Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

188. Letter From the Ambassador to Argentina (McClintock) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)¹

Buenos Aires, May 31, 1962.

Dear Ed: In response to your letter of May 8,² may I say how welcome it is to know that you have set up informal working groups in ARA closely to study the trend of recent events in Argentina, to draw conclusions therefrom, and to advocate a line of policy which may make it possible for us to achieve our objectives in relation to Argentina. I also note that you share the views expressed in our telegram No. 2233,³ that our policy and endeavor should center on economic measures to palliate the crisis and give hope of social reform, and on political measures designed to speed the transition between democracy in word and democracy in deed. You will recall that I ended that telegram with the statement that although the price of victory would be high, the cost of defeat would be even greater.

We have accepted your suggestion that our recommendations on possible new courses of action should be cast in the format of a revision of the Department’s Guidelines paper on Argentina dated March 1962.⁴ With the full collaboration of the entire Country Team, we have prepared such a revision and enclose it herewith.⁵ For the convenience of the various elements in the Department who will study the paper I am likewise sending the original hectograph mat to facilitate reproduction. We have sought to stay as close to the March issue of the Guidelines paper as possible but have not hesitated to depart where necessary from its language. We have also been happy to draw here and there on phraseology from the first draft of the Strategic Studies Group on Argentina prepared in S/P.⁶ I shall, however, wish on a separate occasion to comment on that valuable paper and in particular some of its suggested courses of action with which I do not agree.

Within the Procrustean bed of a bureaucratic policy paper it is difficult to impart the flavor of the present situation in Argentina.

As I pointed out in Embassy telegram No. 1977,⁷ the revolution which overthrew Frondizi was the result of, and also the explanation of, a number of paradoxes. Fair and free elections supervised by the military returned a Peronist vote which many construed as the threat of a return to Peronist dictatorship. Even in advance of any request from the military that he negate the results of the elections, President Frondizi intervened the provincial governments where the Peronists had won on March 18, 1962; yet despite his zeal in this direction, he was thrown out by the military. Although Frondizi was physically deposed, the Supreme Court piously declared that his successor, Guido, was in fact constitutional President. The military themselves, although they could easily have reached for overt power and still in the background exercise the negative power of veto, undertook their revolution in the firm conviction that they were acting in the name and spirit of democracy. However, as I have pointed out, we are in the case of Argentina using the same vocabulary but different dictionaries.

Fundamentally the recent crisis in Argentina was an emergency in morality. It was the inability of President Frondizi to move for any length of time on a straight course and his inability to follow a consistent policy of telling the truth which aroused many elements of the population against him and particularly the military who thought that he was either a front man for Peronism or, worse, a Judas who would eventually betray the country to Communism. Their suspicions of Frondizi were deepened by the utterly amoral, and frequently immoral, activities of Frondizi’s eminence grise, Frigerio, who thought that every man had his price and who himself had his own price, frequently a high one. This crisis of morals in the political leadership, the absence of morals in that part of the economic community which paid bribes to Frigerio, and the cynical apathy of the people which will be noted below, caused a moral bankruptcy which was the basic cause of the recent coup d’etat. Whatever remedies we seek to apply must in essence begin on a moral basis.

In what I sometimes ironically refer to as “the constitutional revolution”, I have also remarked to Argentine friends that the nation is suffering from a political disease called acefalía. This is a word taken from the 1868 Law of Presidential Succession aptly termed la ley de acefalía, or headlessness. This ultimate paradox finds us with a tacit dictatorship lacking a dictator. In effect, a committee of three high military officers, the Secretaries of War, Navy and Air, act as a triumvirate with power of veto and suggestion over the civilian government headed by President Guido. (This they also exercised from time to time over the government of Frondizi.) However, within the civilian Cabinet there are men of ability and power who have a wide range of liberty of action and are a more positive counterpoise to the military. Principal of these is Alsogaray, the decisive, imaginative and bold Minister of Economic Affairs. Second to him is del Carril, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose sense of historical perspective and whose ability to write have given him an increasing ascendancy with the somewhat illiterate military. A third figure yet to be tried, but who impresses me favorably, is Cantilo, the civilian Minister of Defense. This hybrid government, a camelopard of many spots, also operates without two of the hallmarks of dictatorship: both the judiciary and the press of Argentina are free.

