Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

282. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan)¹

Washington, July 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• British Guiana

I return herewith the BG dossier.² I agree with Mac’s memorandum and with my earlier memorandum³ on the initial version of the plan (which I think you have). In short, I agree that there is no future in Jagan; and that the Burnham risk is less than the Jagan risk; but the CIA plan makes me nervous; [1 line of source text not declassified]. I also share Mac’s doubts as to whether the Secretary is the man to talk to Ormsby Gore on the subject.

I would suggest that you bear down hard on two points:

1) Does CIA think that they can carry out a really covert operation—i.e., an operation which, whatever suspicions Jagan might have, will leave no visible traces which he can cite before the world, whether he wins or loses, as evidence of U.S. intervention?

2) If we lose, what then? The present suggestions are pretty bleak—especially when our chances of winning are probably less than 50-50.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.⁴

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, British Guiana, June 1-Aug. 15, 1962. Top Secret.
2. Not printed.
3. Documents 281 and 278.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.