Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

349. Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State⁰

Washington, June 20, 1963.

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH CASTRO

I. Background

The cardinal point of Castro’s foreign policy until the missile crisis was to bind Cuba tightly to the USSR as a means of ensuring the regime’s survival in the shadow of United States power—based on the proposition, as Cuba goes so goes world communism. Soviet refusal to rUN the quarantine and its acquiescence in withdrawing the missiles shook the foundation of Cuban foreign policy.

Since the missile crisis, Castro has indicated, sometimes vaguely, sometimes rather clearly, through various channels, public as well as private, that he is interested in an accommodation with the United States. His immediate disillusion over the Soviet missile crisis posture probably prompted him to grope for a policy which would diminish his depend-ence upon the Soviet Union, lessen his ties with the communist world and enable him to establish counter-balancing relations elsewhere. In casting about for some sort of new alignment, he may possibly have envisioned Cuba’s emergence as a neutralist state. (Given Castro’s temperament and ambition, any such neutralization would have to be dynamic and proselytizing rather than passive.) Although it is of course impossible to be certain, it would seem that Castro, at least in his early post-missile crisis flirtings with accommodation, was acting essentially in his own interest and may have been prepared to move further from the Bloc than the USSR, despite its general urging that Castro seek ways to reduce tensions, would have liked.

Castro’s Moscow visit re-cemented Cuban-Soviet relations, at least for some time. In his TV broadcast upon his return to Cuba, Castro left no doubt that he accepted Khrushchev’s leadership of a communist world that included Cuba, and he specifically and flatly rejected the possibility that he might stray. Whatever possibility may have existed immediately after the missile crisis that Castro might in fact adopt an independent and more neutralist policy has probably vanished under present circumstances. Viewed in this context, Castro’s latest gesture toward “normalcy” in United States-Cuban relations appears clearly to constitute a concerted Soviet-Cuban initiative, encouraged by the Soviets and fully consistent with the policy of “peaceful co-existence.”

Castro’s comments have not made clear what he envisages as the terms of such an action. Castro has indicated a willingness to negotiate concessions for expropriated properties, though his opening position is a rather onerous one, involving the use of Cuban receipts from the sale of sugar to the United States in excess of 3 million tons at 5.56#. He has implied that his subversive activities in Latin America would be no problem, but largely by denying that he is currently engaged in anything of the sort. He has made clear that nothing can change the fact that his regime is Communist and must continue to have the closest of political ties to the Soviet Union.

There have been indications from Soviet sources that Soviet military presence in Cuba could be removed if that is an obstacle.

The general tone of Castro’s discussion of this subject in his TV broadcast on his return from Moscow is that we need a settlement more than he does and therefore we should offer the concessions. In this connection he again mentions the abandonment of Guantanamo as one of the conditions he would affix to a reconciliation.

II. Motivation

It seems likely that the motives both for Castro and the Soviets in seeking some kind of an accommodation are both economic and political. Castro’s economy is not doing well, and he needs trade with the United States both as a market for sugar and source of supply for spare parts and equipment generally. He may even hope to get some United States technical aid to supplement that from the bloc with which he seems to have considerable dissatisfaction.

The Soviets probably wish to get some relaxation of the burden they are now carrying to keep the economy going at all. It would certainly cost them nothing not to have to buy Cuban sugar whatever the price.

It may be also that Castro retains some interest in such an accommodation in order to have more maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviets. From a long-term standpoint as well as in the incidents at the time of the missile crisis, an independent egoist such as Castro must find his dependence on the Soviets galling.

From a longer-term standpoint Castro and the Soviets may also feel that there will be a better opportunity to make Cuba more nearly a showcase of communism in the hemisphere rather than a glaring example of economic failure, if an accommodation with the United States is possible. Not only would economic benefits accrue but the respectability and prestige that Castro would derive from successful accommodation, which would be played as “victory over the United States,” would significantly advance both the Soviets and Castro toward their long range goals in the hemisphere. Support for the regime from within Cuba might well become wider and more active with an effect on economic prosperity as well as political attitudes.

