Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, March 29, 1963, 9:01 p.m.

2336. Following is text of letter which Tyler is carrying from President to Chancellor.¹ In your discretion this text can be given to Chancellor’s office for transmission to the Chancellor prior to Tyler’s call Tuesday.

Begin Text. March 29, 1963. Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Ambassador Merchant has given me a full report of his conversation with you in Bonn and his discussion with other high officials of the Federal Republic.

I am glad to know that your Government supports the concept of a multilateral force and is prepared to join in its development.

Your country and mine—along with other members of the Alliance—have the opportunity to mount a powerful military force of a nature unique in the history of the world—one which would respond to the increasing threat of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Such a force—organized on a multilateral basis—would have more than military significance. It would meet the healthy desire of the great nations of Europe for a larger role in nuclear defense without contributing to the dangerous situation in which many nations throughout the world would own separate national nuclear forces. It would make a long further step toward effective Atlantic cooperation, and give body and substance to the Atlantic partnership. I am happy to think that Germany and the United States can act together with other allies in the creation of this great enterprise.

My Government is prepared to join in pressing ahead with this venture immediately, and it has occurred to me that you and I and the other heads of governments might be able to sign a general preliminary agreement during my forthcoming visit to Europe. Our two Governments and others have already been discussing the possibility of reaching such agreement in June, and if we can meet this schedule I think we can sustain the sense of momentum which is essential in these great new international ventures.

But for me there is one important political problem here at home. The multilateral force will require major legislative action in this country, and before I can properly sign a general preliminary agreement, I must have thorough consultation with the Congress and indeed with the American public as a whole. I am ready to undertake this consultation promptly, and, as I say, it is a necessary step on the way to the preliminary agreement which we envisage for June.

But for this consultation to be effective, I must be able to say firmly that this proposal will in fact meet the requirements of the principal prospective participants—and most of all of the Federal Republic. The Congress will be much more likely to accept the principles of this radical development in our own policy if it can be confident that the prospect of the multilateral force is real and the need in Europe urgent.

On the basis of what you and your colleagues have stated in messages and discussions in recent months, I believe that I might now give this assurance, but I would not think it proper to do so without your express approval, especially with respect to two specific questions which were not fully resolved during Ambassador Merchant’s visit. One of these is the mode of deployment of the force—whether on surface ships or submarines—and the other the mechanism for political control. Let me set forth my thoughts on each of these issues for you.

I am sure you know that arrangements governing nuclear weapons have been a matter of great national sensitivity in this country from the beginning. We have invested tens of billions of dollars and two decades of effort in the development of our vast atomic arsenal. The American people have learned to think of the American strategic force not only as a great national asset but also as the principal bulwark of Free World defense.

I can lead them to understand that the time has come—for many reasons—when we must begin to share nuclear military responsibility with the now strong nations of Europe. But I know that you will appreciate how great a change in traditional American habits of thought is involved in the kind of sharing of nuclear responsibility envisaged in the multilateral force.

Against this background I have given the matter careful thought. I am convinced that the initial force should be based on surface vessels. I am convinced further that from the point of military effectiveness we can build a first-class force in this manner. Secretary McNamara—who has made the most thorough analysis of the problem—has advised me that, for the uses intended, the balance of advantage clearly weighs in favor of a surface-borne system—particularly when the factors of timing, ease of operation, and costs are taken into account.

The multilateral force would operate in an environment quite different from that which dictated the design of our United States Polaris submarine system. That system was developed to meet the problems of operating over long distances and in all geographical and military situations around the world. But, in our view, the multilateral force should be specifically related to the defense of Europe. It would deploy in a highly favorable situation where its operating areas would be behind the shield of NATO. It would thus automatically be protected by distance, and by the full air, surface, and anti-submarine defenses of the Alliance, including the Greenland-Iceland-UK barrier. Further, the areas of its intended operation have extensive shallow-water zones, straits, inlets, islands, and long, irregular coastlines. All of these factors could be used to advantage by surface forces.

