Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

75. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, May 10, 1961, 4:14 p.m.

1761. One of decisions taken at high level review of problems posed by Castro regime (Depcirtel 1755)² was to explore possibility of establishing Caribbean Security Arrangement within OAS framework to improve capabilities of Caribbean countries to protect themselves against both external and internal threats of Castro-Communism. Given below is brief description of essential elements of arrangement. Before preparing plan for presentation to foreign officials we desire soonest views of Embassy in consultation with Defense members country team on its feasibility as well as probable receptiveness local government.

1. Rationale. Primary US objective in Latin America and only long-term solution to basic problems of area is to advance as rapidly as possible in social and economic development, thereby giving mass of people greater stake in functioning of their own government. This process will take time. Castro-Communism in meantime can be expected attempt infiltrate and subvert established governments and to disrupt positive development program. It is essential build up defenses against this danger so Latin American countries can get on with development plans.

Area most immediately vulnerable to Castro-Communism is Caribbean. States bordering Caribbean basin have special interest adopt new techniques to cope with this threat.

2. Membership. Arrangement would include governments which have demonstrated awareness of danger posed by Castro-Communism and which USG has reason to believe would be interested in joining with US in such arrangement: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Colombia and Venezuela. Given its attitude on Cuban situation, Mexico undoubtedly would not be interested in plan. Dominican Republic under present conditions would not be invited to participate until acceptable post-Trujillo government is formed. Parties to arrangement would make known, however, that one of its purposes was to protect entire island of Hispaniola. Arrangement also might be elaborated provided concurrence metropol governments obtained, to place protective arm around West Indies.

3. Commitments. Each participant in arrangement would:

a) Pledge to assist at their request other participants threatened by indirect aggression and subversion directed or supported by Castro-Communism.

b) Each state would earmark and train military units for a Caribbean Security Force. In event of emergency stemming from such a situation this force could be used in whole or in part at request of threatened state and with approval of state contributing elements.

4. Immediate Steps. While details of arrangement are worked out among participating countries, USG would be prepared, at request of any threatened participating state, to establish a system of surveillance in Caribbean to seek out and prevent, in territorial waters of requesting state, landing on part of Castro-Communist elements of armed forces or supplies, and otherwise assisting governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to subversive elements. Such a system could subsequently form part of operations plan for the Caribbean Security Force with participation of units from other states parties to arrangement.

5. Intermediate Steps. Arrangement would have bilateral and eventually multilateral aspects. Intermediate phase would involve bilateral agreements between USG and other participating states, incorporating commitments specified in paragraph 3 above. Depending upon Congressional authorization where additional funds are involved, USG prepared to negotiate agreement with each participant to help build up internal security and military capabilities for internal and external defense, or, in cases of governments with which US already has MAP agreements to redefine “missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere” to indicate maintenance of constitutional order in existing cases. Assistance would be pursuant to requirements determined by survey team now in area.

6. Long-range Relationship to OAS. Eventually bilateral commitments could be multilateralized through agreement, negotiated among participating states, establishing arrangement under OAS as one of “special treaties” on collective security referred to in Article 25 of OAS Charter. It would be given further OAS context by having states participating in arrangement reach agreement in advance on salient points and submit these to OAS when it meets to consider Cuban problem. OAS could take note that Castro regime presents special threat to Caribbean area countries and authorize them to work out special measures among themselves to insure their own security. Participating states could utilize Inter-American Defense Board to develop security plan built around Caribbean Security Force.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1061. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by William G. Bowdler of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs and Jamison; cleared in draft by Coerr, Task Force on Latin America Chairman Adolph A. Berle, and Assistant Special Counsel to the President Richard N. Goodwin; and approved by Achilles. Sent to Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Managua, San Jose, Panama, Bogot#, Caracas, and Port au Prince and repeated to Mexico City, Ciudad Trujillo, London, Paris, The Hague, Ottawa, and USUN for Stevenson.
2. Circular telegram 1755, May 8, sent to all Embassies in Latin America, stated that a decision had been made “to seek as promptly as possible inter-American program to condemn, isolate, and weaken Castro regime and assist other governments to counter its subversive activity.” (Ibid., 737.00/5-861) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 211.