Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

238. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs (Burton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)¹

Washington,May 14, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Proposals for Reducing Brazilian Resistances to U.S. Hemispheric Polices

1. Brazil has shown an increasing tendency to reject the OAS or various key actions in the OAS and to seek action (a) in the UN, (b) in concert with other Latin America Republics, or (c) in an organization, such as LAFTA, of which the U.S. is not a party. Other LA’s, including major ones such as Chile or Mexico, have often been in agreement with Brazil.

2. Brazil has increasingly expressed its concern that the OAS (a) is being converted into an instrument for intervention into the internal affairs of individual nations, (b) is being used as an instrument for the imposition of U.S. objectives.

3. Brazil has become increasingly sensitive about its position as a major power in world affairs and increasingly resentful, it seems, of its “dependence” on the U.S. U.S. purchase of coffee and U.S. aid are, to many in Brazil, elements of a kind of dependence of which they would like to free themselves. This attitude can at some point provoke a kind of defiance and opposition which can give us very serious trouble.

4. While we can oppose and pressure Brazil vigorously on OAS, Cuba, and related issues—and I have strongly advocated this in various instances there may come a time when such tactics will work against us, when we will regret not having resorted more to other tactics, when we will find it imperative to win over Brazil and yet find it impossible because we started too late.

5. What I am suggesting is a more active effort to win Brazil over (and others in the process) by a vigorous consulting with Brazil in order to reach a greater meeting of minds on hemispheric problems. In this context we might sort out a number of things we are doing and decide that they are not worth the strains and cleavages they engender. Even if we agree on only limited measures of accommodation, the fact that we treat Brazil’s views with respect by resorting to a greater exchange of views for the purpose of achieving a greater meeting of minds could bring a greater responsiveness on the part of the Brazilian Government.

6. While I would disagree vigorously with any suggestion that we are carrying on any kind of “war” against Brazil in hemispheric affairs, I would agree even more vigorously with Ambassador Gordon’s recent efforts to initiate a more extensive exchange of views with the Government of Brazil on hemispheric matters—in which he needs our support.

7. My own limited background and exposure suggest that a rather serious reappraisal of our hemispheric measure—perhaps by a special group—would be desirable to decide whether certain of these measures generate dissensions and resistances which deter or destroy cooperation to major objectives far more than they contribute thereto. (Not an inter-agency group, but a committee of statesmen of the caliber of Bunker and Merchant.)

8. My more immediate concern is to obtain a greater measure of consultation between the U.S. and Brazil on hemispheric matters (a) to obtain a better understanding in the Brazilian Government of U.S. policy, (b) to make such accommodations to Brazil’s views as may be appropriate, (c) to give Brazil a feeling that we accept and respect her position as a major hemispheric power, (d) to win, in the process, a greater measure of responsiveness from Brazil in hemispheric matters. Such consultations, for maximum impact, must be carried on through our Embassy with the Brazilian Government. I think it would be generally agreed that the chief impact has to be on the government in Brazil, not the Brazilian representatives in the OAS or the UN.

Recommendations:²

That we take steps in cooperation with our Embassy in Brazil to initiate a more active and continuing dialogue with the Brazilian Government on hemispheric problems for the purposes set forth in 8 above. This is consistent with recent views and recommendations of Ambassador Gordon. (Recent Deptel 1939,³ attached—particularly paragraph two—is a move in the direction recommended.)

That RPA have primary responsibility in ARA for the foregoing and that the Office of Brazil Affairs give supporting assistance.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BRAZ-US. Secret. Drafted by Burton and cleared in draft by Allen of ARA/RPA.
2. Martin approved both recommendations.
3. Dated April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, CSM 9-6 LAT AM)