Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

186. Summary Record of the National Security Council Meeting⁰

Washington, April 2, 1963, 10 a.m.

The meeting opened in the absence of the President with Secretary Rusk reviewing the current situation in Europe. Referring to a paper (copy attached)¹ which had been circulated to the Council, the Secretary called attention to the fact that several of the NATO countries are facing elections in the near future and others have problems connected with the replacement of aging leaders. France is the only country which will have a reasonably stable political situation in the immediate future. Secretary Rusk commented that because the British did not tell us as much as they knew prior to de Gaulle’s action in vetoing British membership in the Common Market, we had overestimated the odds that the Common Market negotiations involving UK membership would be successful. Most countries in Europe do not want the U.S. to leave, but all want their relationship with the U.S. to appear to be less one of dependence. There is popular support for de Gaulle’s position insofar as it expresses the European desire to be independent of the U.S. and to reduce U.S. presence in Europe.

In the light of the present situation, Secretary Rusk said that there are no new major changes in our European policy which we must make. As to the Paragraph 6 forces, we seem to be moving ahead and probably we can reach agreement in Ottawa in May as to how these forces will be organized and controlled in NATO. It is even possible that the French might be prepared to contribute some of their forces to the Paragraph 6 force.

As to the MLF, Secretary Rusk reviewed briefly the points which Assistant Secretary Tyler would be making to Adenauer tomorrow in Italy. On the basis of Tyler’s preliminary discussions with German officials in Bonn, the major problem appears to be German concern about the survivability of surface craft as opposed to submarines. The problem of controlling the MLF can probably be dealt with by indicating, without making a commitment, that in the future we would be prepared to consider changes in the control arrangements, if such changes were desired by those contributing to the MLF. In effect, we would do no more now than promise to review control arrangements at a later time.

Under Secretary Ball reported on a meeting he attended recently in Cannes, France,² which brought together for the first time since de Gaulle’s press conference of January 14 the leaders of the major European States. As a result of numerous informal conversations, Mr. Ball said he was impressed with the lame duck character of most of the member governments of NATO. He referred to the “air of death” which surrounded the Macmillan government and noted that the schedule for the replacement of Adenauer is apparently unchanged. He predicted that Erhard would succeed Adenauer.

Mr. Ball said that de Gaulle is isolating himself more and more, and that he does not have a “grand design,” or even a clear European policy. All de Gaulle can really do is to oppose the initiative of others by being negative. He cannot build the Europe he desires because his actions are conditioned by his overriding desire to build the predominance of France. As a result, he has nothing to offer other European States.

Mr. Ball said Ambassador Bohlen agreed with the analysis that de Gaulle cannot organize a European nuclear force. De Gaulle still yearns for a U.S./U.K/France directorate in which France would speak for all of Europe. However, Europeans are not prepared to have de Gaulle speak for them. Except for de Gaulle, most Europeans do not want the U.S. to get out of Europe. It is unlikely that the British will be admitted to the Common Market as long as de Gaulle rules France. Furthermore, prospects for making something of the Western European Union are not good.

Mr. Ball said that six months from now Europe would look different and twelve months from now it would look quite different. Adenauer will be gone, and, as a result, de Gaulle’s power in Europe will be greatly reduced and limited primarily to France itself. A Labor government will probably take over in the U.K. (In this connection, Mr. Ball said we should start planning now how to avoid a damaging effect on sterling in the event the Labor government did gain power in the U.K.) There will be a strong tendency in Europe to fall back on nationalism as a result of de Gaulle’s recent actions.

In conclusion, Mr. Ball said that the momentum toward the unification of Europe has slowed down. No new initiatives are required now, but we should play by ear a decision as to whether at a later time we should put forward a new political suggestion around which “good” Europeans could rally in opposition to de Gaulle. One suggestion to think of in the effort to restore progress toward an Atlantic Community would be a political executive committee for NATO.

