153. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State0
Polto 309. Reference: Topol 344.1NAC discussion NATO defense policy ended in no formal agreement on conclusions Stikker paper NDP/62/10, but general consensus discussions defense policy should move deliberately in coming months without pressing for decisions. Main effort should be put into working group with expanded terms of reference made up of committee of whole of PermReps. Conflicting views expressed as to extent to which working group should concentrate on study multilateral forces as distinct from other ways providing MRBM’s. Stikker will prepare paper proposing procedures for forthcoming NAC and working group discussions to be circulated early week September 24 and discussed NAC meeting Thursday, September 27. Norstad appearance before NAC was generally welcomed but no date set.
Most PermReps participated in extended discussion to be reported in detail in separate message.2 Stikker opened by centering discussion [Page 445] on procedure and suggesting possibility expanding terms of reference working group proposed paragraph 45 his paper. UK called for a limited step by step approach to discussion of Stikker’s paper and urged initial emphasis on use of NATO Nuclear Information Committee to get better understanding present and planned nuclear capability Alliance. Italy urged basic re-examination NATO strategic concepts and political directive, but gon [got no?] support.
Belgium (de Staercke) then made strong plea for NAC to undertake concrete study of the multilateral force idea advanced by US June 15 and listed a number of organizational military and financial aspects requiring careful study. French expressed interest in Stikker’s concept of possible special role three nuclear powers in paragraph 36 and possibility stress on conventional build up might weaken credibility strategic nuclear deterrent. Agreed policy debate not wise at this time when negotiations under way to decide political framework and shape Europe will take as well as role UK in Europe. Willing have working group study military and technical questions but not political ones. Canada supported Belgium on focusing on study of multilateral force in working group and both Canada and France indicated interest receiving more briefings in NATO nuclear committee as proposed by UK. Netherlands, supported later by UK, questioned focusing on multilateral sea borne forces because prejudicial to eventual decision as to how MRBM’s might be provided and de Staercke disclaimed any desire to prejudice decision stating wanted only give concreteness and focus to work of coming months.
Germany stated imperative give continuing attention NATO defense policy and promised submit detailed comments. Believed urgent strengthen SACEUR shield forces but also wanted go ahead with working group study technical aspects MRBM force. States Germany prepared participate in integrated NATO missile force and to contribute funds and personnel if NATO decides establish such a force. Force must have Atlantic character and participation United States absolutely indispensable. Further study needed however whether force should be exclusively sea borne or whether some missiles should be deployed on land. Felt command and control problem less urgent since NATO Athens guidelines and present custodial arrangements could serve on interim basis. Favor a number of experts groups drawing on personnel from NATO capitals. Suggested immediate establishment separate legal experts group.
US (Finletter) spoke along lines instructions Topol 344 and supported de Staercke on expansion terms working group and specific attention multilateral force. Recognized Nuclear Information Committee proper channel for sensitive information but main focus should be working group of committee of whole of NAC making appropriate US [Page 446] experts, sub-groups, and government contributions. Stressed importance secrecy NAC discussions this subject.
UK warned should not be assumed any MRBM’s required and expressed doubt military requirement existed for MRBM’s. Suggested this question of requirement might be first point of study. French disputed this, arguing requirement for MRBM force could not be settled on purely military basis. Stikker then summarized outcome discussion as in first paragraph this telegram.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/9–1862. Secret; Limited Distribution. Pouched to the other NATO capitals.↩
- On August 30 Stikker gave Finletter a copy of NDP/62/10, August 29, a paper that the Secretary General had drafted dealing with NATO defense. No copy has been found, but on September 1, Finletter characterized it as proposing an active study of the complicated military problems facing the Alliance. (Polto 241; ibid., 375.75/9–162) In Topol 344, September 15, the Department of State transmitted instructions to Finletter for dealing with NDP/62/10. (Ibid., 740.5611/9–162)↩
- Transmitted in Polto A–354, September 22. (Ibid., 375/9–2262)↩