Office of the Historian

350. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, June 22, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State re Discussion of Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

PRESENT

  • The Secretary of State
  • Under Secretary Harriman
  • Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
  • Director Hughes
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. FitzGerald
1.
The undersigned briefed the Secretary concerning the components and rationale of the program.
2.
The first specific item in the program to be discussed in detail was “autonomous operations.” It was explained that these operations would be based outside of the United States and that every trace of U.S. involvement in the program possible would be concealed. It was also pointed out that the concept of autonomous groups is open-ended and the purpose is to develop resistance capabilities inside Cuba. Any exile group having capabilities in the field of resistance could be included and supported. For instance, Manolo Ray and his JURE will be offered financial support within the next day. The Secretary stressed the need to document and publicize Castro’s subversive and terrorist operations in Latin America and to seize the opportunity to place raids against Cuba in the guise of retaliation for these acts on Castro’s part. It was pointed out that autonomous operations are particularly well designed to fit into this concept.
3.
There ensued a discussion of sabotage and harassment operations and their place within the program. It was stated that the hit and rUN operations, whether staged by autonomous groups or unilaterally by the Agency, are primarily designed to encourage resistance within Cuba which must in turn bear the main burden of coordinated and extensive sabotage. Commencing in mid-July the frequency of hit and rUN operations would be two to three per month with a probable average of two. The Secretary noted that the mid-July date for the commencement of these operations would coincide with Governor Harriman’s presence in Moscow.
4.
Mr. McCone stated that the program should be considered as an integrated and continuing thing which could not be put on a stop and go basis if it could be expected to achieve its goal. He stated that the Special Group would have the program under continuous review but would recognize the need to permit the program to flow forward as planned without requiring each operation to be justified in political and economic terms without regard to the total plan.
5.
Governor Harriman said that it was obvious that the Soviets have put their prestige on the line in Cuba and will undoubtedly deliver aid, both military and economic, on any scale deemed necessary. Governor Harriman said that this aspect of the matter should be kept under continuous scrutiny with the realization that these Soviet efforts may well affect the present program one way or the other.
6.
The Secretary pointed to certain signs of trouble in the Berlin area early next Fall. He said that this should be watched carefully as again Soviet actions in Berlin might influence and be influenced by the program under discussion.
7.
Mr. McCone asked the Secretary whether he favored the program. The Secretary replied that he did but that the only portion of it which gave him concern was the hit and rUN operations. He underlined [Page 844] the desirability to have these tied in some manner to retaliation against Castro’s actions in Latin America.
8.
The Secretary asked for views concerning the prospects of Castro’s reconciliation with the United States and his Latin American neighbors. He mentioned that Castro’s statements since his return from Moscow had appeared to be on the whole conciliatory. Mr. McCone said that he had read these statements of Castro’s as meaning that Castro was even more firmly tied to the Soviet Union and that any reconciliation with the U.S. would have to be on Castro’s and the Soviet Union’s terms. He said that he felt that any rapprochement on the part of the U.S. with Castro which retained Soviet troops in Cuba, maintained Cuba as a closed society and permitted no on-site inspection could not be acceptable to the U.S. He also pointed out that it would make Castro respectable in the eyes of Latin America without reducing Castro’s ambitions and pressures there. It was agreed however that we should continue to probe wherever possible to find out what Castro really has on his mind. The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba should be debriefed in detail and Donovan should be encouraged to return to Cuba if invited.
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret. The meeting was held on June 21 from 3:40 to approximately 4:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)↩