361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic1
290. A. Subject your discretion suggest attaches draw on following explanation of what lies behind our position in informal discussions with Dom military:
Secretary statement and President press conference mean exactly what they say2 but should be understood in light of following background—we have our problems too.
Coup raised important questions far beyond DomRep involving not only Dom democracy but cause of constitutionality and representative [Page 745] democracy—right of people to choose own ruler—throughout hemisphere and indeed beyond.
US was deeply involved, materially and morally, in agonizing transition from dictatorial oppression to representative democracy in DomRep. Transformation achieved remarkably quickly and peaceably (with help Dom military—which makes present situation doubly tragic).
Although USG had misgivings about Bosch as ideal president, nevertheless, he won that office with overwhelming majority in a free election which was great source satisfaction to hemisphere and to Dom and Am people in particular. US pointed with pride to its role in these historic events, predicting that in DomRep would arise a clear demonstration of advantages to common man of peaceful democratic evolution as contrasted to violent communist revolution.
Perhaps in time US would have become completely disenchanted with Bosch’s fumbling mismanagement and fully alarmed over freedom he allowed Castro/Communists. But even some his severest US critics felt that seven short months provided wholly inadequate basis for final judgment. And coup seriously set back cause democracy throughout hemisphere. These are salient considerations for US, and nothing gained now by arguing whether coup “necessary.” Problem is what next.
Military’s dominant role in coup presents special problems for US. Regardless of merits, fair or unfair, LA military are seen in US as arbitrary perpetrators of endless series of coups against elected civilian government, thus preventing progress and democratic evolution. Timing of Dom coup made matters far worse—it followed Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador, and Honduras followed it, arousing widespread alarm in US of chain reaction that might endanger democracy in other struggling LA nations.
Therefore, US reaction against coup very strong, as reflected in editorials and Congress. Moreover, some distinguished members Congress who in past have opposed military assistance to Latin America were so outraged they are now pushing for legislation denying both US military and economic assistance to any government springing from a military coup. Their feelings are understandable, for they represent precisely the same forces which have been most disposed to extend generous helping hand to Dom people in efforts to build a democracy on ruins tyranny.
Dominicans should not underestimate strength or importance of public reaction to coup. USG can never disregard public opinion, as Dom military trained here can appreciate.
US does not seek to impose unacceptable—or any single—solution in DomRep. We recognize Communist dangers; we will insist on its being curbed, in our own interests as well as DomRep’s. But we must ensure in so far as realistically possible that would-be golpistas in other LA countries take no encouragement from Dom coup, and we must [Page 746] ensure that any solution to present impasses takes fully into account the desire of Dom people (and US people) that control over their destiny shall be returned to hands of a government responsive to their will.
In this connection, well to remember that all PRDers, just like all military, not bad per se, and not “brainwashed” (JANAF 162116Z).3 We must stop thinking in labels and bogeymen, face realities and individuals.
Finally, DomRep, for historical, geographic, cultural reasons occupies special position vis-à-vis US. US feels nothing but friendliness and sympathy for Dom people and Dom problems.
B. This background, of course, does not in any way presage a new “softer” position. It is an attempt to explain our present firm position, and to give attaches something to keep talking to military, especially, perhaps, junior officers, about.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 DOM REP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by J.B. Martin. Approved by Cottrell.↩
- References are to the Secretary’s statement of October 4 (see footnote 2, Document 360, and the President’s press conference of October 9 (see footnote 2, Document 65).↩
- Not found.↩