Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

184. Memorandum of Meeting⁰

Washington, March 22, 1963.

MLF

PRESENT

• The President; the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. William Tyler, Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Mr. Gerard Smith; the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Nitze, Mr. John McNaughton, General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral John Lee; Mr. John McCone; Mr. Carl Kaysen

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze to report on the discussions in Paris. Mr. Nitze reported along the lines of his memorandum to Mr. Bundy of March 22.¹ At present, the Dutch, Belgians and Germans were eligible to contribute to the Paragraph 6 forces, in addition to ourselves and the British. Soon there would be a total of eight or nine countries. With our new dispersal the French would become eligible, and after their elections it might be possible to take up the subject with the Canadians. There are still some technical obstacles to Italian participation, and Belgian participation is waiting on treaty ratification. The discussions in Paris revealed some problems with the British on how arrangements would be described, and with Lemnitzer on the details of the command arrangements. These can be worked out in two weeks.

In response to the President’s question of when we would announce this, Mr. Nitze said that we would announce it at Ottawa and we could give it whatever color we wanted to in terms of wording of the communiqué and any accompanying statements made by ourselves. Secretary Rusk commented that, presented as the first step in implementing the Nassau Agreements, these arrangements would appear more important than they would viewed simply in themselves. The Secretary indicated to the President that he would like to raise with the French the subject of possible assignment of their forces when he is in Paris on April 8. The President indicated that this would be appropriate if the dispersal had already been made.

The President approved the next steps on the Paragraph 6 forces as set forth in Mr. Nitze’s memorandum.

Ambassador Merchant summarized the conclusions to which his exploratory discussions in Europe had led. There was no doubt that there was a genuine interest in the MLF in Germany and Italy and even the UK was willing to support it, though not so strongly. The prospect of getting a Preliminary Agreement by the end of June was sufficiently good that we should now make the decision to go ahead. Further, we now have the advantage of momentum; delay will lose this advantage. While he is committed to making a tour of the smaller NATO countries he has not yet visited, these visits are not essential to the decision, which can be made now. Ambassador Merchant asked for new instructions authorizing negotiations for a Preliminary Agreement, and Presidential action with Adenauer, Fanfani and Macmillan to close out the submarines as a possibility at present. This involves the risk of making the MLF non-salable, but we must face it. Ambassador Merchant argued that we can and should mitigate the risk by expressing a willingness to consider at a fixed future period the possibility of another increment to the force in the form of submarine-launched missiles. In addition, it would also be helpful to suggest the possibility of present or future cooperation in the field of nuclear propulsion. Mr. Merchant recommended that the President should inform the Congressional leaders on these points now.

Mr. Merchant noted that there is already agreement on some of the essentials involved in the Preliminary Agreement. These are mixed manning of ships, membership open-ended in NATO, the force to be assigned to NATO, and ownership and operation by a separate organization set up by treaty (or joint resolution in the U.S.). On the vital points of costs and control, further negotiations were necessary. We had to preserve the veto in some way, but this could be done not only through unanimous decision, but also through various weighted voting Schemes. Ambassador Merchant suggested that the control issue be reviewable in five years when the NATO Treaty itself is up for review. There had to be an agreement on costs. Ambassador Merchant had already told the Europeans that the U.S. was willing to pay up to 40%, and that our treatment of overheads of various kinds would be reasonable. Ambassador Merchant stated that the minimum membership had to be the U.S., Germany and one of Italy or the UK. He judged that if Germany agreed, Italy would follow and if the UK joined, both Holland and Belgium would join. Greece and Turkey were eager to join, but could not presently meet the cost. Secretary Rusk endorsed Ambassador Merchant’s judgment on membership. In his views, if Germany joined, both Italy and the UK would feel constrained to join. Ambassador Merchant observed that Italy could not make a commitment before June. He went on to say that we must formulate our views somewhat differently than we had in the past; namely, that, after considering the views of our allies, we had decided that this was a desirable force. We were giving it our backing. We were prepared to amend the Atomic Energy law and get a treaty or whatever was necessary to bring the force into being. It is clear that there were obstacles in European opinion to the success of this effort, especially their concern with submarines which he thought reflected German-Italian collusion. If this effort were successful, it would add strength to NATO and counter DeGaulle’s appeal. In its absence he saw no other course which promised a tolerable result for us. In the short run, there would be great pressure in Germany for land-based MRBM’s. In the long run we would have a problem of Franco-German nuclear arrangements.

Ambassador Merchant felt that we could get an exploratory agreement ready in time to be signed in Rome by the President, and the heads of other European governments involved. On this basis the Preparatory Commission could go to work on 1 July, and the final agreement would be ready to give to the Congress this Fall. Ambassador Merchant pointed to the undesirability of putting this agreement before the Congress in a Presidential election year. If we do not take the opportunity now, it will fail. Secretary Rusk raised the question as to which was preferable, a treaty, or a joint resolution plus an amendment of the McMahon Act.² In response to the President’s question on what amendment to the McMahon Act was required in order to put the MLF into being, Ambassador Merchant pointed out that the ownership and custody of the warhead would lie with the MLF rather than with the U.S., with arrangements to protect the design data.

