63. Memorandum From the Secretary General of the International Peace Corps Secretariat (Goodwin) to President Kennedy1
In the last couple of weeks (while on vacation) I have given considerable thought to the Alliance for Progress in my recent capacity as disinterested observer.
I believe this is the most important on-going program of your Administration (as distinct from critical decisions such as Cuba, test ban etc.). Moreover it is a new and significant initiative in U.S. policy toward an area of the world which has been of historic and intimate concern to us; an area which is second in importance only to Europe. Its success would be viewed as one of the great achievements of U.S. policy ranking with the Marshall Plan, the Good Neighbor policy etc.; policies which now have the gloss of past triumphs but which were intrinsically no more path-breaking or significant than the Alianza.
It is increasingly disappointing that a program which is sound in conception and historically right is operating at about one-half effectiveness. (And that may be a generous estimate.) I have continual self doubts about this estimate since Washington is a city filled with reassurances and self-justification; but every time I get involved or go to the field (I was recently in Bolivia) my dismay and alarm keep crowding back. As an example: about a year ago we suggested the state-to-country program using California and Chile as a pilot. Everyone concurred in this idea. Several times you indicated your personal interest in it. Yet one year later a person is being placed on the staff to implement the project. This, I submit, is inexcusable and, as a result, we have lost not only time in the Alianza but all hope of political benefit in time for Congressional actions on the AID request. Another example: The AID Director in Bolivia has been waiting six months for a qualified loan officer despite the fact that he has one of the largest, if not the largest, loan program in Latin America. Individual instances of this sort can always be explained and justified; but they are part of a pattern of lack of imagination, daring, administrative efficiency etc. which is critically damaging the program.
Much of the delay etc. is explained on the grounds of the necessity to be careful about what Congress thinks. But all the cautions in the world have not only failed to win over those hostile to the Alianza; but the consequent failures and delays and inefficiencies have helped to alienate our friends. A dynamic, successful program—well-publicized—is the way to win congressional support rather than the building of an intricate network [Page 147] of safeguards which protect the individuals running the program, but not the program itself. The fact that obvious failures cannot be blamed on anyone is itself a bad sign. For people unwilling to take chances of personal failure will never run the risk of success.
Probably the most serious single problem is personnel. The Alianza has the same trouble as the Washington Nats—they don’t have the ballplayers. There are, of course, some very good people, but there is also a tremendous amount of mediocrity in high places. No program is better than the people who run it. The reasons for this are many and too detailed to go into here, but they include: complete lack of a good recruiting effort, impossible personnel procedures, a structure which discourages individual initiative and responsibility, a careerist mentality, and inability to recognize mediocrity when it is seen. There are good people available, and they can be recruited. I know this for several reasons: (1) I know enough people to know there are good people available; (2) Shriver’s success at recruiting people, some of them formerly among the best of AID. The Alianza is intrinsically more exciting, bigger and more glamorous than the Peace Corps and there is no reason why it should not attract as good or better people; (3) A year and a half ago I proposed to Moscoso that we should try and recruit the brightest young men from Wall Street law firms etc. to come to Washington to work in the Alianza. We would give them a six months’ training program to prepare them to become development desk officers for various countries. He thought this was fine. I organized a cocktail party in New York (our intention was to follow it up with similar gatherings in other cities). About thirty-five young lawyers and businessmen attended. They were nearly all men with outstanding scholastic records at major law or business schools; of high caliber personally and rising in their firms. I talked with them about the Alianza and asked those who were interested in joining the training program to send a letter with a resume. Twenty-two sent letters. Their quality can be judged by the fact that Bicks (the antitrust chief under Ike) told an acquaintance of mine that the Alianza was getting all the bright young lawyers in New York. I sent the names and letters to the Alianza. No action was taken to my considerable personal discomfort. But it did prove the people are there.
I can think of only one answer to all of this: to tell Shriver he must run the Alianza for at least a year, get it on its feet and recruit a successor. This does not mean that he is the only one who can do it. But he is the only one I know; especially since to put a new man, no matter how good, into the existing situation who lacks the personal muscle and experience to destroy the bureaucratic obstacles will not do the job. Shriver must also get what he thinks he needs to do the job. This will mean radical organizational and personnel changes. Many people, including some of your best and most trusted people, will object. It will run afoul of all sorts of [Page 148] theoretical administrative objections, and some serious practical difficulties. All I can say to this is: (a) We have had two and one-half years trying to do the job the other way; (b) If you expect a good man to try a difficult job you must give him the tools he thinks he needs to do it, not what others think he needs; (c) For whatever it’s worth it is my judgment that this is the only way to do the job, and I disagree with those who think it is not; (d) It is a good idea to break up a losing ball club.
This approach will conflict with many ambitions, desires and the considered views of thoughtful and dedicated people. It will hurt Moscoso, whom I admire and like deeply. But I feel so strongly about the importance of this program to the country and to your Administration, that I am confident everything must be tried. We will be judged on whether we won or lost, and not how we played the game.
There will also be some feeling that things are not going so badly. I submit that much of this is because we have lived so long with existing shortcomings, lack of imagination etc., that we regard them as part of the nature of things and lower our sights accordingly. The Peace Corps has helped show what an overseas program can be when approached with great imagination and skill. I think we could do as much for the Alianza, although I recognize the great difficulties involved.
I also believe action of this sort should be taken quickly. Latin America will probably be a foreign policy issue in the campaign; and the Alianza is likely to be a principal target both in Congress and outside unless it can be raised above too much reproach rather quickly. Otherwise we will be in a weaker position on it, to say nothing of the very real danger of losing much of it in the Congress. This year is really the “year of truth”—to paraphrase a Latin phrase.
I do not want to sound as if I have all the answers, or that I am sure that this approach is the right one. But I have felt this with increasing strength for a long period of time, and would be remiss toward you if I did not relay my thought.
It would be helpful if you did not circulate this memorandum since I have to deal with many of the people affected; but I leave that entirely to your judgment as to the best approach.
Frankfurter always told me that I would only be of use as an assist-ant as long as I was willing to say unpleasant things.
P.S. Of course, I have told Sarge about this memo.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Goodwin. No classification marking.↩
- The last two sentences are handwritten by Goodwin on the source text. Reference is to Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, for whom Goodwin clerked in 1958-1959, and to Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps.↩