use the nuclear weapons of the Force should be taken by unanimity of the principal owners in a political committee representing all the owners; and

3. Specific shares of the cost of creating the fleet, with its necessary supporting establishments, and the recurrent expenses of operating and maintaining it, including possible later modernization.

On costs, we used the round figure of $500 million a year over a ten-year period, pointing out (in considerable detail) that this figure was incomplete in that it did not take into account past R&D (which would run in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars) or modernization costs. The latter would be designed to take later advantage of developments in the art of missilery and similar future developments in technology. This item of modernization, I said, might amount to something like $1 billion over the ten-year period, with the bulk of such expenditures naturally coming toward the end of the period. I pointed out such additional capital investments would be the subject of future decisions of the owners. Past R&D we would want to discuss in more detail but I said I thought we would be disposed to be generous in the treatment of this item when it came to costing.

On the question of cost sharing, I spoke at all times of a U.S. contribution of the order of one-third. I think some made an unwarranted reference that we might be prepared to go to 40 percent. In Bonn, I made clear that I would expect the Germans to match our contribution. In Rome, I talked in terms of Italy taking on 15–20 per cent. With Spaak I spoke of a Belgian contribution of the order of 5 per cent. In London, I talked of a British contribution of 5 to 10 percent.

The Nature of a Preliminary Agreement

I am convinced that before we enter a Preparatory Commission or Conference to draft the Treaty, the participants in such a body must have reached specific advance agreement on the following key elements, in addition to an agreed declaration of intent to proceed with the creation of an MLF:

1. A mixed-manned surface fleet of X ships and Y missiles to be assigned to NATO and appropriately fitted into the NATO command structure;

2. The Force should be created at no prejudice to the conventional buildup in NATO;

3. The political decision to authorize the use of the weapons would be made in a committee of the owners (on which all major owners would sit), voting by unanimity of major owners or some other specific formula which would safeguard our interests;

4. A specific agreement on the percentage of the total cost which each participant would bear, with the total amounting to 100 per cent; and

5. Some provision authorizing detailed multilateral planning and possibly other preliminary steps in advance of the Treaty coming into force.

I think it would be foolhardy to enter a Preparatory Commission unless prior agreement had been reached on these key points. It is possible that further examination will indicate other points or elements which should be similarly covered in the Preliminary Agreement.

Reaction by Countries

Italy

Fanfani expressed great surprise at our stated strong preference for surface ships. He claimed that he had presented the MLF to the Cabinet and to the Parliament as a concept which Italy supported on the assumption that it would be composed of submarines. How much of this was bargaining, how much due to prior exchanges with the Germans, how much to the fact that the Garibaldi is a political liability and also a surface ship, and how much due to a desire to find a justification (during the election period in which the Government is paralyzed) for stringing out technical talks is hard to say. I do doubt, however, that his surprise was entirely genuine, and I suspect in some degree all of the reasons I have cited played a part. Compared to this issue, the other elements of our concept as presented did not seem to give great difficulty to the Italians who appear to be prepared to support the MLF with substantial resources.¹

Belgium

I saw only Spaak (with de Staercke) in Brussels and found him somewhat preoccupied with domestic political problems related to the MLF but still full of enthusiasm for it. He did raise the serious point of the Belgian Government’s belief that something had to be done to make their conventional forces combat worthy and that it was hard to see how funds could be found for an MLF over and beyond those needed for improving their conventional forces. I think Belgium will continue to give loud vocal support to the MLF without commitment. However, if an MLF is in certain process of creation with the US, Germany and the UK among its founding membership, I believe Belgium will scramble aboard the bandwagon.²

Germany

Our discussions in Bonn were in greater depth than in any place else and, on the whole, quite satisfactory. The Germans are strongly prosubmarine but I think it is significant that von Hassel, during the course of our visit, took public credit for having originally suggested the surface ship. Unanimous political control by the major owners is the other point which gives them difficulty. I believe they genuinely fear the risk in years to come of a leftist or neutralist government in one or two other countries which would be members of the MLF. Privately, they spoke of both Italy and the UK in this connection. The Germans do not want to contemplate the Force being paralyzed for use in the supreme crisis by one weak member. The control issue I think can be worked out with them but it is a real problem in their eyes. On all the other points in our concept, I think they are all right. They give clear evidence of willingness to match any US share in the cost of the MLF.³

United Kingdom

The attitude of the British in the first meeting was decidedly tepid. Lord Home’s first reference to it was in terms of “the UK not necessarily being opposed in principal to the MLF”. Later in the day Macmillan was more forthcoming but showed an alarming sensitivity to the possible effect on innocent merchant shipping coming into British ports in a crisis (such as the recent one over Cuba) if there were merchantmen armed with missiles and intermingled with this commercial movement in the sea lanes.