Yet all of these elements, both civilian and military, seem to be suffering from this political disease of acefalia or headlessness. The disease extends likewise to the leadership in the political parties. Although officially placed in an “estado de asamblea”, an Argentine legalism for suspension of activities, the various party leaders and the members of Congress whose sessions have been suspended by decree, still vociferate and grumble at their impotence. I do not discern in the congressional leadership nor in the political parties as now constituted any real emergent chief. In consequence, some of the easy recommendations for us to encourage a fusion of the two Radical Parties, or to bring about the creation of a Labor Party utilizing sanatized Peronist strength, seem in the shape of wishful thinking. In politics, as in the government itself, the disease of acefalía is rampant.

I have frequently pointed out that Argentina at present exhibits a perilous political vacuum. In the absence of leadership there is a terrible apathy in the Argentine public which in reality is not a true apathy of “I don’t care”, but the more dangerous apathy born of an absolute cynicism. The Argentine people, and particularly the inhabitants of Buenos Aires, inherit the anti-government sentiments of their Spanish and Italian progenitors plus the “me first, the devil take the hindmost” attitude of the Italian immigrants who came to Argentina for the sole purpose of making money. After a generation of military rule in one form or another, their natural distrust and disgust of government has reached the point of utter cynicism not yet tinctured by utter despair.

With this aching void in a mass of people who have yet not reached the point of suffering where they will take great personal risk, the time will inevitably come when new leadership will emerge. The danger is that the new leader will be an adventurer masked in the old Argentine tradition of the caudillo. Whether he comes mounted on a horse or a tank is a matter of detail.

However, there are certain assets on which one can build. In their halting and groping way most of the Argentine military are sincere in their patriotism and in their desire to make way for a truly democratic state. They are also, mark you, friendly to the United States at the present time and find it difficult to understand why we should look down our noses at the military who are as fervently anti-Communist as we. The Argentine military, in my judgment, should be regarded as an asset by the United States (if rightly used) and not as a liability as some people in Washington seem to believe. In this connection, see the nuclear contingency I added to the Guidelines paper on Argentina.

The Argentine military in the background and the Ministers of the civilian government in the foreground need help in trying to rebuild the political machinery of the state. If some manner could be devised to divest Argentina of its self-serving present politicians and to replace them with younger and more enlightened elements, I see no reason why a new democratic political era should not dawn in Argentina. Much will depend upon who emerges as the next President and upon the degree of enlightenment coupled with leadership he will show. It is clear to me, however, that at the present time the key vote in Argentina is the Peronist vote, that this bloc of voters has by far the best discipline, and that it should not be beyond the range of ingenuity to canalize this element into new courses which will lead to a new and effective party with which we could get along. I am less confident, unless the present leadership is removed, of the ability of anyone to get the two warring factions of the Radical Party to get together.

All of these contingencies in the political field are deeply affected by the current economic crisis. Unless measures can be taken to increase productivity, to bring the national economy more into balance, to make possible markets for Argentine agriculture and to alleviate the pang of the rising cost of living on the workers, the chances of achieving political democracy will be correspondingly diminished. In the economic field we probably have more practical resources at hand to guide the course of events than in the political field. However, I do not despair of the resources of personal diplomacy nor of the ability of this Embassy to influence the course of political events.

Forgive the length of this letter. It was merely that I wished to give a certain sense of perspective and an intimation of direction that seemed easier of expression by this means than in the more stilted phrases of a policy paper. We have an exceedingly difficult task ahead but we are not bereft of assets and we are dealing with a proud and intelligent people. In fact, as I have said in my telegrams, I think the present crisis in Argentina affords us a unique opportunity for showing that the principles of the Alliance for Progress can be made to work and produce tangible results.

In consequence, let me conclude on a note of confidence. Over the long range I am bullish on Argentina. With the exercise of diligence, the use of our heads, and that essential ingredient of diplomacy, “a little bit of luck”, I think we can succeed.

Cheers,

RM

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William Brubeck Series, Argentina, ‘61-’62. Secret.
2. Not found.
3. Dated May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/5-462)
4. This paper, prepared in consultation with interested Departments and Agencies, was issued under the authority of the Department of State for guidance of all concerned in the conduct of foreign policy. (Ibid., 611.35/3-3162)
5. Not found attached.
6. This draft study, April 14, is 85 pages long. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Argentina)
7. Dated April 6. (Ibid., Central Files, 735.00/4-662)