Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

102. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85-4-62

Washington, November 9, 1962.

CASTRO’S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

The Problem

To describe and evaluate Castro’s capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commitment not to invade.

Note: In this estimate we have considered Castro’s raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.

Summary

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro’s efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro’s influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them.

B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro’s subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba.

C. We have examined how Castro’s subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro’s subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would maintain Castro’s potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets.

[Here follow the remainder of the estimate; Annex A, “Highlights of Cuban Subversive Activities in other Latin American Countries to Date” and Annex B, “Estimated Military Equipment in Cuba After Withdrawal of Strategic Missiles.”]

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Cuba, November-December 1962. Secret. A note on the title page indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on November 9 except the AEC representative, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.