The second day went very much better and ended up with the British talking in terms of how they could help with other allies and where they might find the money in their budget to finance a 10 per cent interest. They even spoke of UK commitment of nuclear warheads to an MLF. If this occurred, I believe the UK move toward the continent would be clear to all. It should also make our case with Congress go better.⁴

Summary of Reactions

In summary, I think the Germans are genuinely enthusiastic; and I think the British will find great difficulty in staying out of a nuclear venture like MLF lest it become a new US-FRG “special relationship”. These two countries, with the U.S., would certainly be an adequate starting nucleus and sufficient to avoid the charge we were working on a bilateral nuclear deal with Germany. If Britain did decide to join, Italy in my judgment could not stay out. We must recognize, however, that it is highly improbable that the new Italian Government arising from the elections will be in a position, even if so minded, to sign a preliminary agreement along the lines sketched above until early or mid-June at the earliest. If the UK should hang back and if the Italian elections should indicate a Government of appreciably different complexion from the present, then we would be of course in some difficulty to find the necessary additional political membership to add to Germany’s as well as to finance the balance of the cost. Greece and Turkey in my judgment by themselves or in combination would be inadequate on both scores. Belgium and Holland, while probably adequate politically, would probably find little enthusiasm for joining a project in which the UK and Italy were doubtful starters, leaving only Germany and the U.S.

As one can see, the UK and/or Italy are key to the enterprise. I believe strongly, however, that we should not delay our decisions, reserve our attitude or otherwise act on the assumption that the worst and least likely combination will develop. My belief is reinforced by the leverage we possess with the British to prevent them wrecking our policy in so vital a matter as the MLF.

Some Opposition and Minority Reactions

In France as you know, I saw Couve de Murville. He was amiable but repeated deGaulle’s decision that France had no interest in joining the MLF. (Adenauer told me that deGaulle said he understood Germany’s interest in the MLF and made no objection to Germany’s planning to enter it.) A day or two before I left Paris, Ambassador Bohlen told me that he had had an indirect indication that General deGaulle might want to see me. I do not think this means anything in terms of change in France’s policy at this time. In Paris, I also spent two hours alone with Monnet.⁵ He is a great enthusiast for the MLF and very hopeful for its success. He thinks it essential since he foresees no real movement for some time on British entrance into the Common Market, and he fears a period in which divisive forces will be active. Incidentally, he was insistent that the U.S., at this stage, not contemplate abandoning a veto over the use of the MLF.

In Rome, I was struck by the fact that Piccioni during the entire meeting lasting four and one-half hours never opened his mouth. Fanfani did practically all the talking and Andreotti was vocal and an active participant in the discussion toward its end. What Piccioni’s silence meant, I will have to find a Florentine or Sicilian to explain to me.

In Bonn, I had a long, private lunch with three members of the Bundestag Commission. Erler of the SPD was one, and he indicated support for the MLF.

In London, I had a long talk (at his request) with Patrick Gordon Walker, the Foreign Minister in the shadow Labor Cabinet and a friend of a number of years standing. He said that the leaders of his party were skeptical of the MLF to the point of outright opposition but at the end of our talk he said he had been impressed and that they would have to do some re-thinking on this subject.

The foregoing are odds and ends of impressions for what they are worth. All of them, I believe, were reported separately by our Embassies or in the Merchant Team’s own reporting telegrams.

The Press

On such a complex project as the MLF which has a number of difficult hurdles to clear, I did not find the negative press coverage a serious handicap. On the contrary, more glowing press coverage would have concerned me.

As the reporters get a better grasp of the immense political opportunities that would crown a solution of the large technical difficulties on which they heretofore have tended to focus, I look towards a warming up of the press to the MLF. There will be needed a well-planned, phased information plan and this we are already working on.

In conclusion, before my next departure (about April 1), there is need to re-examine and re-affirm or modify our position on the key elements in our concept and also to review our suggested timetable and procedures. There is also a good deal in the way of further technical work to be put in hand. The status of consultation with Congress and a systematic plan for further action in this respect is also needed.

In my own view, the key questions and the ones causing the greatest difficulty are: (1) submarines vs. surface and (2) political control by unanimity.

On the former, I urge that we close out the submarine alternative definitively at the present time. The acceptance of surface ships would be more palatable, however, if we could hold out some legitimate hope that in a later modernization program or for a later additional increment to the fleet, submarines could be seriously contemplated. We would, of course, have to be sure that we were in a position to properly hold out such a hope, however cautiously and carefully phrased the language would be.

