182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0

4851. For the Ambassador from the Under Secretary. Paris for Ambassadors Finletter and Merchant; Bonn for Chargé. I note in your 35101 that Macmillan stated inter alia that he regards the Nassau Agreement “as a whole and stood by it entirely.”

Against that background, this may be an appropriate moment to try to put the nuclear issue in its widest context and especially its relationship to broad European and Atlantic developments in discussions with UK in aftermath of Merchant mission.

Reports from Merchant supplemented by Chayes suggest Merchant’s team made gratifying progress in Bonn and also in Italy. We appear to be farther along in getting a firm footing with the Germans than we might reasonably have hoped a month ago.

This raises question as to UK role. Not only would the political impact of the Multilateral Force be enhanced, but course of European and Atlantic development might be given a new lift if Macmillan Government could be persuaded to take more enthusiastic position on MLF.

As your own analysis here in Washington so clearly indicated, the key to constructive developments in Europe and to an effective mutually supporting European-US relationship is Germany. If ultimate UK entry into Europe is to be possible, German leadership to this end within the Community is essential. Moreover, whether Europe proceeds in the pattern of the last ten years, or moves toward autarky and the third [Page 528] force delusion, will depend on the German role and the ability of the Five to work pragmatically with Britain.

The danger of the present situation is that the stiff-upper-lip mien of the British in the aftermath of January is less a policy than a respectable diplomatic reaction. For the sake of Europe as well as Britain, I think it would be useful for the British Government to take positive steps that will line them up solidly with the FRG and give the lie to de Gaulle’s contention that they are not genuinely European. Just as Schroeder and von Hassel are committing themselves to the MLF so there is an opportunity for Britain to commit itself to the “new Germans.” And, as you will have learned from Livie, this is exactly what von Hassel hopes to persuade them to do, by committing themselves on a substantial scale to MLF. This could be venture that brings British and Germans closer together. It could lead to close and mutually beneficial relation between Germany and Britain devoted to building new Europe and stronger Atlantic partnership which was so well begun by Schroeder when he led the Five in support of British entry on January 28 and 29.

Great advantage of substantial UK MLF participation is that it would put UK at heart of a venture in which it would be participating on terms of equality with continental countries; para 6 implementation is necessary and useful but, by itself, probably insufficient. If British preclude UK role in genuine nuclear sharing with Germany and Italy, they may well end by isolating themselves further from Europe and Germany. A more open-handed British support of the MLF, on the other hand, could provide an outlet for the talent and experience of the British in naval and nuclear affairs.

I fear that, if the Macmillan Government cannot be brought to see these larger issues of UK’s relation to the continent, the natural evolution of events may conspire to damage British basic interests and position in the world. They cannot profitably re-establish policy on classical balance of European power, playing with pragmatic bilateral political and economic arrangements while hoping that somehow European developments will work in their favor. And a continued sense of drift and lack of purpose could encourage Little Englanders and niggling and sterile anti-Gaullism.

I recognize British have conditioned reflex against mixed manning. But this is not instinct to be encouraged. In fact, attitude it reflects may well be the principal cause of British post-war failure to understand significance of forces at work in Europe. I have no specific suggestions as to any action to be taken but have set forth the foregoing thoughts in the hope you may find them useful to draw on in your conversations with key members British Government during critical next few days and weeks.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol US-UK. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Schaetzel and Ball; cleared with Tyler, Kitchen, Furnas, Owen, Popper, and BNA; and approved and initialed by Ball. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
  2. Telegram 3510, March 12, reported that Bruce, Finletter, and Merchant had spent a half hour with Macmillan at the latter’s invitation discussing Nassau and the MLF. (Ibid., Def 12 NATO)