278. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy1

SUBJECT

  • British Guiana

I attach a collection of papers from the State Department.2 They include [3 lines of source text not declassified] and (c) a report from Harry Hoffmann on the British Guiana political situation.

[3 paragraphs (181/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

At the same time, the Secretary recommends that we go ahead with the economic studies proposed by the Hoffman-Mayne mission on the ground that action on the economic aid front will indicate good will, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and lay the groundwork for a development program when we have a friendly government.

I agree that the evidence shows increasingly that Jagan’s heart is with the Communist world. He is quite plainly a Marxist nationalist, who sees the west in terms of the old stereotypes of capitalism and imperialism and who is deeply persuaded of the superiority of Communist methods and values. There is no convincing evidence that he is a disciplined member of the Communist party, but then neither is Castro. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

The alternative to Jagan is Forbes Burnham. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Burnham, moreover, as an African, is the representative of the ethnic group deemed by its low birth rate to minority status in British Guiana. On the other hand, Burnham is regarded more favorably by the AFL-CIO people who have had British Guiana contacts and by some people in the British Labour Party (among them Gaitskell). He made a generally good impression in his visit to Washington.

All alternatives in British Guiana are terrible; but I have little doubt that an independent British Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit himself to a multiracial policy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana under Jagan.

[4 paragraphs (25-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

On a three-day trip to the Berbice and Corentyne last week, I found considerable unrest and suspicion—even fear—of Jagan’s leanings among middleclass East Indians, even in Jagan’s home village of Port [Page 573] Mourant. They expressed respect and admiration for Raibut to the man they said in an election showdown the masses would flock to Jagan. Rai was described as too new on the political scene, compared with Jagan, and lacking in the mass appeal that belongs to Jagan, who could make political hay by characterizing Rai as a traitor to the cause. In the end, they said, the East Indians would vote race—and Jagan would get the votes of even many of the doubtful ones as the East Indian most likely to win.

This situation would be changed, of course, if there were a uniting of the Burnham and D’Aguiar forces behind Rai. But, so far, Burnham is so impressed by his own importance and self-analysis of popularity that this is not likely to happen. He is convinced in his own mind that his PNC would win any new election, and until such time as he can be persuaded otherwise the chances for any reasonable and effective unification are remote. Also, there is considerable feeling here, which I am inclined to share, that British Guiana would be worse off with Burnham than with Jagan.

[4 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., British Guiana. Top Secret.
  2. None printed.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.