Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, October 13, 1963,10:45p.m.

264. For Charge from Under Secretary.

1. Cables received today from Casasnovas addressed to President and Secretary state that Casasnovas has been designated by the National Assembly as provisional President during absence of Bosch.² Diplomatic recognition is requested and agrement for Del Rosario as Ambassador.

2. Bosch cabled President last night and suggested this compliance with constitutional provisions makes Casasnovas provisional President and therefore legitimate head GODR with which US already has relations.

3. We do not know who has put together this Bosch-Casasnovas-Assembly maneuver, and it is essential you get firmest evidence possible on this point. We are particularly concerned lest it reflect effort by the PSP or other Castro-Communist elements. If you are satisfied, however, that this is basically a PRD operation and that Casasnovas is not being used, knowingly or unknowingly, as tool of Castro-Communists, this appears to create new situation requiring revision of time schedule. Possibly it offers a chance for immediate restoration higher degree constitutionality than we had envisaged.

4. We recognize considerations which lead you to conclude that waiting a few days more will not materially harm our interests. However, as result of PRD action, positions may rapidly polarize. Situation appears to be that triumvirate represents power without legitimacy whereas Casasnovas represents color of legitimacy without power. The problem is to fuse two elements before irrevocable polarization. To this end approach to triumvirate should be made now.

5. Against foregoing background, you are instructed to approach Tavares unofficially as soon as possible Monday morning along following lines:

A. You should state that it is possible the triumvirate has been misled by Lear Reed. We have just become aware of his unauthorized activities. He is a private citizen, purely a volunteer with no official or unofficial standing with USG and he does not and cannot represent views of USG. Whatever has been said to Lear by triumvirate, he has not passed along to USG, and any opinions he has expressed as to USG position should be totally ignored.

B. As indicated in Secretary’s statement of October 4,³USG will not collaborate or normalize relations with de facto government under existing conditions. There should be no ambiguity on this point. Actions taken by USG for removal of personnel are continuing and will be continued unless prompt return to constitutionality assured.

C. USG would like to know plans of present de facto government to return to constitutionality.

D. If Tavares describes triumvirate position as you have predicted, that a constitutional assembly will be elected within a year, followed by joint municipal and constitutional elections, with presidential election at end of triumvirate term, you should say that this whole proposal inadequate and unacceptable and that USG could not work with triumvirate on this basis.

E. You should state that USG has been asked to recognize Casasnovas as legitimate provisional President under constitution given substance by action of Assembly. This matter being seriously studied by USG. FYI: However, we are not anxious to act in manner that could exacerbate confusion and polarization or provoke civil disorders. End FYI.

F. We would be interested, therefore, in attitude triumvirate to acceptance of Casasnovas as head of government on assumption Bosch and Gonzalez Tamayo will not return to Dominican Republic. Triumvirate would dissolve and Casasnovas would then have right to select own Cabinet.

G. This would mean immediate restoration of constitutional government with military withdrawing from political control and resuming proper constitutional role. Would also mean withdrawal of certain political parties or party leaders who have forced themselves or their men into key cabinet posts.

H. If triumvirate and their military backers would agree to this arrangement prompt restoration of USG cooperation could be effected.

I. You should make clear to triumvirate that if they agree to Casasnovas takeover, triumvirate will be publicly recognized as having preserved civilian control in most difficult circumstances and provided bridge back to constitutionality thus performing indispensable service of statesmanship to Republic. You should make clear to triumvirate that we would insist that Casasnovas take effective measures to closely restrict Communist travel and internal activities and ensure country against Communist infiltration and subversion, which together with ousting Bosch, was after all ostensible reason for coup. If you think it helpful as sweetening for Triumvirate, we should have no objections to your suggesting that we might try to persuade Casasnovas to make use their talents in new cabinet.

FYI: Throughout discussions, you should bear in mind that important objective is to bring about an effective as well as a constitutional government, at cabinet level and below. You should hold strongly all major points of position. However, if Tavares or other spokesmen for triumvirate indicate possibility of accepting national government in which Casasnovas would agree to include representation of some other parties in Cabinet, we would be prepared to canvass this with them as possible alternative solution. End FYI.

6. Since key appears to be military acceptance, immediately after talking to Tavares on Monday you should approach Vinas Roman (in company with other DR military leaders if you deem others’ presence advisable) and make same points to him or them as you made to Tavares (Para 5 above).

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by J.B. Martin, Cottrell, and Ball; cleared in draft by the President; and approved by Ball.
2. Not printed. Telegrams 262 and 263, from Santo Domingo, October 13. (Ibid.)
3. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1963, p. 624.