Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, August 23, 1962, 9:28 p.m.

Topol 259. Re Polto 180.¹ Question of how to proceed in September, both in terms objectives and tactics, with NAC consideration nuclear matters and MRBM question, as well as our Defense Data Program, must be related to three factors:

(1) UK-EEC negotiations have not yet proceeded to point where we can see clear image of shape of UK tie to continent which may emerge sometime this Fall after negotiations resumed. This fact, plus strong UK objection, pending completion negotiation, to any NAC discussion of basic political issues involved in consideration multilateral force, must be recognized as powerful constraint on further policy debate, although not on discussion and examination relevant data and analyses for purposes of education.

(2) At moment Europeans generally are hard pressed to catch breath in area of nuclear strategy. Our June 15 NAC statement,² several major speeches on strategy, etc., have not yet clarified in minds of Europeans our objectives and proposals sufficiently to provide basis for Alliance consensus. In addition, changes in US military high command have evoked considerable speculation as to our intentions (see Paris 857).³ This lack of consensus and mood of uneasy suspicion is certainly in part attributable to widespread European lack of basic orientation to nuclear facts of life which US largely alone enjoys. On other hand we must recognize that deep differences on basic strategy may still exist after conclusion our “nuclear education program”, due to simple fact that Europeans have different political responsibilities and attitudes stemming from heritage of ideas and experiences which lead to positions which cannot be quickly shaken by rational argument. Obviously process of achieving consensus on strategy likely to be long drawn-out.

(3) NATO is now faced with several competing requirements: air defense, MRBM force, NADGE, conventional forces for forward strategy, etc., which in aggregate represent enormous costs and certainly raise issue of priorities in applying limited European resources. We have not yet focused on costing and related problems, some of which are subject current studies to be concluded in September–October period. It unlikely, however, that all these priority problems can be sorted out and decided upon in NAC prior to December Ministerial Meeting.

In light these factors our objectives for coming NAC discussions of MRBM force should be, as indicated in Polto 128,⁴ to provide technical data on weapons systems; to set forth our views on military aspects of requirement; to demonstrate technical feasibility of multilateral ownership, control, and multi-national manning; to dispel allies’ misconceptions US policy does not leave them free to discuss control issue on its merits; and to make clear distinction between genuine multilateral force and disguised national forces under multilateral veneer. In addition, we should in light studies mentioned above try to answer any questions of technical nature concerning June 15 or other statements. By such multifaceted educational process we would hope to increase understanding relevant fact and issues and thus ensure that future allied policy debate on NATO nuclear role which seems likely to follow outcome UK-EEC negotiations is as solidly grounded in such understanding as possible.

Defense Data Program is designed to provide to Europeans nuclear information needed by them to understand evolution our policy in direction less reliance on nuclear weapons. We still working on content and scope of next presentation (presently only one of limited scope planned prior to December NATO meeting); however, doubtful whether this one presentation will in itself provide sufficiently broad factual base to accomplish seven tasks re policy clarification you enumerate in reftel.

We believe September through December is time to “make haste slowly”. We should not try to force conclusions or decisions concerning US policy views, nor should we conduct our presentations or technical discussions in manner which seems to call for early policy decisions on issues about which Europeans disagree with us. Nor is this time for new US policy initiatives, i.e. for new proposals not yet made known to allies. On other hand we want to provide as rapidly as NAC et al. can assimilate those analyses, facts, and findings which have led US to its policy conclusions set forth in Ministerial Meetings and NAC, particularly June 15 statement. Several important studies will provide substance for Defense Data Program. In short, our aim at this point is to provide facts and analyses for educational purposes, not to force decisions.

We agree completely your views re UK proposal for consultative role for NATO Nuclear Committee. We have repeatedly told UK Embassy here we see no urgency in matter, and Committee should address problem not only after but in light experience it has not yet had.

Finally, believe NAC should make special effort to maintain highest degree of secrecy about upcoming NAC talks. You should make strong intervention on this point, pointing out much harmful uncertainty and misunderstanding re NATO strategy directly traceable to attempts individual governments “smoke out” others through inspired commentaries and press leaks. Only Soviets benefit.

Above and other thoughts will be gone over with Amb Finletter this week in Washington.⁵ Any further comments by you by then would be appreciated.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/8–1062. Secret. Drafted by Kranich; cleared with Weiss, Bundy, Owen, Popper, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Tyler.
1. Polto 180, August 10, reviewed the sensitivities of Alliance members to U.S. statements and suggested areas in which the United States might make proposals to allay their concerns. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 1, Document 142.
3. Apparently a reference to telegram 865 (Document 151), which, as transmitted, was incorrectly numbered 857 and subsequently changed to 865.
4. Presumably a reference to Topol 128 (Document 149) since Polto 128, July 25, summarized an NAC meeting on that day dealing with Berlin and disarmament. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/7–2562)
5. No record of Finletter’s discussions in Washington has been found.