Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

332. Telegram From the White House to the Department of State¹

San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 16, 1961.

PRWHO5. From Naval Aide to the President. To Mr. Bundy, WashDC, Sec Rusk, State Dept. Following instructions were given to Mr. Hill by the President.

Memorandum for John Calvin Hill, Consul General, Santo Domingo

For your use immediately on your return to Santo Domingo on December 16, 1961, there are attached:

1) Instructions for a conversation with President Balaguer on my behalf.

2) Instructions for a conversation with General Rodriguez Echavarria.

3) General instructions for your guidance in these conversations.

s/John F. Kennedy

December 16, 1961

La Fortaleza

San Juan, Puerto Rico

1. The President has personally instructed that you make the following known to President Balaguer.

The Government and people of the United States have great admiration for President Balaguer’s heroic and courageous efforts to effect a peaceful transition to democratic government in the Dominican Republic whatever the feelings of the moment in the Dominican Republic. The President is confident that if Balaguer’s efforts are successful he will endure as one of the great figures of his country’s history and an important figure in the history of this hemisphere. Because of this admiration for President Balaguer the President is greatly disturbed at the current course of events in the Dominican Republic. If the current impasse is allowed to continue then violence and terror are certain to rise—the problems of peaceful transition will be complicated—and the efforts to achieve democracy will be endangered. As long as President Balaguer continues without indicating a definite decision to turn over the office of President to a successor—then the entire atmosphere in the Dominican Republic will continue to grow hostile and dangerous—and distrust for the regime and for President Balaguer will increase. Thus, unless immediate steps are taken to set a date for departure the dangers of a new dictatorship will increase and the prestige of President Balaguer will decline. If he leaves early and on his own initiative then he undoubtedly will be known as one of the few men in any country to have brought about a peaceful transition to democracy. If he does not do this, and if he is forced out at some later date, then his prestige and his position in history will be damaged or even destroyed.

We realize the difficulties which President Balaguer faces. And we admire the skill with which he has handled the enormous problems of his country. Therefore we have, at all times, supported his efforts to bring about constitutional government. We believe that the following suggested course of action will bring final success, after which we are confident President Balaguer can return to an important official position of some prestige—as well as to a secure position in the history of his country and of western democracy:

(A) We suggest that the President make it clear that the announcement of his final solution was not forced on him by others—but was arrived at his own free will and after careful thought for the welfare and future of his country.

(B) That the President announce his intention to resign on February 27, 1962. He should state that in the interim he intends to carry out the program of establishing the Council of State, reorganizing the cabinet etc. To create a government of national unity. We believe it is essential to announce a definite date for President Balaguer’s resignation. Not to do so would create distrust of his intentions, make it impossible to form a bona fide coalition government, and make it very difficult for the United States to lift sanctions or recognize the government until after his departure. On the other hand, if he announces a date the sincerity of his intentions will be recognized. His position and prestige in his own country and elsewhere will be strengthened, and it will be his government that will achieve not only democratic government, but the restoration of diplomatic relations and an end to sanctions. If he does not announce a date then it will appear as if he were forced out, as if others had made the decision as to when he should leave, whereas if he does set a date then he will appear to be in control of the situation, to have made his own decision, and be shaping his country’s future.

(C) Balaguer should also announce—on his own initiative—his intention to create a Council of State, a representative cabinet, and to take other measures necessary to assure a government of national unity with elections.

(D) That President Balaguer announce the appointment of these bodies including the appointment of the members of the Council of State as advisors to the President pending enactment of the necessary constitutional and legal change to establish the Council. That he also announce his intention to resign February 27, 1962 in favor of the person who will be elected Vice-President of the Council.

(E) The United States will then proceed to move to lift sanctions and re-establish diplomatic relations so that these things will be accomplished before President Balaguer leaves office.

2. The President has instructed the Consul General of the United States, in his discretion, to seek an interview with General Rodriguez Echavarria and state the following points on behalf of the President:

(A) The United States believes the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic are deeply interested in supporting the democratic evolution of the republic and in its reincorporation into the Inter-American community at the earliest possible time.

(B) The United States considers that the support of the armed forces to a political and constitutional solution as may be reached between President Balaguer and the responsible opposition will greatly help in overcoming the present crisis and will pave the way for quick international action on behalf of the government and people of the Dominican Republic.

