Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

347. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 85-63

Washington, June 14, 1963.

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

Conclusions

A. After a period marked by bitterness on Castro’s part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31-32, 41)

B. Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime’s leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro’s ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (Paras. 15, 42-43)

C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (Paras. 2, 5, 12-14, 35, 37)

D. With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (Para. 36)

E. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (Paras. 8, 12-14)

F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplatesan attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled “offensive” by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (Paras. 38-40)

G. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communique¹ held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro’s earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime’s exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (Paras. 46-48)

H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba’s special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (Paras. 49-51)

[Here follow a 13-page discussion section and an annex listing major Soviet military equipment in Cuba. See the Supplement for both.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to covering sheets this estimate was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 14. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency participated in its preparation. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred with it with the exception of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This NIE superseded NIE 85-2-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” August 1, 1962, and SNIE 85-3-62, “The Military Balance in Cuba,” September 19, 1962. For texts, see vol. X, Documents 363 and 433.
1. The Joint Soviet-Cuban Statement signed in Moscow by Castro and Khrushchev, May 23, 1963; for a partial text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 269-271.