187. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk1
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
- Prospects for Argentina—Political Repression and Military Rule
Argentina will probably be ruled by the military until May 1964. Annulment of the March 18 election results and federal intervention in all Provinces leaves the country without an effective Parliament and with government completely in the hands of the central Executive, installed and controlled by the military. Since the remnant which remains in the Chamber of Deputies will barely exceed a constitutional quorum, even token dissent will prevent legislative action, and the expectation is that Argentina will be ruled by decree for the next 24 months.
Little hope is seen for the liberalization of the present military regime. Violence and repression are likely if Peronists and other labor groups strike against the economic austerity program which has already substantially increased the cost of living. The Peronists might well extend strikes and demonstrations to protest against cancellation of their election victories, the probable proscription of Peronist parties, and restrictions on labor union activities. However, military forces appear to be strong enough to control the country, although there will likely be some deaths and many arrests. The economy will be slowed by strikes and a loss of business confidence at least in the short run.
In Italy and France at the close of World War II as large a part of the electorate supported Communism as now supports Peronism in Argentina. [Page 384] However, the Communists in Italy and France were not proscribed from political participation and thus were not limited to strikes, demonstrations, and terror for political expression. Instead the existence of the Communist group in Parliament and in the electorate encouraged the non-Communist forces, which were divided on many issues, to work together. Frondizi was pursuing such a course in Argentina, before the military reversed the trend on March 29.
The hard-line military group now in control have no constructive plan for the political future of Argentina. Some military probably hope to break the Peronist movement by suppression; but this tactic did not work between 1955 and 1958. Others assume the military will proscribe the Peronists in the 1963 election and guarantee the election of their candidate. However, in any free election in which the Peronists are proscribed from presenting their own candidate they hold the balance of power in choosing among the major candidates. The ability of the Peronist organization to direct about two million voters was demonstrated in 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1962. Thus in the 1963 elections the military might well be confronted, as they were in 1958, by a situation in which the leading candidates appeal for Peronist support despite military objection.
Implications for U.S. Policy. The United States can have little effect on immediate developments in Argentina. However, the nature of our relations with the government will be an important factor in determining the strength of those forces which want a rapid return to fully democratic government. Such forces are already considerable in the political parties, in apolitical groups, and even in the military. Considerations for U.S. policy are:
- 1)
- the nature of official U.S. contact with members of the present government, especially with the Argentine military;
- 2)
- the extent of our contacts with the political parties, including the Peronists;
- 3)
- whether to disburse or withhold the announced $150 million in Alliance for Progress aid; and
- 4)
- if aid funds are released, whether to channel them through the government or directly into projects which immediately benefit the people.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Argentina, General, 4/62. Confidential. Copies were sent to Schlesinger, Dungan, and Thomas Parrot of CIA.↩