III. Concessions

For any negotiation to have a prospect of success, we should probably have to agree to the following:

1. Stop overflights.

2. Stop giving support to Cubans who are attempting to overthrow the regime.

3. Pass legislation restoring a sugar quota to Cuba.

4. Take legislative action, and executive action in consultation with Congress, permitting trade with Cuba on at least as extensive a basis as the Soviet bloc.

5. Possibly seek to remove the strictures against Cuba and her activities in the hemisphere adopted in the Inter-American System and perhaps accept Cuba back into the OAS and its subordinate bodies.

6. Agree to continuation of political, economic and some international ties with the USSR.

In return it may be presumed that Cuba might agree to the following:

1. Send back Soviet personnel except for training missions in connection with Soviet military assistance programs of a type similar to those which accompany United States military assistance programs.

2. Halt Cuban assistance to subversion in Latin America.

3. Agree that Cuban armed forces will not be used outside of Cuba except in accordance with decisions of the Inter-American System.

4. Agree that the Soviets will not be permitted to use Cuba as a base for armed action.

5. Negotiate an agreement for some compensation for seized properties, presumably tied to the level of export earnings from sales of sugar to the United States.

IV. Conclusion

This is not an acceptable arrangement for the following reasons:

1. It would be an agreement with Castro and in no general sense with the regime as a whole or the people as a whole. It would fall with his fall. Even with his continuation, his word has too frequently been demonstrated as worthless to give us much long-term assurance of quiet in the Caribbean.

2. Without the political break with Moscow a precedent would be established for other communist regimes in the hemisphere and the whole effort to keep them out of this area and to establish its special status would fall to the ground. It could mean the death of the Inter-American System.

3. Since subversive activities in Latin America are to a very considerable extent covert anyway, there would be no effective means of ensuring that Castro had kept his word. Moreover, it would be all too simple for activities which he has been conducting to be shifted in large part to other bloc countries, who are already extensively engaged.

4. Approval of a communist regime would be a great encouragement to native communists in Latin America and would increase their power.

5. With the threat perhaps increased or at least substantially unchanged, there would inevitably be a major relaxation of anti-communist effort on the part of the Latin American countries since there has been so much focus on the threat of Cuba. The prospect of communist take-over would thus be enhanced.

6. It is exceedingly difficult to envisage this as a two stage operation with the second stage the elimination of communism or Castro. Any such compromise would enormously strengthen him with the Cuban people and make the regime less dependent on him personally than it has been. A communist regime in Cuba would be even more securely entrenched than it is now.

7. An essential component of the economic aspects is legislative action by the United States Congress. This must take place before Castro limits in any way his present dependence and close relations with the Soviet bloc. He cannot afford economically the possible gap. It is probably not feasible at any time, but particularly under these circumstances, to secure Congressional assent to the economic measures while Castro maintains his full present relationship with the bloc. The sugar legislation will be made particularly difficult by the need to deprive other friendly countries of sugar quotas and to assign a sugar quota before adequate assurances have been secured with respect to compensation for United States sugar property owners.

8. Any such settlement will cause serious problems of order within the United States so far as a couple hundred thousand Cuban exiles are concerned. They, and all parties of the right in Latin America, in many cases supported by Cuban exile groups, will denounce the United States for surrendering to communist pressure. Our posture in Latin America would be seriously prejudiced in important circles heretofore friendly to us.

9. The United States attitude toward communism and expropriation which such an accommodation would reflect and the encouragement to subversion in Latin America from this acceptance of a communist regime will completely dry up investment there as well as encourage capital flight. The success of the Alliance for Progress will become clearly impossible.

0. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba—1963. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum, Assistant Secretary Martin sent this paper to U. Alexis Johnson on June 20.