Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

88. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, November 2, 1961.

CA-388. Depcirtels 1761, May 10;² 196, August 1, 1961.³

The Department, after careful consideration of the Caribbean Security Arrangements Plan in the light of your replies to the reference Depcirtels and developments throughout the Latin American area, has concluded it is more desirable at present to pursue the objective of strengthening the defenses of the Central American and Caribbean countries against the Castro-communist threat of indirect aggression through a less formal approach than previously envisaged.

Benefits to be derived from formalization of the Plan through a series of bilateral agreements do not at present appear to be great enough to offset possible consequences of the fact that several governments would deem it necessary to seek congressional approval. This would give Castro-communist elements greatly increased opportunity to exploit nationalist sentiments, anti-Americanism, and other Castro-communist themes with a resulting possibility of failure of the governments to join in the Plan which would seriously detract from its psychological impact and effectiveness.

As you are aware, the most obvious methods by which the United States Government can contribute to the strengthening of security in the Caribbean and Central American area against indirect aggression—that is, incitement to revolt, and infiltration of men, materiel, funds and propaganda for creating disturbances, terrorism and sabotage—are the following:

1. Helping to equip and train local forces;

2. Offering to provide immediately, upon request, air-sea surveillance;

3. Attempting to promote more useful exchange of information among all the countries, and particularly between neighboring countries, on movements of subversive agents, arms and substantial amounts of propaganda material, known misuse of travel documents, methods of sabotage, espionage, terrorism or agitation and any other pertinent information which government officials consider useful to their colleagues in other governments for the purpose of detecting and preventing subversion.

The Department expects to be able soon to inform the Ambassadors in the Central American capitals and Panama, and in Bogota, that Presidential determinations have been given for the provision of materiel for the internal security of the Governments to which those Ambassadors are accredited.⁴ (It is considered that the Government of Venezuela does not require this type of assistance at this time. Serious question has been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance against indirect aggression in addition to that already being made available to the Haitian Government should be given in present circumstances, particularly because of the apparent aspiration of President Duvalier to perpetuate himself in office indefinitely.)

In those countries in which the Governments have not already been given assurances that the U.S. Government would provide air-sea surveillance upon request—when there appears to be good reason to believe that this might help to prevent landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-communist elements—the Department believes that the Ambassador should take occasion to give this assurance at the time when he personally informs the Chief of State to whom he is accredited concerning the fact of the availability of the additional materiel for security against indirect aggression. In those countries where assurances have already been given pursuant to Depcirtel 196, the Ambassador should repeat the assurances, alluding to the previous offer of air-sea surveillance in time of emergency. If any of the Ambassador addressees in such countries which have not previously been given these assurances wish to suggest some alternative procedure, it would be appreciated if they would inform the Department. At the same time, the Department would appreciate the comments of the Ambassadors at Caracas and at Port-au-Prince, in their separate and different circumstances, concerning the appropriate timing of such assurances to the Chiefs of State to whom they are accredited. You should mention to the Chiefs of State, when discussing this subject, that as beneficial effects of the Alliance for Progress appear and as there develops a more widespread conviction that economic and social progress can really be brought about more rapidly by democratic methods, it can be expected that subversive activities will be stepped up by Castro-communist elements.

At the same time that discussions are initiated on the above subjects in the respective countries, it would be appreciated if the Ambassadors would consult with the Chiefs of State to whom they are accredited concerning the problem of improving exchange of information. The object is, of course, to promote the rapid flow of practical information between the particular officials most directly able to use it for the purpose of revealing plans or preparations for indirect aggression and therefore of preventing it should it occur. We believe that the exchange of information can better be handled if the GUS and the Government to which you are accredited were to designate an official (or officials) in their respective countries who would be primarily responsible for sending and receiving such information. Similar arrangements could be made by each government with the other governments of the area. The transmission of information between the designated officials could then be carried out through diplomatic channels. We believe that this type of system is preferable to establishing a new centralized organization for this purpose which would probably only slow down the transmission, although we would not want to give the impression of impeding the establishment of a Central Intelligence Service as envisaged by the recent meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the Central American countries and Panama if these states want to set up such a body.

Department recognizes possibility that security of individual countries can be enhanced by collective measures whereby countries work out joint defense plans and establish procedures for dealing with subversive activities, and Depcirtel 707⁵ authorized Ambassadors emphasize this line. While hoping that CADC may perform actively in this role, Department aware some divisive tendencies within CADC, such as: Col. Lopez’ (Honduras) statement he doubted advisability of central intelligence exchange, particularly with Nicaragua; Minister of Government Robles’ (Panama) statement in the National Assembly that Panama has no obligation toward CADC; President Echandi’s (Costa Rica) as yet uncertain attitude toward the participation of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil officers in the meetings so far. Ambassadors accredited countries which participated recent meeting Guatemala of Chiefs of Staff⁶ may at their discretion again refer to Depcirtel 707 provided they believe such repetition would be helpful in achieving reftel objective and would not be a meaningless or harmful gesture. Advise if you believe renewed approach 707 would be helpful.

Your comments and suggestions would be appreciated.

For Embassy Mexico City: Given the Mexican attitude toward the defensive measures contemplated in this instruction, the decision on how to approach the GOM and how much of the foregoing to use in the approach is left to the Embassy’s discretion.

For Embassy London: Further instructions re UK Caribbean territories will follow.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5/11-261. Confidential. Drafted by Woodward, Jamison, and Bowdler; cleared by Charles Maechling, Jr., Director for Internal Defense in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Captain Paul B. Ryan, USN, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Goodwin; and approved by Woodward. Sent for action to Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua, San Jose, Panama City, Bogota and Caracas.
2. Document 75.
3. Circular telegram 196, August 3, instructed recipient Embassies to give the President and Foreign Minister assurances of U.S. support and to indicate that the United States was prepared to establish a system of air-sea surveillance in case of need upon request. The telegram is missing from Department of State, Central Files, 713.00/8-361. The information here is from a copy of the first page on a microfilm index and from follow-up telegrams to and from Guatemala City, San Jose, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa, all ibid., under 713.00 and 713.5.
4. The President so authorized in Presidential Determination No. 62-9 on December 14. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations)
5. Dated October 14; sent to six Embassies in Central America and Panama. (Department of State, Central Files, 713.5/10-1461)
6. The meeting of Central American Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, held September 19-23, called for coordinated defense efforts, including the creation of a Central American Defense Council. (Despatch 147 from Guatemala, September 26; ibid., 713.5/9-2661)