Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, February 27, 1963, 6:01 p.m.

1491. Joint State/AID/Defense message. Subject: Military Assistance for Internal Security in Latin America.

In connection with Presidential approval of the use of military assistance funds for internal security purposes in Latin America for FY 63, the Executive Branch has been directed to apply the most challenging scrutiny to the justification of items proposed to be provided to Latin American countries under the Military Assistance Program. In this connection, the following guidance shall control the development of Military Assistance Programs hereafter. All such programs shall be carefully tailored and constantly updated so that they are interrelated parts of our overall strategy aimed at development and security in the Hemisphere. They should be related to the concepts of approved Country Internal Defense Plans where such are in effect. The MAP program and the Alliance for Progress programs are mutually supporting elements of U.S. foreign policy. Internal security and civic action are the primary purposes of our Military Assistance Programs in Latin America. At all levels, both in the field and in Washington, the program development and review process must assure that the specific items furnished under MAP are appropriate to solving the key internal security problems to which our overall country planning is addressed. In this connection, it is clear that the internal security question is composed of political, military, and economic factors, which are closely interrelated. Specific evaluation of these factors is an integral part of the justification of any proposed Military Assistance Program, even when programs are politically motivated. The program justification must also, in addition to major item justification, set forth the interrelationship of the proposed program with other objectives of the U.S. in the country, so that program justification makes it apparent that the proposed program would strengthen and support the overall objectives of the U.S. in the country concerned, including the development of popularly-supported civilian governments and effective civil police authorities. In those cases wherein the communist threat or other local circumstances make it impossible to justify a full compatibility between the Military Assistance Program and the longer-range goal of encouraging the development of popularly supported civilian governments, the relevant and controlling facts should be expressly set forth.

Military elements as a political force in the country concerned may, in the U.S. national interest, require support because of this political consideration. To the extent that this is a factor in the formulation of Military Assistance Programs, it should be expressly analyzed and recognized in program submissions. In this connection, the current and desired role of each of the military services should be expressly analyzed, and the proposed levels of MAP support for each service should be specifically justified.

It is U.S. policy that the thrust of MAP programs to Latin America should be to cope with the internal rather than the external threat. This determination is based upon the evaluation of the immediacy of the respective threats, the necessity of the most careful marshalling of the resources of the United States and its Latin American allies, and in light of the role of the United States in Hemisphere defense. Internal security, as a justification for Military Assistance Programs in Latin America should not be used as a catchall justification for the continuation of military assistance which cannot be soundly justified as being related to the actual or potential internal security threat. Pressures for the continuation of programs at previously existing levels and composition cannot be accepted as automatic justification for the inclusion of items as internal security items. There is a continuing requirement to screen all MAP items against the full range of intelligence, political analysis, policy evaluation and other U.S. programs on a current basis. Thus, deviations from previously submitted programs could at any point in the programming cycle be directed in order to insure consonance of program composition with policy objectives.

Some specific points which require express justification are the following:

1. The inclusion of jet aircraft in Military Assistance Programs as items justified for internal security missions and training should be supported by express evaluation of both political and military considerations involved. The external as well as the internal implications of providing jet aircraft should be specifically discussed. In this connection, the regional interrelationship of country programs requires special comment by all levels above the Country Team level, in order to avoid the inclusion of items in country programs simply because they have been included in other country programs.

2. The interrelationship between MAP internal security programs and the current efforts of the U.S. to strengthen the roles and capabilities of civil police should be the subject of express consideration. There should be a notation of the correlation of missions between the military and police units of a country, and particularly those supported by the U.S., and the degree to which the internal security problem requires the support of complementary strength. The possibility of political elements in the country using military or police forces in struggle, one against the other, should be discussed. The projected level of MAP should expressly reflect a consciously measured balance between our military and police efforts in the internal security field, related to the concepts of approved Country Internal Defense Plans when such are in effect. On these issues, as well as on the whole subject of civic action programs, both the AID element and the political element of the Country Team will have important contributions to make.

3. It is U.S. policy that careful consideration be given to intensifying civil police programs wherever such action will yield more fruitful results in terms of our internal security objectives. While Military Assistance Programs and Police Assistance Programs should not be treated as being necessarily substitutional, Country Team evaluation in depth and judgment of the respective requirements is an essential part of the programming justification process.

4. It is the responsibility of all elements involved in the programming process to insure, by careful consideration and express evaluation of the factors concerned, that each Military Assistance Program submitted promotes internal security and stability. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission should insure that all related aspects of the internal security problem are evaluated and coordinated at all stages in the development of proposed programs, including not only submissions made in the annual programming cycle, but spot recommendations made from time to time.

In light of the foregoing, programs for FY 1965 and subsequent years should be accompanied by justifying statements clearly covering the foregoing points.

With respect to MAP programs for FY 1963, Missions are directed to review approved programs and promptly submit by March 25 any comment as to whether the delivery of any of the items included therein should be questioned. Specific comment is requested on the inclusion of jet aircraft in these programs.

With respect to FY 1964 programs, all Missions are requested to prepare and submit statements dealing with the points covered by this instruction, to reach Washington by March 25.

It shall be the continuing responsibility of Missions to be guided by the foregoing with respect to ongoing as well as future programs, bearing in mind the situation as it may develop in the country concerned and the continuing nature of military assistance programming.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-LAT AM. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Administrator for Politico-Military Affairs in the Agency for International Development Joseph J. Wolf; cleared by AID Administrator David E. Bell, Martin, Maechling, Enemark, and Dungan; approved by Wolf. Sent to 19 Embassies in the American Republics and CINCARIB.