I recognize that some commentators in Europe are suggesting that surface ships are somehow inferior to submarines and that, therefore, the multilateral force may seem to be a second-class force. I want you to know that our own conviction of the quality of the surface force is so clear that we expect, if this force is agreed on, to be able to make substantial savings in the provision of additional U.S. strategic striking forces which might otherwise be needed to cover the same targets. This Government would not consent to the very substantial investment which it is now willing to make for this force except on the basis of a clear conviction of its first-rate quality.

In order to make progress with this matter, I propose that we now agree on surface ships for the initial multilateral force. The number of ships can be mutually agreed; the force must make a substantial contribution to the Alliance deterrent in order to support the objectives we both have in mind, but the figure of twenty-five ships and two hundred missiles is not immutable.

A decision to go forward now with a surface force would not preclude consideration of submarines at a later stage, if this seems wise, after we have gained operating experience in mixed-manning and other features of joint ownership and control.

Let me turn to the second issue, the question of political control. Ambassador Merchant has already discussed with your Government the method by which the political decision would be taken to release the force for military use. The proposal we have made would call for the unanimous agreement of all major participants. In view of the enormous importance of any decision to use strategic nuclear weapons in the NATO area, it has been our belief that every government playing a major role in the provision of such forces would wish to have a right of concurrence in any such decision to fire. Obviously each government must make its own best judgment on this important matter, but speaking for my country, I must say that in our judgment it is essential that a decision to fire should have the concurrence of the United States. In this judgment I am greatly influenced by the fact that any use of the multilateral force would almost inevitably require the immediate support of the full strategic strength of the Alliance as a whole. Since the overwhelming proportion of this total strategic strength is American, the American Government must have a particularly intense concern with any decision to fire any NATO strategic forces.

Let me point out here that this right of concurrence is one which I should think that your Government too will wish to insist on for itself. In the light of the substantial proportion of the force which your Government is thinking of contributing, and in the light of the exposed forward position of Germany, I should think that any German Government would wish to be assured that the multilateral force would be fired only with its consent. In this respect, I think it is clear that in the current stage of the affairs of the Alliance our two Governments must have a most powerful concern with any decision to use such a force.

But within this limit, I can tell you that we are quite prepared to accept whatever arrangement best suits the other major participants. One method would be the unanimous decision of the major participants which Ambassador Merchant has already suggested. But if other major participants do not insist on the right of concurrence that such a procedure would give each of them, we would support an initial control scheme which required the concurrence of the United States and any combination of the other participants. All that is necessary at this stage, I think, is that our two countries should be prepared to move forward on this problem on the broad basis which I have outlined above.

With these considerations in mind we have prepared a list of points to be covered in a preliminary agreement, which I am asking Mr. Tyler to show you.² I hope you will let me know promptly and candidly whether your Government can go ahead with an agreement along this line. If so, I would be glad immediately to undertake the necessary discussions with Congressional leaders that would make it possible for me to be able to conclude a preliminary agreement in Europe in June.

I have read with interest comments of all sorts on the multilateral force, and I know how easy it is to find weaknesses or limitations in any new arrangements for the nuclear defense of the Alliance. But in these matters it is much easier to be a critic of any proposal than it is to produce a better one, and all of the alternatives which I have heard of seem to me to be much less satisfactory in the long run for the Alliance in general and for our two countries in particular. Thus, it seems to me that it is the proper course now for us to move firmly forward on the basis of a proposal which is clearly good, and not to get bogged down in a profitless search for ideal answers which do not exist.

I am convinced that if we can act promptly together we have a chance now to set in train an enterprise that can fix the direction of nuclear defense along safe and sound lines for future generations—a direction that will assure the security of the West while, at the same time, preventing developments that might undermine the safety of the world. In addition, we may recapture the momentum toward trans-Atlantic unity which has unhappily been arrested by recent events.

It is my deepest hope that you and I can now join in this common effort which has such portent for the Atlantic Community as a whole.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy. End Text.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Def 12 NATO. Secret; Verbatim Text; Priority. Drafted in EUR and the White House, cleared in draft with the President, and approved by Tyler.
1. On March 29 the President signed a memorandum instructing Tyler to visit Chancellor Adenauer for the purpose of obtaining an early German decision on the MLF. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF) A similar letter was drafted for delivery to Fanfani (ibid.), but Tyler, using discretionary power, decided not to deliver it during his meeting with the Italian Prime Minister on April 3.
2. Not found.