237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil1
1677. Subject: Conversation between President and Brazilian FinMin Dantas 3/11/63. Following uncleared interpreters’ memorandum of conversation for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.2
President welcomed Minister Dantas and said thought he had come at most useful time for discussion matters concern both countries.
Dantas thanked President, presented Goulart’s greetings and handed him two letters from Goulart.3 He expressed Goulart’s hope President Kennedy would visit Brazil. President Kennedy replied that such a visit must certainly take place during the present terms of office of himself and Goulart, and they would have to consider a satisfactory time for such a visit.
Dantas explained purpose his call was to discuss Brazil’s economic and political situation in all frankness and clarify some aspects of situation which are objects of concern to United States, including some aspects which already discussed during Attorney General Kennedy’s visit Brazil. He particularly wanted bring President up to date on how things stand now that government has retuned to Presidential system, thanks to plebiscite.4
Plebiscite has enabled Goulart establish government of solid authority, marked by unity of purpose. Plebiscite was categorical in extending overwhelming popular support to Goulart. Consequently, Goulart believes he will now be able deal with Brazil’s problems along lines he had already described to President Kennedy.
Goulart feels present situation Brazil such that he will be able bring about a democratic consolidation of country. Best way to do this is through government that has great popular support and enjoys confidence [Page 501] of working class. This was case of Vargas administration. Vargas exercised type leadership that attracted progressive and liberal elements and Goulart believes he can do same, i.e., have a democratic government supported by working classes.
[Here follows discussion of Brazil’s economic stabilization plan.]
Next question Dantas raised was US concern that Communists have infiltrated GOB. Dantas said this infiltration greatly over-estimated, and added that label of “Communist” has been attached to people who have leftist tendencies but are not members of Communist party.
[Here follows discussion of left-wing elements within Brazilian Government and society.]
Dantas then brought up Brazil’s view of Cuban situation. This already discussed by representatives of US and Brazil, but he felt it worthwhile go over it again. Goulart government must maintain consist-ent relationship with public opinion, particularly left of center groups that support it. Public opinion on Cuba varies considerably in Brazil, but there is no doubt that when there is danger of military aggression based on Cuba, the government’s stand is fully supported by people. This was clearly shown at the time of naval quarantine last October and Brazilian vote on this in OAS. When, however, it is matter of hostility towards regime itself, situation is different. Dantas assured President Kennedy that in the case of real security threat from Cuba, Brazilian people will support US fully, and this support will in turn yield positive policy decisions on part of GOB.
[Here follows a discussion of public utilities in Brazil and Communist infiltration of the Brazilian labor movement.]
In conclusion, Dantas stressed Goulart’s belief that this is decisive moment which will define Brazil’s future role in Latin American framework. Brazil’s democratic position is definite; Brazil is a friend of US and will remain so, with or without international cooperation. But effectiveness of Brazil’s role in Latin America will depend on whether or not in 1963 & 1964 it succeeds in stabilization program and in strengthening private enterprise.
If Brazil succeeds, it can play important role in maintaining strength of West. If it fails, while there will be no shift in Brazil’s ideological position, Brazil’s effectiveness will be greatly reduced. Therefore, Goulart believes it is very important for United States and Brazil to come to understanding so as to assure success of stabilization plan.
President Kennedy thanked Dantas for his presentation and said he was pleased that a man of Dantas’ experience and ability was working to solve major problem of obtaining stability plus growth. He wished Mr. Dantas success, adding that we in US have stability but not enough growth.
[Page 502]Details of how US can assist Brazil are to be discussed at later meetings with other officials of the Administration, but he assured Dantas that US wants to help. He explained it is becoming increasingly difficult for US to support efforts of other countries, adding that it is a bad mistake to set up a good plan which then fails owing to lack of adequate implementation and support. Therefore we hope American aid to Brazil will be used to meet Brazil’s real needs.
President Kennedy then raised other matters which concern US, assuring Dantas that his comments were not to be taken as interference in Brazil’s affairs, but simply as an expression of our interest in Brazil.
[Here follows discussion of Communist influence in the Brazilian labor movement.]
President Kennedy commented that he did not think it would be possible to bring complete social peace to Brazil in near future. (Even France, with great prosperity in recent years, has not been able to solve its social problems, witness current miners’ strike.) He believes that it is most important to get rid of Communists in Army, labor movement, and Goulart’s household. The Government is bound to have problems, and Communists will exploit them.
As for American aid to Brazil, we have various preoccupations here owing to expropriation of American firms in Brazil, certain aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy, Brizola’s activities, and situation in labor movement.
Furthermore, Alliance for Progress has been attacked in Brazil. Alliance for Progress is an effort by United States to help Latin America with hope that our aid will succeed. If we cannot hold out this hope, it is difficult to get American people to support long-range aid to Latin America. Attacks on Alliance by Brazilians make it difficult for us to help Brazil, and give impression that whatever we do it won’t make much of a difference. The United States wants to help Brazil, provided we feel that our help can make a difference.
Ambassador Campos said reports here about Communists in Goulart’s household are exaggerated. It is difficult to distinguish between various shades of leftism and communism. He said there are no communists in key positions of authority. Problem of Communist infiltration in labor movement is serious however. Situation arose because government tolerated their presence because it needed support of labor. Now, with split in labor over stabilization plan, Communists will be eliminated. Process may be more gradual than United States might like, but Campos believes there will be an erosion of Communist influence.
Dantas said government should remove all Communists because they present a danger to government. However, government cannot go so far in removing leftist elements that it appears to be a conservative government. If that happens, it would lose support of people.
[Page 503]President Kennedy said he had no objection to an “opening to the left,” but that it should stop short of Communists. He also understands difficulty in distinguishing between Communists and leftists. He also knows that this is a matter that has been discussed by Ambassadors Campos and Gordon.
President stated his belief that situation in Latin America is critical to West. Latin America is a key element, and Brazil is key country in Latin America. He then wished Dantas success in his undertaking stressing once more his pleasure that a man of Dantas’ capacity and experience had taken on very difficult task of promoting economic stabilization and development in Brazil. He suggested that they meet again to continue their talk, and a date was provisionally arranged for Thursday, March 21.5
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Brazil, March 12-21, 1963. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burton and Crane; cleared by Gordon, Wellman of ARA/EST and S/S; and approved by E.M. Martin.↩
- No formal memorandum of conversation was found in Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. A place-holding card in this file directs the reader to telegram 1677 for a record of the conversation. The card notes that the telegram’s account had been reviewed by the White House and cleared.↩
- Both letters dated March 8; for full texts, see ibid.: Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.↩
- Reference is to the January 6 plebiscite that restored to the Brazilian Presidency those powers curtailed by the September 2, 1961, amendment to the Brazilian constitution. See Document 213.↩
- President Kennedy and Minister Dantas met again at the White House March 25, 11-11:35 a.m., according to the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) No memorandum of their conversation has been found. At that time AID Administrator David E. Bell and Dantas signed an agreement by which the United States would provide Brazil with $385.5 million in economic assistance. See Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1963, pp. 557-561.↩