Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

348. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, June 19, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at the White House concerning Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

PRESENT

• Higher Authority
• Secretary McNamara
• Under Secretary Harriman
• Mr. McCone
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy
• Mr. Thomas Parrott
• Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
• Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General W.F. McKee

1. The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the NSC¹ was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest in proposed external sabotage operations. He was shown charts indicating typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages ensued. It was well recognized that there would be failures and a considerable noise level. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the program presented and made the point that, having made the decision to go ahead, we be prepared to take the consequences of flaps and criticisms for a sufficient period to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the program would be “reviewed weekly” by the Special Group. (It is believed that an arrangement can be made with Mr. Bundy for less detailed control by the Special Group than was indicated by Mr. Harriman.)

2. Higher Authority asked how soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher Authority said this was a matter for our judgment. Although at one stage in the discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program “this summer” it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do.²

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret. Prepared by FitzGerald.
1. See Document 346.
2. McCone added an addendum to this memorandum stating that he emphasized to the President “the importance and necessity for continuous operations,” and he also pointed out that the activities “would create quite a high noise level.”McCone also stated that the noise level “must be absorbed and not create a change in policy.” He concluded that “no single event would be conclusive.”