(C) Were the armed forces to give their unequivocal support to the solution accorded by President Balaguer and the responsible opposition, the United States, on its part, will:

(1) Take or support an initiative in the OAS to revoke immediately the sanctions imposed by the San Jose conference.

(2) Restore diplomatic relations as soon as formal action is taken by the COAS and,

(3) Consequently authorize the additional “windfall” sugar quota for the Dominican Republic.

(4) Give immediate and sympathetic consideration to bilateral programs between the United States and the Government of the Dominican Republic under the Alianza Para el Progreso, with particular reference to the social development of the Dominican people.

(5) Be prepared to discuss, upon request by a government of national unity of the Dominican Republic the conclusion of a suitable military agreement for military cooperation including the provision, if desired, of a United States military mission.

(D) Were the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic to deny their support to the political solution reached by President Balaguer and the responsible opposition, the United States will be unable to support the lifting of sanctions or will consider inadvisable to grant the “windfall” quota or enter into any agreements related to the extension of the Alliance for Progress to the Dominican people.

3. The President instructed the Consul General of the United States in the Dominican Republic to seek an immediate interview with President Balaguer on his return to Santo Domingo on December 16 and to convey the message which he has been instructed to give to President Balaguer. In addition, the Consul General may make any or all of the following points:

(1) The United States is anxious that there be an early solution to the political impasse between the Government of the Dominican Republic and the anti-Communist opposition at the earliest possible date.

(2) When an accord is reached, the United States is prepared to take, or support, an initiative in the OAS to revoke the sanctions imposed by the Conference of San Jose, to restore diplomatic relations and, consequently to authorize the additional (“windfall”) sugar quota for the Dominican Republic. The United States, upon the restoration of diplomatic relations, is further prepared to give sympathetic and immediate consideration to bilateral programs between the United States and the Dominican Republic, under the Alianza Para Progreso program, in such fields as economic, cultural and military cooperation as well as give sympathetic support to Dominican requests to international institutions for the financing of sound programs and projects for the economic recovery and development of the Dominican Republic.

(3) The United States, however, considers that it will not be in a position to take these actions in benefit of the Dominican Republic until such time as the Dominican Government is broadly representative of national opinion on the basis of an accord between the government and the main political groups representing the Dominican people. Therefore, the United States believes that reaching such an accord is of the greatest urgency.

(4) The United States further considers that delay in reaching an accord not only enhances the possibilities of the growth of leftist and Castroist agitation and disturbances or of the growth of military influence in the civil affairs of the Dominican Republic, but also does serious damage to the international reputation of the United States, of President Balaguer and of the Dominican Armed Forces. The United States, and its President, fully recognize and appreciate the role which President Balaguer has taken in setting the course of his nation towards a democratic system and towards the restoration of good relations with the United States and other American Republics. The United States is prepared to use its influence in order to assure that, upon leaving office, President Balaguer is treated with the consideration due to the efforts he has made towards these objectives.

(5) While recognizing that the nature of an accord between the government and the opposition is essentially an internal matter, the United States is prepared to lend its support in the OAS and bilaterally to a government consisting of

(a) A President.

(b) A Council of State composed of distinguished citizens mutually acceptable to the opposition and to the government including the armed forces.

(c) A cabinet divided among nominees of the present government and the opposition and

(d) The armed forces, responsible under the constitution solely to the President and responsible under him for their own self-administration without political interference.

(6) The United States does not consider that the completion or non-completion of President Balaguer’s term of office should be an obstacle to reaching an agreement. On the contrary, the United States believes that President Balaguer has a unique opportunity to successfully set his country on the road to democracy, but that his position would become untenable in the eyes of the hemisphere if insistence on completing his term of office became the sole obstacle to reaching an accord and that such serious damage would be done to the reputation of the President and to the present Dominican Government that it would be impossible for the United States to lift sanctions or resume diplomatic relations.

(7) Note: In reporting the results of this conversation and of other developments in the Dominican Republic, the Consul General will forward his recommendations on the desirability of having Deputy Assist-ant Secretary Morales Carrion return to the Dominican Republic and on the advisability of having OAS Secretary General Mora go there.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/12-1661. Secret. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text. President Kennedy, en route to Venezuela and Colombia, met with Woodward, Bowles, Morales-Carrion, Hill, and Goodwin at the Governor of Puerto Rico’s mansion, La Fortaleza, to discuss the Dominican negotiations.
2. Printed from an unsigned copy.