On political control, I am frankly increasingly more concerned over the question of “positive control” (by which I mean degree of assurance that MLF would be fired if we should want it to be) than “negative control” (assurance that it could not be fired over our veto alone). In the first situation, I am concerned that there might be in the crunch a timid partner who would veto. This risk both reduces the credibility of the MLF as a deterrent to the Russians and lowers its value to us as a reliable coverer of targets. I am not so much concerned that we would stand alone in voting to withhold firing under any imaginable circumstance, particularly were the UK a member. It is almost inconceivable to me that under the circumstances when all the other partners knew that we were not prepared to loose our own retaliatory forces there would not be at least one partner who would see the lunacy of acting under those circumstances without us. This, however, is a matter on which the President’s judgment must prevail as to what the Congress at the present time would accept. If one assumes we must retain our veto, then I think “the rule of unanimity” should be coupled with agreement to re-examine the voting question at a started future time or times, any change of course being determined by unanimity.

I think we are far enough advanced to take final decisions on all these and on some less important and less controversial points which require re-affirmation of past decisions. The returns are not yet in from The Hague, Ankara and Athens, but none of these will crucially affect the prospects or the outcome. Hence we need not wait for the results. The Scandinavian countries, Portugal and Luxembourg, I consider out and in my own judgment Canada is dubious as even a delayed starter, irrespective of whether Diefenbaker or Pearson forms the next government.

We will have further papers coming to you posing choices and making recommendations, but I thought the foregoing draft which I have dictated hastily might be helpful setting of the stage. Both Gerry Smith and Admiral Lee concur in it though each of them would modify some of my formulations.

Recommendations for Action Now

The Administration up to now has only given conditional endorsement to the MLF, pending the development of concrete evidence of European interest. Mr. Smith, Admiral Lee and I believe that the Team’s visit to capitals during the past month has produced sufficient evidence of European interest to warrant an unconditional endorsement by the Administration of the MLF. In view of the Congressional atmosphere, I appreciate that it will not be easy for the Administration to make a deep commitment to the MLF now—a commitment which will not permit any early change to some other policy.

In the event of such affirmative decision, all appropriate resources of the Federal Government should be devoted to the success of the MLF. Public and Congressional relations must be handled at the highest level and the people of the United States should be brought to realize that the Administration means business about the MLF.

If the President takes this affirmative decision, we should also move promptly to end any European expectations that the United States would supply to the MLF nuclear propelled submarines for the initial force. In view of the past participation of the President in this question it is suggested that an appropriate communication from the President to the Heads of Government of appropriate countries be promptly forwarded. (Drafts are being prepared.)

As an earnest of our serious purpose to try to mount follow-on squadrons of the MLF submarine, we should propose after appropriate consultation, to the Germans and the Italians and other contributors to the MLF a program of cooperation in submarine technology aimed at ultimately putting the MLF in a position something like that of the UK in December, 1962 when it elected nuclear propelled submarines as the platform for Polaris missiles. It is believed that meaningful cooperative agreements could be made with the MLF in the nuclear propelled field without compromise of the most sensitive information referred to in the recent memorandum from Secretary McNamara and DCI McCone on this subject.⁶

Since the Nassau Agreement was reached at the Heads of Government level, it is recommended that a Preliminary Agreement to establish the MLF could appropriately be signed by Heads of Government. An especially appropriate occasion would be President Kennedy’s pending visit to Rome in June of this year. I believe this timetable could be met if the necessary underlying decisions are made promptly and we move ahead vigorously on all fronts.

Livingston T. Merchant

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US/Merchant. Secret. Initialed by Merchant. In a March 20 covering memorandum, which indicates that Secretary Rusk saw it, Merchant suggested a limited distribution within the State Department and “strongly recommended” that a copy be sent to McGeorge Bundy, a recommendation that was approved by Rusk.
1. Merchant reported on his meeting with Fanfani in telegram 1752 from Rome, March 3. (Ibid.)
2. Merchant reported on his discussion with Spaak in telegram 1350 from Brussels, March 6. (Ibid., Def(MLF) 3)
3. Merchant reported on his discussions with Adenauer and von Hassel in Bonn in telegrams 2293 from Bonn, March 6 (ibid., Pol 7 US/Merchant), and 3471 from London, March 9 (ibid., Def(MLF) 3).
4. Merchant reported on the first meeting with the British in telegram 3523 from London, March 12 (ibid., Pol 7 US/Merchant); on the second in telegram 3549 from London, March 13 (ibid., Def (MLF) 3); and on the meeting with Macmillan in telegram 3510, see footnote 1, Document 182.
5. A memorandum of Merchant’s conversation with Monnet on March 2 is in Department of State, Central Files, Def (MLF).
6. Not further identified.