In the interim period, Mr. Ball said there were several problems which we should watch carefully:

a. East-West trade—The British oppose our policy and the Germans are not happy about the embargo on large diameter pipe. Our attitude toward East-West trade is not understood in Europe. The time might be coming when our effort to push Europe to support our East-West trade policy may not be worth the cost. He recommended that we consider a revision or our policy.

b. Conventional force strategy—Despite our efforts to explain our conventional force strategy, the Europeans are not convinced. This strategy is being used effectively to undermine the European faith that the U.S. is resolved to use nuclear weapons when required.

c. Nuclear industry—The Europeans are worrying that if they do not have nuclear weapons, they, as a result, will have no nuclear industry. We must think of ways to overcome this European concern.

d. Agriculture in trade negotiations—Despite the very difficult problems caused by the impact of European agricultural policies on trade negotiations, the situation is not entirely without hope. The fact that the British will not now be in the Common Market has eased for the present some of the agricultural trade problems.

Secretary Rusk added two points:

a. The Atlantic alliance policy is a bipartisan policy in almost all NATO countries. Therefore, in the present election uncertainty, there is no fundamental threat to the continuance of the alliance.

b. The Soviets may act in such a way as to put an end to present divisions in NATO and reunify the alliance. He cited the current Berlin airplane incident, reports of which were circulated to Council members.³

Mr. Murrow commented that so far there was no political base for our MLF proposal. He feared that if the MLF concept was not explained adequately to the Europeans, we would be caught in a cross-fire in Europe.

Secretary Rusk replied that during the talks which are now going on, we have not been in a position to take a firm stand on the various matters connected with the MLF. He expected that in a very short time, our government, as well as the European governments, could take the lead in explaining to their people the multilateral concept, thereby overcoming the present difficult situation as regards public understanding.

The President joined the Council members, accompanied by the Attorney General.

Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball reviewed their presentations. Mr. Ball emphasized de Gaulle’s negativism, i.e. he can wreck the Common Market and upset NATO, but he cannot build a European force. Mr. Ball commented that the British Conservatives might panic and take reckless nationalistic actions in an effort to hang on to power. Labor politicians feared the Conservatives might go all out for a purely British national nuclear deterrent, thereby downgrading the NATO alliance.

The President commented that Diefenbaker may win in Canada. We can expect a similar anti-American line to develop in the U.K. He asked what we thought de Gaulle was likely to do in the event that he saw he could not have his way in Europe.

Under Secretary Ball doubted that de Gaulle would take any dramatic action and pointed out that he may have serious domestic trouble in the months ahead in connection with the miners’ strike and the possibility of inflation.

Secretary Rusk reminded the Council that we must be very careful to continue to deal with the British government of the day. We must avoid talking to Wilson as if he were the British Prime Minister or appear to be negotiating with him. He may not become the British Prime Minister and we must be careful not to appear to believe that the Labor government has already taken over in the U.K.

In concluding the discussion, Secretary Rusk asked whether it would be possible for us to offer the French a Polaris package similar to that which we are offering the British this week.⁴ He suggested we should consider the Nassau offer to France still open. In connection with suggestions that we start new discussions with de Gaulle, Secretary Rusk said he was seeing de Gaulle in Paris next week, but that other than Viet-Nam, he had little he could now discuss with de Gaulle.

Mr. Bundy said he judged that on the basis of Ambassador Bohlen’s review, and of the Department’s review, the lines of our European policy required no change. However, he suggested that because of the period we are now entering, it might be helpful if the officials concerned met often to discuss informally the current developments in Europe.

At this point Assistant Secretary Martin and Mr. Dungan joined the group at the President’s request to discuss the current status of the Cuban raiders who have been arrested by the British in the Bahama Islands.

Mr. Martin said the present plan was for the British to turn the raiders loose on their boat three miles off the Bahamas. The U.S. Coast Guard would pick them up there. If they refuse to go to Miami, the question before us is what do we then do?

After a discussion of the legal points involved, the President expressed his view that we should ask the British to take away from the raiders all their ammunition, and that we would ask the leaders to come peacefully to a U.S. port. If they refuse to come into the U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Coast Guard ship would follow them but not fire on them. We would soon know the names of the raiders on the ship and would seek to apply pressures on them to agree to enter a U.S. port. If a threat to prevent them ever again from entering the U.S. was not effective, the Coast Guard would report the situation to Washington for additional guidance.

Bromley Smith⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1963. Top Secret.
1. Not printed.
2. Not further identified.
3. On April 2 a Soviet fighter plane had fired warning shots at a private plane in the Berlin air corridor. The reports under reference have not been identified further.
4. For text of the Polaris Sales Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington April 6, see 14 UST 1431.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.