107. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army (Vance) to Secretary of
Defense McNamara1
Washington,
March 15,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees
REFERENCES
- (a) NSAM No. 213 dated January 8,
19632
- (b) Memo for McGeorge Bundy
from DepSecDef dated January 10, 1963, subj: Interdepartmental
Organization for Cuban Affairs3
The attached Program on the Movement of Subversives and Subversive
Trainees to and from Cuba was approved by the President on March 8,
1963.
For implementation in the Department of Defense, the Program has been
divided under two major headings:
- A.
- Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of the Department of
Defense, and
- B.
- Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of a Department or
Agency Other Than the Department of Defense.
[Here follow assignments of actions within the primary responsibility of
the Department of Defense.]
Attachment
PROGRAM ON THE MOVEMENT OF
SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
ONMARCH 8, 1963
A. Actions Within the Primary
Responsibility of the Department of Defense
- 1.
- Continue current U.S. sea and air surveillance of the
Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.
- 2.
- Continue the development, at high priority, of U.S.
communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting,
reporting and control capabilities.
- 3.
- Study, on a priority basis, the feasibility and desirability
of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and
Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and
dissemination to countries concerned, via the American
Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of
subversives.
- 4.
- Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system
involving:
- a.
- Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S.
forces.
- b.
- A U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence
of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to
the American Ambassadors
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to countries concerned (contingent
upon the decisions made as a result of the study under
A. 3, through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command
and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic
Command).
- c.
- A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by
each country in its own territorial waters.
- d.
- U.S. assistance in final interception in territorial
waters, upon request by the country concerned.
- 5.
- Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance
to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and
Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft,
and training and logistical support, to enable these countries
to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide
necessary funds in addition to present programs.
- 6.
- Provide U.S. Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training
assist-ance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol
capabilities of Latin American military forces. This may take
the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile
training teams, or a combination of both.
- 7.
- Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces
and police forces in Latin American countries and the
intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at
preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned
trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as
required.
B. Actions Within the Primary
Responsibility of a Department or Agency Other Than the
Department of Defense
- 1.
- Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to
identify persons who have travelled, or intend to travel, to
Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host
government, as consistent with our own intelligence program, and
the requirement to protect our sources.
- 2.
- Intensify our action in making available to each country
selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature and
implications of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with
the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.
- 3.
- Utilize U.S. intelligence capabilities to determine the nature
and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic
between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with
special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade
governments concerned to institute surveillance and other
control measures.
- 4.
- Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence
efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba,
and determine routes and methods employed. Report selected
information, consistent with
[Page 245]
the requirement for protecting our own
intelligence program to host government.
- 5.
- Intensify current efforts to introduce [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] from each
country into the Cuban training program.
- 6.
- Both through the OAS and
bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to:
- a.
- Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to
own nationals “not valid for travel to Cuba.”
- b.
- Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a
third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued
by his own country for travel to Cuba.
- c.
- Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an
integral, non-detachable part of the travel document
issued by the country of which the traveller is a
citizen.
- d.
- Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing
for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these
manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western
Hemisphere countries which are affected.
- 7.
- Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing,
all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide
data to the parent country of the nationals involved.
- 8.
- Make [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] arrangements [2 lines
of source text not declassified] to impose
administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious
Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of
travel and thus discourage prospective travellers.
- 9.
- Both through the OAS and
bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their
ports to ships of Cuban registry.
- 10.
- Pursue a campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban
training of the nationals of other countries for subversive
purposes, in order to discourage prospective trainees and
impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the
urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to
Cuba.
- 11.
- Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate
legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the
prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for
evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of
evaders.
- 12.
- In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate
the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate
OAS bodies, and bilaterally
among the several states, in the interchange of information
concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist
subversive activities.
- 13.
- Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of
ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the
implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of
subversives in the Caribbean.
- 14.
- Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately
and/or collectively with Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and
Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific
measures to prevent the movement through their countries of
third country personnel to and from Cuba.
- 15.
- Encourage Latin American governments to institute
administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of
manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection
and inspection of health and other documents, all designed
deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying
of passengers to Cuba.
- 16.
- Request governments of Latin American countries which persist
in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the
falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or
consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of
Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a
halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as requested.
- 17.
- Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in
improving immigration and customs controls.
- 18.
- Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to
do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of
Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on
technical grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since
the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into
disrepair.
- 19.
- Request again of Great Britain, Canada and any other potential
supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba’s
Britannia aircraft.
- 20.
- Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and
Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from
reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the
cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally
providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved,
such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.
- 21.
- Intensify [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] input of propaganda in Latin American
public information media discrediting the Cuban training effort,
exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American
tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone
subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers
and develop popular opposition to such activities.
- 22.
- Identify returned trainees who are dissatisfied with their
Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for
provision of intelligence and propaganda material for exposing
and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.
- 23.
- Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not
attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on
the use of
[Page 247]
Mexican,
Uruguayan, Brazilian and Chilean transit facilities for movement
of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive
purposes.
- 24.
- Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on
both the national and international levels, to control travel by
their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report
by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific
recommendations set forth herein.
- 25.
- Once the initial comprehensive program in 24 above is
undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through
such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of
experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services
of the Special Consultative Committee on Security.
