Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

85. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy¹

Washington, September 29, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Determinations under sections 511(b) and 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, permitting the use of funds in order to furnish military assistance to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that you make the requisite determinations under sections 511(b) and 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), to permit the use of funds in order to furnish military assistance up to $6,500,000 to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

The proposed military assistance is needed for purposes of internal security to increase the capability of these countries to defend themselves against Castro-communist subversion. The considerations relevant to this recommendation are as follows:

1. Washington agencies which have primary interest in the maintenance of effective internal security forces by the Latin American nations are aware of the serious threat to the security of the area generated by growing social unrest and the intent of the Castro movement, in alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc, either to promote or use this unrest to overthrow governments by internal subversion. In May, 1961, these agencies determined that the most effective way to assess the internal security requirements of the area and to develop specific United States programs aimed at assisting American Republics to develop a capability to counter subversion was to appoint an interagency Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team to hold on-the-spot discussions with each United States Government country team. It was determined that the Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team should visit initially only Panama, the five countries of Central America, and Haiti. All of these countries are considered prime targets for Castro-communist subversion. Near to Cuba geographically, they do not have the capability to prevent the clandestine entry of men or arms into their national territories. Because of unstable political institutions, enormous social differences, and retarded economic growth, many groups in their societies feel isolated from the main currents of national development, and are easy prey to Castro-communist propaganda and organizers. Forces responsible for maintaining law and order have neither the equipment nor the trained personnel to counter well-conceived and well-executed plans to subvert the state, either by mob action, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sabotage or by armed invasion.

2. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team held discussions with the United States Government country teams in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala from April 27 to May 12, 1961. It was determined that serious threats to internal security exist in these countries; that these threats are likely to take the form of direct and/or indirect Castroist action, either unilaterally or in conjunction with local communists, exiles, or dissident opposition groups. It was further determined that the action might take the forms of actual invasion, strikes, guerrilla action, sabotage, terrorism, or mob action.

3. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams are of the opinion that the six countries do not possess the effective capability to resist invasion or protracted internal subversion. They do agree, however, that with the provision of grant assistance, to include equipment and training, a considerably improved degree of capability can be developed to cope with isolated, spontaneous attempts at internal subversion, to determine the existence and nature of border incursions, and to prevent the small-scale clandestine movement of men and arms across frontiers.

4. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams reached the conclusion that the major deficiencies within Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala for coping with the internal security threat were in the fields of transportation, communications, and maintenance; in leadership and intelligence techniques; and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in serviceable and appropriate arms, and in certain types of consumable goods. Recommendations, in consequence, follow the general lines of, for mobility, such items as jeeps and trucks, transport aircraft, and Coast Guard-type patrol vessels. Similarly, for communications, there were endorsed essentially a certain amount of fixed, or automobile transported, and of “walkie-talkie” types of radio apparatus. In terms of arms, there were endorsed riot control type equipment or light weapons such as the M-1 series. As respects leadership and intelligence techniques, recommendations concerned training and military and civil police advisory assistance. The recommendations took into account the ability of the countries to absorb the equipment and training.

5. If the recommendations of the Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams as to the equipment and other requirements referred to above were accepted for funding, it would require the obligation of approximately $6,500,000. In addition to the requirements to be funded from military assistance availabilities, there are equipment and training requirements, for which $726,000 was obligated in fiscal year 1961, to be administered by the International Cooperation Administration through its Public Safety program in Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

6. In addition to enhancing the capabilities of local security forces to counter threats to internal security, the provision of grant military assistance will serve an additional purpose. Part of the assistance will consist of tools and/or construction machinery which will enhance the capability of the security forces to participate more fully in social and economic development, thereby contributing to narrowing the gulf that historically has divided the security forces in these nations from the rest of society.

[Here follow paragraphs 7-12, with discussion of the internal security situation in the six countries in question.]

Under these circumstances, it is considered to be important to the security of the United States to promote stability in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala by furnishing these nations with military assistance for their internal security upon a determination under the third sentence of section 511(b) of the Act that internal security requirements may be the basis of this program. It is also considered important to the security of the United States to furnish military equipment and materials to Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador (which are not parties to general military assistance agreements with the United States) and to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (which are parties to general military assistance agreements with the United States, such agreements being applicable, however, only to assistance furnished for Western Hemisphere defense missions), for the purposes described above without regard to the requirements of section 506(a) of the Act requiring agreement to four specific undertakings. It is planned to seek special agreements with the six countries providing all or some of the undertakings in section 506(a) of the Act; however, since the negotiation of these agreements may be protracted in duration or may not be successful, it is considered necessary to waive the requirement for such undertakings in the event that negotiation of these agreements is protracted in duration or not successful.

Enclosed is a detailed statement of the background and justification of this program, the implementation of which is estimated to require the expenditure of up to $6,500,000 of funds available for military assistance.

It is considered that the furnishing of the assistance described above and the use of funds made available for military assistance programs are in furtherance of the purposes of the Act and are important to the security of the United States.

It is accordingly, recommended that you sign the enclosed memorandum, thereby making the determinations required by the Act for the above-mentioned purposes.²

The Department of Defense concurs in this recommendation.

Chester Bowles

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
2. The President signed Presidential Determination No. 62-3 on October 26. (Ibid.)