The President and Mr. Merchant, after a brief discussion of the advantages the Europeans saw in this arrangement as against the present arrangement, moved on to the problem of control. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President asked how we have made the argument in Europe with respect to submarines. Ambassador Merchant responded that he had emphasized the positive case for surface ships in terms of ease of operation, economy in cost per ready missile, and date of availability. In response to a private question by Von Hassel, Ambassador Merchant had admitted that there were political difficulties but stated that these were not controlling. Ambassador Merchant’s impression was that the Germans had made their own head count in the Congress and had come to the conclusion that we would have a hard time offering submarines.

The President then decided that if the Europeans are not ready to accept surface ships, we cannot go on with the offer. Ambassador Merchant urged the need for some language permitting a re-examination of this issue at a later date. The President noted that this would not make sense economically before the 70’s. There was some further discussion of the vulnerability of surface ships versus submarines and of the relative costs of the two modes, taking vulnerability into account, and omitting it. There also was some discussion of the costs of detecting and tracking a surface force. Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and Admiral Lee indicated that in the particular circumstances of European waters, a surface ship force had a real military value. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary McNamara said that if the MLF were accepted by the Europeans, he would recommend in the FY 65 force structure that we reduce the goals of our Minuteman force by a number of missiles equivalent to those that the MLF would provide. [8–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President asked whether we should now write to the Germans and the Italians, defining our stand on the surface shipping control problem. Ambassador Merchant responded that, while he needed to make a second trip, it was desirable that we should make up our minds as soon as possible on the main issue and tell the Germans and Italians that we are now prepared to sign a Preliminary Agreement on a surface-ship force, with the possibility of additional submarine-launched missiles to be examined at some future date, and a control formula, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Secretary Rusk raised the question of timing. Ambassador Merchant has returned from Europe, and must consult with Congress. Secretary Rusk suggested that he make an interim report to the Congress now; consult with the Germans again after his trip to the other European countries; and then come back for final approval of Congress. Ambassador Merchant again emphasized the need for us to be able to say to the Germans that we would like to endorse the proposal because we believe in it, and we are prepared to move ahead on the basis specified, if they are willing. What Congressional consultation would we need before we could say this? Mr. Gerard Smith raised the question of the dangers of an adverse press playback in Europe of any consultation here. The experience of our first consultation with the Joint Committee exemplifies these dangers.

In response to the President’s question of what we should do if the proposal for an MLF dies, Mr. Ball argued that if we present it in a positive way, it won’t die. As a great power, we should know what we want, the Europeans are accustomed to our leadership, and they have been looking for it. He urged that Ambassador Merchant be given a positive instruction to go ahead. The Secretary asked how we could go ahead unless we are sure the Germans are interested. Mr. Ball responded that their interest would depend on our attitude.

The President, after reviewing the attitudes of other governments and the moderation of his own enthusiasm for the proposal, agreed that we should put it to the Germans strongly before the next week was out. He wanted to write to the Germans and the Italians on the basis outlined and leave the matter of Congressional consultation until later. Congress should be given our proposition on what was essentially a take it or leave it basis. The communication to the Germans should invite immediate technical consultation on any problems that remain if they accepted our basic principals.

The President asked whether Ambassador Merchant agreed with this formulation. Ambassador Merchant demurred on the question of Congressional consultation and urged the President to talk to the leadership, and at the same time check on European desire to act on what we consider a good argument. The President again expressed his desire not to consult with the Congress now. When the Secretary pointed to his commitments to make an interim report to some committees, the President suggested that Ambassador Merchant say that he was too ill to meet anybody for a week.

The Secretary raised some of the mechanical problems involved in communication by letter, Adenauer in particular. The Italians obviously could not answer a letter now. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Italians had to be informed of what we were getting from the Germans, but we could indicate that we expected no action from them now before their elections. Our emphasis must be on the Germans. For this it might be desirable to find some device for getting Schroeder and Von Hassel to go down to consult with Adenauer when he got the letter. The President and the Secretary agreed that the essential point was German agreement.

In response to the President’s question, Secretary McNamara agreed that this was the best course of action, both with respect to European governments and the Congress.

The President then raised the question of how he should explain our failure if we got a negative response from the Germans and asked both Departments to suggest how we might be prepared to deal with this. Mr. Nitze expressed his fear that we would get no definite answer. Messrs. Merchant and Ball shared this expectation. The President disagreed and asked State to deal with the how and when of communication. He wanted a plan which had a definite control scheme that would be clear and defensible and agreeable to the Germans. If Congressional pressure for consultation appeared to be irresistible, he requested that he be consulted before any appearances or discussions with the Congress. He also requested the two Departments to examine what can be done with Paragraph 6 as an alternative in the event that the Germans did in fact fail to respond.

C.K.³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
1. Not found, but Nitze transmitted a summary of his discussions with Stikker on March 20 regarding paragraph 6 in Polto 1190, March 21. (Department of State, Central Files, Def 12 NATO)
2. For text of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), see 60 Stat. 755.
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.